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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays in corporate finance. In the first essay, which is a joint
work with Lilian Ng and Yelena Larkin, we investigate how short-term institutional investors
gain informational advantage over other market participants. In particular, we examine the
information transmitted along the supply chain to test whether short-term investors are better
able to process public, yet slowly diffusing, information ahead of others. We find that greater
supplier dependence on a few major customers is associated with larger holdings by short-term
institutional investors, consistent with our hypothesis that short-term institutions value complex
public information. Further substantiating our findings, we show that the relation is stronger
when institutional investors have less alternative means of gaining informational advantages.
The impact of customer concentration on short-term investment decisions is more pronounced
for opaque firms and for periods following the passage of the Fair Disclosure Regulation. Our
results offer an explanation to the apparent contradicting evidence that short-term institutions
would prefer firms with more information disclosure even though these investors gain from
trading on their informational advantage over others.
The second essay, coauthored with Rui Dai and Lilian Ng, examines the strategic bad news
withholding of firms facing distinct dimensions of competition. We exploit the network of
customer-supplier relationships to distinguish the competitive threats posed by existing rivals
from those by potential competitors. In particular, suppliers of similar products are classified as
existing rivals if they serve the same corporate customers and as potential rivals otherwise. Our
analyses show that existing competition is positively related to stock price crash risk, a proxy
for the accumulation of undisclosed unfavorable information. Further investigation finds that
such relation is driven by increased proprietary costs of disclosing bad news to existing rivals,
corporate customers, and investors. In contrast, we find a negative relation between potential
competition and crash risk, indicating that firms facing threats from potential entrants disclose
unfavorable information to deter entry.
ii
In the third essay, using the 1977 amendment of the Clean Air Act nonattainment desig-
nations as an exogenous source of variations in county-wide environmental regulations, I find
that regulatory effects differ across firms facing varying degrees of competition. Firms in more
competitive product markets have stronger incentives to remain in regions with tightened regu-
lations and seek competitive advantages through green innovation and product differentiation.
Analyses in a triple-difference framework show that competition dampens regulatory effects on
plant closure decisions and alleviates their adverse impact on firm operating performance. I
also find that post-shock variations in firm performance are driven by increased green innovative
output, greater product differentiation, and better customer attraction and retention for more
competitive firms. My results show that competition plays an important role in firm responses to
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1. Short-Term Institutional Investors and the Diffusion of Sup-
ply Chain Information
1.1 Introduction
The role of institutional investors in US financial markets has increased dramatically over the
past three decades, receiving growing interests from researchers across different disciplines. Ex-
isting studies show that institutional investors play an important role in corporate governance,
financial policies, as well as investment and management decisions of their portfolio firms through
direct engagement, voting, and threats of exit (e.g., Aghion, van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013;
Fich, Harford, and Tian, 2015; McCahery, Sautner, and Starks, 2016; Harford, Kecskès, and
Mansi, 2017). Given the pivotal role of institutions in firm management, previous research has
attempted to shed light on how institutions make their investment decisions. This literature has
devoted particular attention to studying the information advantage of institutions (e.g., Bushee
and Noe, 2000; Ke and Petroni, 2004; Yan and Zhang, 2009).
Interestingly, while the literature seems to be in agreement that long-term investors are good
at gathering information about the fundamental value of a firm when making their investment
decisions, there is no similar consensus regarding the informational advantage of short-term
investors. On the one hand, Ke and Petroni and Yan and Zhang provide evidence that short-
term institutions possess better information-processing skills at predicting future earnings than
do long-term investors and hence, can achieve superior returns. On the other hand, Bushee
and Noe show that compared to long-term investors with information-gathering capabilities,
short-term institutions implement strategies that benefit from better disclosure of information.
Thus, it remains unclear whether trading gains of short-term institutions are derived from im-
plementing strategies that rely on enhanced transparency and more information disclosure, or
from exploiting their information-processing advantage.
In this paper, we offer a way to reconcile these competing views in the literature by argu-
ing that one key advantage of short-term institutional investors lies in their ability to process
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publicly disclosed, while potentially complex, information, but nevertheless is overlooked by the
general public. The existing literature shows that relevant information that is complex to pro-
cess, such as soft information (Engelberg, 2008), information on economically-related entities,
including suppliers and customers (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Menzly and Ozbaz, 2010), sub-
sidiary industries (Cohen and Lou, 2012), and foreign divisions (Huang, 2015) is incorporated
into stock prices slowly and generates return predictability. If short-term investors are good at
processing complex public information in advance of the less sophisticated market participants
and then are able to act upon it, they can generate superior returns without the need to invest
in costly collection of private information.
To empirically examine this question, we look at information transfers along customer-
supplier links. Focusing on firms with large customers provides a particularly suitable labora-
tory to test our predictions. First, given that customers and suppliers are economically linked,
knowledge of major customers is informative of the firms’ future performance. At the same time,
any customer-related information, although publicly available, is not transmitted through the
supply chain instantaneously and is often overlooked by investors, especially the less informed
ones (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Menzly and Ozbaz, 2010). Second, while customer-supplier
relations tend to be persistent over time, changes in customer concentration are nevertheless
more frequent than opening/closing of inter-industry and multinational divisions.1 Third, as
will be elaborated below, supply-chain information setting allows us to tease out changes in cus-
tomer concentration that are plausibly exogenous to firm fundamentals, and therefore, address
endogeneity concerns.
We conjecture that a firm’s disclosure of its major customers should affect short-term in-
vestors more than long-term investors, and empirically test this prediction by examining whether
customer clientele shapes a firm’s short-term investor clientele. If short-term institutions value
public, but difficult to process, information more compared to other market participants, cus-
1In untabulated analysis of our sample, we find that 52.49% of suppliers add or drop a customer in a given
year. As opposed to that, only 22.89% of firms in the same sample add or drop an industry segment (defined
based on 2-digit SIC) in a given year.
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tomer concentration should attract short-term institutional investors. On the other hand, cus-
tomer concentration should have little or no impact on long-term investors, who generally have
more access to private information than short-term investors and are less interested in exploit-
ing short-lived informational advantages (e.g., Porter, 1992; Bushee and Noe, 2000; Boone and
White, 2015).
Our study begins by examining how customer clientele affects investor ownership struc-
ture on a sample of 46,099 firm-year observations for the 1980-2015 period. We identify firms
that report major customers in Compustat Customer Segment Files and employ information of
13F institutional holdings to determine their investment horizon in these firms. Our baseline
evidence shows that only short-term institutional investors are attracted to firms with large cus-
tomer concentration, and that the relation is economically significant. An increase in customer
concentration in the magnitude of its interquartile range (75th minus 25th percentile) attracts
approximately 11% of additional institutional holdings relative to the median short-term insti-
tution ownership. At the same time, long-term investors do not exhibit any preference towards
firms with high customer concentration. Both findings are robust to a battery of alternative
definitions of customer concentration and alternative classifications of institutional investors.
It is possible that the baseline results are subject to endogeneity issues. For instance, the
observed relationship may be attributed to omitted variables that are related to both customer
concentration and institutional holdings. It is also likely that institutions actively affect man-
agerial decisions, and that their intervention impacts customer concentration. To mitigate these
concerns, we conduct three instrumental variable (IV) analyses. In our first approach, we con-
struct an instrumental variable using M&A activity in the customer industry, following Campello
and Gao (2017). High M&A activity increases the customer concentration for a given supplier,
as suppliers face a more concentrated distribution of customers following the mergers. Since
our specifications also include supplier industry-year fixed effects, this IV is orthogonal to the
M&A activity of the supplier, and is unlikely to affect the institutional holdings of the sup-
plier through alternative channels, such as propagation of merger waves across industries. In
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an alternative approach, we follow Gutierrez and Philippon (2017) and use the regulation index
in the customer industry as an instrument. This approach relies on the notion that increased
regulations generate barriers to entry and benefit larger firms, shifting the distribution of cus-
tomer industry incumbents towards a small number of sizable firms. Once again, the inclusion
of supplier industry-year fixed effects accounts for the possibility that some government regula-
tions could affect supplier and customer industries simultaneously. In our final test, we follow
Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh (2016) and instrument customer concentration using the
lagged industry average concentration in the supplier’s industry. We find that our IV results are
consistent with the baseline evidence, primarily among short-term investors.
Next, we provide evidence in support of public information transfer as the channel through
which customer concentration attracts institutional ownership. To gauge this channel, we start
by evaluating the overall information environment in which institutions operate by considering
the role of Fair Disclosure (FD) Regulation. FD Regulation, implemented in year 2000, prohib-
ited selective disclosure of material information to a small group of investors (typically analysts
and some institutions) without making it publicly available. Ke, Petroni, and Yu (2008) show
that short-term investors are particularly affected by the reform and have changed their trad-
ing behavior. As a result, if the private information advantage of short-term institutions has
declined following the reform, the information value of supply chains should, in turn, increase.
Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the impact of customer concentration on short-term
institutional holdings has become more pronounced following the FD Regulation.
To further substantiate the information channel, we examine whether the information en-
vironment of the concentrated firms affects institutional holdings decisions. If institutional
preference for customer-concentrated firms is driven by the information transfer channel, we
would expect this transfer to be slower among more opaque firms, generating better investment
opportunities for short-term investors. To perform this analysis, we split the sample into trans-
parent and opaque firms using the forecast error as a proxy for information asymmetry. We find
that institutional investors are primarily attracted to firms with high customer concentration
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when information asymmetry is high, confirming our argument.
Our final test looks at short sellers – another type of sophisticated investors who have superior
information processing skills (see, Reed, 2013). Short sellers can be viewed as a special type
of short-term investors with a primary focus on short, rather than long positions, and whose
trades are based on speculative motives and short-lived information advantage (Reed, 2013).
We examine the intensity of short sellers’ trading activities, as proxied by the fluctuations in the
number of open short positions over time. We expect that, similar to short-term institutional
investors with long positions, short sellers can also capitalize on the customer information before
it is impounded into the supplier’s stock price. Thus, if gradual transfer of public information
is the channel underlying our main findings, we should find short sellers to trade more actively
in firms with larger customer concentration. Our cross-sectional results, as well as the IV’s, are
consistent with the prediction that short interest dispersion is greater among firms with large
customer concentration, further lending support to the information mechanism.
Finally, we address alternative explanations of our findings. The first explanation we consider
is that short-term investors prefer firms with customer concentration due to their risk-return
profile. Existing literature has shown that concentrated customer base improves operating effi-
ciency, increases economies of scale, and enhances profitability (Patatoukas, 2012; Irvine, Park,
and Yildizhan, 2016). At the same time, firms’ dependence on a few major customers increases
their risk profile, leading to higher costs of equity and debt capital (Dhaliwal et al., 2016;
Campello and Gao, 2017). If short-term investors are less risk-averse than long-term institutions
are, then they may be attracted to higher profitability of firms with customer concentration, and
also be willing to bear additional risk, associated with such investment. We address this issue
in two ways. First, we include controls for both risk and stock performance in all of our specifi-
cations. Second, we repeat our main analysis by looking at subsample of firms with government
as the major customer. Dhaliwal et al. (2016) demonstrate that government suppliers are less
risky, and at the same time, less profitable than corporate suppliers. If risk-return preference
explanation is at work, we should find that short-term investors exhibit lower preference towards
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firms with government customers compared to suppliers of corporate customers. Our results in-
dicate that this is not the case. The effect of government customer concentration on short-term
holdings is statistically significant and is similar in magnitude to the impact of large corporate
customer base. This finding reinforces the notion that short-term investors are attracted to the
informational feature of concentrated firms, rather than their risk-return profile.
We also examine whether the positive effects of customer concentration on short-term insti-
tutional ownership are driven by cross-ownership in both the supplier and customer firms. Firms
with stronger customer-supplier links may attract common ownership for non-informational rea-
sons, and disentangling the motivations behind common investors can be challenging. To address
this issue, we reestimate our baseline regression for supplier’s shares owned by institutional in-
vestors that do not simultaneously own any of the linked customers. We find that the positive
effects of customer concentration on short-term institutional ownership remain even after ex-
cluding institutional cross-ownership, indicating that other mechanisms, potentially driving the
common ownership, cannot fully explain our main findings.
Overall, our research sheds light on the sources of trading strategies of short-term investors.
Existing literature demonstrates that short-term investors value short-term investment strategies
of firms (e.g., Krueger, Sautner, and Starks, 2018). However, there is still scant information
about the selection process that short-term institutions implement in their decision-making
beyond standard firm characteristics, such as size, book-to-market ratios, past stock performance
and liquidity (Bushee and Noe, 2000; Bushee, 2001, 2004; Gompers and Metrick, 2001). Our
work expands the extant literature by showing that product market characteristics play a crucial
role in portfolio management decisions of short-term institutional investors. Motivated by this
strand of research, our study explores whether institutions with different investment horizons
are attracted to firms with concentrated customers.
Our work introduces a channel through which customer concentration affects investor clien-
tele of supplier firms. Although the main purpose of the Statement of Financial Accounting
System (SFAS) disclosure was to benefit and protect investors, little research has been done
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to examine whether a firm’s improved information environment through disclosure of major
customers has affected market participants to the same extent. Ellis, Fee, and Thomas (2012)
demonstrate the downsides of customer voluntary disclosure due to strategic responses of com-
petitors. In contrast, our research focuses on mandatory, rather than voluntary, disclosure of
customer information and outlines the benefits of revealing such information to certain groups
of investors.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides literature review hy-
pothesis development; Section 1.3 describes the databases used in this study and summarizes
the sample’s descriptive statistics. Section 1.4 discusses the main results, and Section 1.5 ad-
dresses endogeneity tests. In Section 1.6, we offer evidence supporting the role of transparency
as a potential mechanism, and Section 1.7 addresses alternative explanations, followed by the
conclusion in the final section.
1.2 Related literature and key hypothesis
A large body of literature shows that institutions with different investment horizons differ in
their abilities and resources to acquire private information. Prior studies mostly agree that
long-term institutional investors, who hold large and stable ownership positions, have both the
incentives and the abilities to invest in gathering private information about the firms they own
(e.g., Porter, 1992; Bushee and Noe, 2000; Callen, Livnat, and Segal, 2006; Boone and White,
2015). Bushee and Noe examine the annual rankings of firm disclosure practices, as published by
the Association for Investment and Management Research, and find little association between
firm transparency levels and the long-term institutions’ investment decisions. Their evidence
lends support to the notion that long-term investors find public disclosures by firms less impor-
tant for their monitoring and valuation purposes given their reliance on the private information.
Complementary to the earlier study, Boone and White show that higher institutional ownership
by long-term investors have no significant influence on the propensity for firms to provide vol-
untary disclosure via management forecasts and 8-K filings. Their study indicates that greater
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long-term institutional investor presence does not affect the demand for public information pro-
duction. Instead of examining the relationship of long-term institutional ownership and a firm’s
overall level of transparency, Callen et al. investigate long-term investors’ demand for public
information in a more direct manner. The authors examine to what extent the long-term insti-
tutional investors would find public release of information via SEC filings relevant in revising
their prior beliefs in firm performance. They find that these investors tend to gather private
information prior to SEC filings, suggesting that such public disclosures are less value-relevant
for them.
However, research on whether short-term investors exploit informational benefits in their
investment strategies, provides mixed evidence. One strand of literature argues that short-term
institutional investors possess superior private information and trade on it. For example, Ke and
Petroni (2004) find abnormal stock selling by short-term investors can predict bad news earnings
that follow a string of good news earnings. Hu, Ke, and Yu (2009) and Yan and Zhang (2009) also
show that short-term institutions’ trading forecasts future stock returns. Such predictive ability
of the short-term institutional investors is consistent with the notion that these investors have
access to and are able to exploit private pre-disclosed information. This argument is further
accentuated by Ke et al., (2008) follow-up study and the work by Li, Radhakrishnan, Shin,
and Zhang (2011). Ke et al. show that the ability for short-term investors to predict future
bad news earnings diminishes after Reg-FD, a reform that restricts access of selected groups of
market participants, such as analysts and institutions, to information that has yet released to
the general public. Similarly, Li et al. provide evidence that short-term institutional investors
sell stocks prior to the publicly announced financial restatements, but such abnormal selling
decreases after Reg-FD. A more recent study by Maffett (2012) focuses on the relationship
between institutional trading and firms’ public information reporting, and argues that investors
derive higher profits from private information in opaque information environment. He finds that
short-term institutional investors trade more in firms with opaque public financial reporting,
supporting the private information argument.
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On the other hand, a different strand of research provides evidence that rebuts the private
information trading argument in support of the notion that short-term institutional investors
favor more transparent firms to minimize their information gathering efforts. First, Bushee
and Goodman (2007) argue that the predictive ability of short-term investors to forecast future
earnings does not necessarily imply trading on private information. The authors find that while
trading by short-term investors is predictive of future firm performance, it is also positively
related to the past and current performance. Such results are more consistent with momentum
trading than trading on private information. Second, a number of prior studies show a positive
association between short-term institutional ownership and firm transparency. Bushee and Noe
(2000) and White (2013) suggest that short-term institutions prefer firms with more forthcoming
disclosure practices and less accounting discretion. Short-term investors are also attracted to
firms with less information asymmetry as characterized by greater analyst coverage and more
accurate analyst earnings forecasts (Chan, Zhang, and Zhang, 2013; Mintchik, Wang, and Zhang,
2014). Moreover, greater presence of short-term investors is associated with increased propensity
for firms to provide voluntary disclosure via more timely and precise management forecasts.
Boone and White (2015) attribute this relationship to the investors’ demand for greater firm
transparency. Third, by documenting that the information content of SEC filings is more value-
relevant for short-term investors, Callen et al. (2006) suggest that, compared to long-term
investors, short-term investors are less likely to collect additional information to assess firm
performance before the firms’ SEC filings.
Given the mixed results from prior literature, to what extent the short-term institutional
investors are informed remains an open question. On the one hand, these investors possess supe-
rior information about future firm performance. On the other hand, these investors appear to be
attracted to firms with more publicly available information. Our study offers a way to reconcile
some of the disagreement in the literature by suggesting that these two seemingly contradicting
views are not always mutually exclusive. Aside from acquisition of private information, sophis-
ticated investors can also gain informational advantage through superior ability to interpret the
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implications of public information (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Fischer and Verrecchia, 1999;
Choi and Sias, 2012). We posit that short-term investors are one such type of sophisticated
investors and can take advantage of the publicly available information that may be difficult to
process by other market participants.
The supply chain information provides an appropriate setting to test our prediction. First,
customers and suppliers are economically linked (e.g. Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers, 2008;
Kolay, Lemmon, and Tashjian, 2016) so that public disclosure of a firm’s customer base al-
lows investors to evaluate the supplier’s performance and inherent business risk. The stronger
the economic link, the more information the customers reveal about the suppliers. Hence,
firms with greater dependence on major customers should be more transparent. Second, while
customer-related information is publicly available, it is not transmitted through the supply chain
instantaneously and is often overlooked by investors. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) and Menzly
and Ozbas (2010) document significant cross-predictability of customer returns on future sup-
plier returns. Thus, this setting captures the slow diffusion of public information, and investors
with superior ability to learn from public signals should take advantage of it. We predict that
short-term institutional investors prefer firms with greater dependence on its major customers.
Short-term investors may be limited in resources and time to gather private information, but
as sophisticated investors, they can process and exploit the customer-related information for
temporary information advantage before such information is fully incorporated. Motivated by
short-term trading strategies and high portfolio turnover, the short-term institutional investors
would trade on their information advantage and realize such trading gains fairly quickly (Bushee
and Noe, 2000). Although short-term institutional investors do not invest in gathering informa-
tion about a firm in a way that long-term investors do, they nevertheless may take advantage
of publicly-available information that may be difficult to process by other market participants.2
Hence, this group of investors can benefit from trading on the slow incorporation of supply chain
information into the firm’s stock price. The greater the customer concentration, the greater is
2Existing studies have shown that information is not transmitted instantaneously along the supply chain and
that customer returns have predictive power for supplier future returns (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Menzly and
Ozbaz, 2010).
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the potential informational advantage these investors can gain from leveraging on the customer
information. In contrast, we expect that long-term institutional investors are not attracted to
firms with higher customer concentration. Given their own private information-gathering ca-
pabilities, long-term investors would find public customer-related information a less important
source of informational advantage. The above discussion leads to the following hypotheses:
HYPOTHESIS 1a: The short-term institutional ownership is positively related to the firm’s
customer concentration.
HYPOTHESIS 1b: The long-term institutional ownership is not significantly related to the
firm’s customer concentration.
1.3 Sample selection and empirical methodology
SFAS Nos. 14 and 131 of Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) require public firms
to disclose sales derived from all major customers, who account for at least 10% of the firms’
total revenue. We obtain this information from Compustat Customer Segment Files. Besides
customer names and sales information, the database also provides information on whether a
customer is a government entity or a corporation. For the purpose of our analysis, we focus
on corporate customers only.3 Information transfer channel posits that short-term institutions
should pay attention to publicly available, rather than privately collected, information. There-
fore, the channel is at work when investors know the identity of the customers and can obtain
information about their performance. To ensure that we focus on information transfer of pub-
licly available knowledge, we further restrict our analysis to those corporate customers whose
names are disclosed and can be matched to Compustat. The database reports customer names
without any unique identifiers, so we identify customers by manually matching each customer’s
name to a firm’s name in Compustat Fundamentals Annual Files to obtain the customer’s gvkey
3We exclude government customers from our main analysis as previous studies show that government-
dependent suppliers are subject to stricter information requirements (Samuels, 2016) and exhibit different be-
haviors from otherwise similar firms (i.e., lower capital investment, R&D expenditure, and sales growth) (Cohen
and Malloy, 2016). We examine the role of government customers separately in Section 6.
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code.4 While not required by the regulations, firms sometimes voluntarily report customers
that account for less than 10% of their total sales. To reduce the self-selection bias associated
with firms’ decisions to disclose non-major customers, we restrict our sample to include only
supplier firms that have at least one major corporate customer accounting for at least 10% of
its supplier’s total sales.
We construct our main sample by merging the suppliers that have concentrated customer
base with the quarterly institutional holdings obtained from Thomson Reuters Institutional
Holdings (13f) database, monthly stock returns from CRSP, and annual financial statement
data from Compustat. We restrict our sample to firm-year observations with non-missing values
for our main variables of interest and exclude all financial and regulated utility firms (SIC codes
4900-4999 and 6000-6999). This yields a final sample of 7,570 unique supplier firms and 46,099
firm-year observations for the 1980-2015 period.5
1.3.1 Measures of customer concentration
Firms across supply chains are economically linked; hence, a shock to major customers would
have an economic impact on suppliers. As a result, customer concentration allows us to measure
a firm’s dependence on the business relationships with its major customers, thereby capturing
the strength of such economic links. Following previous studies (Patatoukas, 2012; Irvine et al.,
2016; Dhaliwal et al., 2016; Campello and Gao, 2017), we choose the following three measures
to capture the extent of a firm’s customer base concentration.
The first measure is the sum of sales to all major customers of a supplier, scaled by the total







where Salesi,t represents the total sales of supplier i in year t, Salesi,c,t represents supplier i’s
sales to its major customer c in year t, and k is the number of major customers that supplier i
4We implement the Levenshtein distance and Phonetic matching algorithms for the name-matching process
and manually check every matched pair to ensure accuracy.
5The sample period is bounded by the data availability of Thomson Reuters 13f database, which starts its
coverage in 1980.
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has in year t. The more the supplier sells to its major customers, the more concentrated is its
customer base, so a higher Customer Sales captures a greater customer concentration.
The second measure is a modification of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), applied to










Compared to the first measure, Customer HHI puts more weight on the larger share of sales.
In the third measure, we focus on the largest share of total sales. It is the share of sales to







It is important to stress that the measures of customer concentration tend to exhibit little
variation over time. The stability characteristic may, in turn, masks the effects of customer
concentration when firm-fixed effects are incorporated into the model. As a result, we follow
existing studies (e.g., Patatoukas, 2012; Irvine et al., 2016; Dwaliwal et al., 2016) by includ-
ing industry-level fixed effects. However, we depart from these studies by including interacted
industry-year fixed effects, as opposed to including just a vector of industry-fixed effects and
a vector of year-fixed effects. This refined matrix of industry-time controls absorbs transient
industry-specific shocks and eliminates a large number of alternative explanations. Neverther-
less, we address the issues of endogeneity more rigorously in Section 1.4, where we perform a
battery of IV tests.
1.3.2 Measures of institutional clientele
Following the discussion of the previous sections, we investigate the ownership decisions of
short- and long-term institutional investors separately, because they exhibit different preferences
for publicly disclosed information (Bushee and Noe, 2000). While long-term investors, who
are better at gathering private information, find public information to be less important, we
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argue that short-term investors tend to invest more heavily in firms with public, but slow to
disseminate, information to realize trading gains. Empirically, we define short-term and long-
term institutional investors based on their portfolio turnover. Following Gaspar, Massa, and
Matos (2005), for every institutional investor we calculate the quarterly churn rate to measure
how frequently institutional investors rotate their portfolio stock holdings over a quarter. The








where Q is a set of stocks investor i held in quarter t− 1 and t, Ni,j,t is the number of shares of
stock j held by investor i in quarter t, Pj,t is the price of stock j in quarter t, and ∆Pj,t is the
change in stock j’s price from quarter t− 1 to t.
Following Yan and Zhang (2009), we sort all institutions, in each quarter, into terciles based
on their average equity portfolio churn rates over the last four quarters. Institutions in the top
tercile are defined as short-term institutions, while those in the bottom tercile are defined as
long-term institutions. We then match the horizon classification of institutions with institutional
holdings at the end of the quarter to define institutional holdings by different institutional type.
Quarterly short-term (long-term) ownership is the number of shares owned by all short-term
(long-term) institutions divided by the number of shares outstanding. For all tests, we match
all financial variables, including customer concentration, with the institutional ownership one
quarter after the fiscal year-end to ensure that the most recent financial information is available
to institutional investors.
Portfolio turnover features of each group of institutions are as follows. The short-term
institutions (i.e., those in the top tercile), hold a stock in their portfolios for an average period
of around 5 months, while their long-term counterparts (i.e., those in the bottom tercile) tend
to hold a stock for an average period of over three years long (about 39 months). The large
difference in the investment horizon becomes a desirable property when it comes to examining
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the information channel, as the heterogeneities in short-term and long-term investors allow us
to capture how differently the two types of investors capitalize on the supply chain information.
1.3.3 Summary statistics
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics of our main sample. On average, short-term insti-
tutional investors hold about 5% of the supplier’s total shares outstanding, while long-term
institutional investors hold about 17%; the remainder is driven by investors with intermediate
investment horizon. Customer-concentrated suppliers, on average, have business relationships
with two major customers, with an interquartile range from one to two major customers. The
average percentage of sales to all major customers is 40% with about 29% attributed to the
largest customer. Hence, for an average firm, the customer base is dominated by its largest
customer. The average customer HHI index is approximately 0.14.
The suppliers have an average firm size, as measured by market capitalization, of $117 million
(log value of 4.8) and an interquartile range from $24 million (log value of 3.18) to $504 million
(log value of 6.22). The average age is 12 years (log(12) = 2.50), with interquartile range from
7 (log value of 1.95) to 21 years (log value of 3.05). The Tobin’s Q averages at 2.05, with
interquartile range from 1.05 to 2.27. The suppliers’ stocks are, on average, priced at $7.30 (log
value of 1.99) with dividend yield of about 1%, stock volatility of about 16%, and turnover of
approximately 13%.
Table 1.2 reports pairwise correlations of firm-specific variables included in our analysis.
Both short- and long-term institutional ownership across all investment horizons are positively
correlated with firm size, age, stock price, and turnover, and are negatively correlated with stock
volatility (columns 1-2), indicating that institutional investors share common preferences in some
firm characteristics. However, long- and short-term investors also appear to have heterogeneous
preferences for other characteristics, as suggested by their correlations with dividend yield, his-
torical returns, and Tobin’s Q. While short-term ownership has close to zero correlation with
dividend yield and positive correlation with Tobin’s Q and historical returns, long-term owner-
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ship is positively correlated with dividend and negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q. Short-term
institutional ownership is has overall positive, but economically low correlation with customer
concentration, whereas long-term investors shy away from stocks with high customer concen-
tration, as evident from negative correlation coefficients. Since customer concentration is also
correlated with other firm characteristics, such as Tobin’s Q, price and volatility, a multivariate
analysis is required for a proper evaluation of links between institutional and customer clientele.
We turn to regression analysis in the next section.
1.4 Customer concentration and investor clientele
1.4.1 Effects of customer concentration on investor clientele
To assess how customer concentration attracts institutional investors of different investment
horizons, we estimate the following panel regression model:
Inst%i,t = α0 + α1Customer Concentrationi,t + Σ
K
k=1βkXki,t + εi,t, (1.5)
where Inst%i,t is short-term (ST%) or long-term institutional ownership (LT%), and Customer
Concentrationi,t is one of the three measures for customer base concentration defined in Section
1.2 – Customer Sales, Customer HHI, and Largest Customer. Xki,t is a set of firm characteristics
that have previously been shown to affect institutional ownership. Following Gompers and
Metrick (2001) and Yan and Zhang (2009), we include Tobin’s Q, firm size, age, dividend yield,
stock volatility, stock turnover, the log of stock price, and historical stock returns over the
previous year as our controls. All regressions include industry-year interacted fixed effects that
control for unmodeled heterogeneity across industry-years. Standard errors are clustered by firm
and year. A detailed definition of all variables is provided in Appendix Table A.1.
Table 1.3 presents results of the baseline model (1.5), where short- and long-term institutional
ownership are separately regressed on each of three different measures of customer concentration,
while controlling for firm-specific variables as well as industry-year fixed effects. We find that
the coefficient of each customer concentration measure is positive and statistically significant at
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the 5% level. For example, an interquartile-range (from 25th to 75th percentile) increase in a
firm’s total sales to major customers yields an 11% increase in short-term institutional ownership
relative to the sample median short-term holding (column (1)). At the same time, the impact
of concentration on long-term ownership is statistically insignificant and economically small: an
interquartile change in total sales is associated with only a 2% increase in long-term institutional
ownership (column (2)) relative to the sample median. These results support our hypothesis that
short-term institutional investors have strong preference for firms with concentrated customer
base, potentially due to greater firm transparency brought by more precise information flow
from customers to suppliers.
The coefficients on control variables are consistent with prior studies on institutional prefer-
ence (Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Yan and Zhang, 2009). Institutional investors, both short-
and long-term, exhibit preferences for stocks with larger market capitalization, higher turnover,
higher price, lower volatility, lower Tobin’s Q, as well as lower dividend yield (Grinstein and
Michaely, 2005). However, we also observe that short- and long-term institutional investors
have different preferences for some firm characteristics. For instance, short-term institutions
tend to invest in younger firms, as suggested by the age coefficient of -0.003, while long-term
institutions invest more in older firms with a larger and positive age coefficient of 0.033. The
preferences for past stock returns are also different for the two groups of institutions. Short-term
institutional investors are momentum traders and prefer stocks with high past returns, whereas
long-term institutional investors seem to invest in underperforming firms, and hold stocks with
low past returns.
Taken together, the results indicate that short-term institutional investors are more attracted
to firms with higher customer concentration, whereas long-term institutions do not exhibit any
preference towards such firms. This evidence is consistent with our main hypothesis that short-
term institutional investors prefer firms that are more transparent due to disclosure of customer
links.
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1.4.2 Alternative investor ownership definitions
Our main analysis relies on the implicit assumption that institutional investors are completely
unconstrained in their portfolio allocation decisions. However, many institutions hold a large
portion of their investments in indexed positions that, in turn, limits their ability to make
active investment decisions. Therefore, one concern for baseline analysis is that the relationship
between customer concentration and institutional ownership may be driven by confounding
variables that increase the probability of supplier firms to be included in the major stock indices,
which would in turn also increase the holdings by passive institutions. To address this issue, our
first robustness check examines whether our findings hold after excluding the passive investors.
Following Bushee (1998 and 2001), we classify investors into three groups: (i) the short-
term-focused “transient” institutions, characterized as having high portfolio turnover and di-
versified portfolio holdings; (ii) the long-term-focused “dedicated” institutions, characterized
as having extremely low portfolio turnover and more concentrated portfolio holdings; and (iii)
“quasi-indexer” institutions, characterized as having passive portfolios that closely benchmark
an index.6 We exclude quasi-indexers from the sample of institutions, and re-estimate the main
regressions using the percentage of ownership by the transient (dedicated) investors as an al-
ternative proxy for short-term (long-term) institutional ownership as our dependent variables
(variables Tran% and Dedi%, respectively).
Columns (7)-(12) of Table 1.3 present the regression results based on the alternative mea-
sures of short-term and long-term institutional ownership. Consistent with the results reported
in columns (1)-(6), the coefficients on the short-term institutional ownership (Tran%) are all
statistically and significantly positive at conventional levels, but the coefficients on the long-
term ownership (Dedi%) are not. The Tran% coefficients are also economically significant. For
example, in column (7), an increase in total sales to major customers by its interquartile range
is associated with an 11% increase in transient institutional ownership relative to the sample
6We obtain Bushee’s (1998 and 2001) institutional investor classification data from Brian Bushee’s website.
See http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html.
18
median. Overall, the implication is that firms with customer concentration base tend to attract
short-term, but not long-term institutional ownership, and the evidence is not driven by the
presence of passive investors.
1.5 Identification strategies
While our baseline results point to an economically and statistically significant relationship be-
tween a firm’s customer concentration and its institutional ownership, causal inferences drawn
from this relationship are subject to endogeneity concerns. For example, it is unclear whether
firms with concentrated customer base attract institutional investors, or firms actively pursue
large customers under the pressure of institutional shareholders. Moreover, there may be con-
founding variables that simultaneously affect both institutional ownership and customer con-
centration, hence driving the observed relationship. To alleviate these endogeneity concerns,
we conduct three sets of instrumental variable (IV) analyses to exploit exogenous variations in
customer base concentration.
1.5.1 Customer industry M&A intensity
In our first identification strategy, we follow Campello and Gao (2017) and use the intensity
of merger and acquisition (M&A) activities in customer industries as a source of exogenous
variation in customer concentration. M&A between two existing customers would mechani-
cally increase the supplier’s customer concentration through the consolidation of purchasing
accountings. Furthermore, prior studies document that horizonal mergers of customers with
other firms in the same industry lead to a more concentrated distribution of customers (e.g.,
Fee and Thomas, 2004; Bhattacharyya and Nain, 2011; Campello and Gao, 2017). Thus, the
suppliers that retain the customers post-merger would gain significant growth in sales from the
combined purchases of those customers and the firms they merged with, thereby increasing cus-
tomer concentration. Campello and Gao (2017) find that the average sales of a supplier to an
acquirer doubled the pre-merger level in five years after the merger. Therefore, we expect that
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higher M&A intensity in customer industries would induce a more concentrated customer base
for suppliers, thereby satisfying the relevance condition.
We also expect the identification strategy to satisfy the exclusion restriction. Since the M&A
activity of the customer’s industry is likely independent of the corporate decisions of suppliers,
it is reasonable to assert that such M&A activity should only affect the institutional ownership
of the suppliers through its effects on customer concentration. One possible concern with the
instrument is that merger waves could have contagion effects through customer and supplier
networks, and that our IV implicitly captures the M&A activity in the supplier industry. While
plausible, this argument of M&A propagation along the supply chain is less critical in our setting;
Ahern and Harford (2014) show that the effect of supplier industry consolidation on customer
M&A activity is much larger than the impact of customer consolidation on supplier industry.
Nevertheless, to address all remaining concerns and to remove any unobserved industry-wide
effect of the suppliers that may contaminate the exclusion restriction, we control for the suppliers’
industry-year fixed effects in the IV analysis.
Our empirical procedure is based on a two-stage least-squares estimation. In the first stage,
we regress a supplier’s customer concentration on the M&A intensity of its customer’s industry.
The second stage tests the effect of instrumented customer concentration on institutional own-
ership. Formally, we estimate the following two-stage model:
Customer Concentrationi,t = γ0 + γ1Customer Industry M&Ai,t + Σ
K
k=1λkXki,t + ηi,t




where Customer Industry M&Ai,t represents the average industry M&A intensity across indus-
tries to which supplier i’s major customers belong, and all other variables are defined above. We
obtain the firm-level annual costs of M&A activity from Compustat (Item AQC). The industry
M&A intensity in year t is measured as the aggregate M&A costs divided by the aggregate sales
over all firms within an industry (2-digit SIC) in a year, and it is averaged over the last five
years. For each supplier, the instrumental variable Customer Industry M&A is the weighted
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average customer industry M&A intensity over all the supplier’s customers’ industries, where
the weights are determined by its sales percentages to customers.
Table 1.4 presents the two-stage least-squares estimates of institutional ownership on cus-
tomer concentration. We report the first-stage regression results for Customer Concentration on
Customer Industry M&A intensity in columns (1), (4), and (7). The coefficients on the weighted
average customer industry M&A intensity are all positive and statistically significant for all three
customer concentration measures, consistent with the notion that the supplier’s customer base
becomes more concentrated following intense M&A activity in its customer’s industry. Specifi-
cally, the coefficient estimates on Customer Industry M&A lie between 13.17 (column (4)) and
16.33 (column (1)). The F-statistics from the first-stage regressions are well above 10, further
indicating that the customer industry M&A intensity is a strong instrument that satisfies the
relevance condition.
The second-stage estimates of institutional ownership on the instrumented customer con-
centration are shown in the next two columns following the first-stage results. The coefficients
on customer concentration remain positive and statistically significant in models where the de-
pendent variable is short-term institutional ownership (columns (2), (5) and (8)), consistent
with our prior that short-term institutions prefer firms with concentrated customer base. For
example, column (2) shows that the coefficient on the instrumented Customer Sales is 0.011 (sig-
nificant at the 5% level), and the results are also significant when using alternative measures of
concentration in columns (5) and (8). On the other hand, the instrumental variable coefficients
for long-term institutional ownership are statistically insignificant (columns (3), (6), and (9)).
Taken together, the results provide evidence of a significant causal link between customer
concentration and short-term investors, but not between customer concentration and long-term
institutional ownership. The overall implication is that firms with more concentrated customer
base are more likely to attract investments from short-term rather than from long-term insti-
tutional investors. The evidence offers the first indication of the information channel that will
be formally tested in later sections. Long-term investors may rely less on public supply chain
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information given their own information-gathering capabilities and focus on firm performance
over longer time horizon (Bushee and Noe, 2001). In contrast, short-term institutional investors
may pursue firms with customer concentration to leverage on such public information and realize
trading profits from the temporary information advantage.
1.5.2 Customer industry regulation
While the previous IV analysis alleviates the endogeneity concerns, it is difficult to completely
rule out the possibility that there may be unobserved developments simultaneously attracting
institutions to certain suppliers and triggering M&A activity among their customers. Thus,
we exploit an alternative approach that relies on the aggregate regulation level of customers’
industries to instrument for customer concentration. Gutierrez and Philippon (2017) argue that
rising regulatory stringency generates large fixed cost components that benefit larger firms and
introduces barriers to entry that are advantageous to incumbent firms. Hence, customer indus-
tries with increased regulation would exhibit shifts in the distribution of industry incumbents
towards a small number of sizable firms, thereby increasing the customer concentration of their
suppliers. One challenge to this approach is the possibility that some government regulations
affect both the supplier and customer industries concurrently. As in the previous subsection, we
control for supplier industry-year fixed effects to address this potential issue. By doing so, this
IV approach, in essence, captures the difference in the level of regulatory stringency between the
customer and supplier industries. Even if institutional preferences are affected by the overall
amount of regulatory restrictions in the customers’ industries, it is unlikely that the difference
in the level of regulation across the supply chain is associated with the corporate decisions and
the institutional ownership of the suppliers. Therefore, the industry-wide regulatory stringency
should meet both the relevance and exclusion conditions.
Following Gutierrez and Philippon (2017), we employ the Regulation Index constructed by
McLaughlin and Sherouse (2018) to proxy for the level of regulatory stringency in the customers’
industries. Government regulations are typically implemented by many different agencies and
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apply to a wide range of industries. The RegData Project is McLaughlin and Sherouse’s efforts to
quantify the applicability of federal regulations to specific industries. This methodology relies
on text analysis to count the number of regulatory restrictions affecting each 6-digit NAICS
industry and, in turn, generate the Regulation Index using these results.7
For the first stage of our IV analysis, we average the natural logarithm of one-year-lagged
Regulation Index across all customers of a supplier firm based on the weights determined by
the firm’s sales percentage to its customers. We then regress the supplier’s major customer
concentration on the weighted average customer Regulation Index to generate the instrumented
customer concentration measures for the second stage analysis. Formally, we estimate the fol-
lowing two-stage model:
Customer Concentrationi,t = γ0 + γ1Customer Reg Indexi,t−1 + Σ
K
k=1λkXki,t + ηi,t




where Customer Reg Indexi,t−1 represents the average of one-year-lagged Regulation Index in log
form across all industries to which supplier i’s major customers belong, and all other variables
are as defined in Specifications (1) and (2). Results are reported in Table 1.5.
Columns (1), (4), and (7) indicate that the customers’ weighted average Regulation Index
satisfies the relevance condition. In particular, the coefficients on Customer Reg Indexi,t−1
lie within the 0.066-0.074 range across the three customer concentration measures and are all
statistically significant at the 1% level. It is apparent that a firm’s customer base becomes
more concentrated as the customers’ industries become more regulated. The large first-stage
F-statistics further suggest that the instrumental variable passes the weak identification test.
The second-stage estimates of institutional ownership confirm our previous findings, and
are consistent with the customer industry M&A IV analysis. Similar to the results of Table
1.4, customer concentration bears a positive and statistically significant effect on short-term
7The newest Regulation Index dataset is obtained from the RegData Project website
https://quantgov.org/regdata/. See Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin (2015) for more details about the Regu-
lation Index measure.
23
institutional ownership but not on long-term ownership. For example, the coefficients on the
instrumented customer concentration vary from 0.019 to 0.023 for short-term institutions, but
once again, is insignificant for long-term investors. These results further support a causal effect
of customer concentration on the short-term but not long-term institutional ownership.
1.5.3 Industry customer concentration
To provide additional evidence in support of our causal inferences, we use an alternative in-
strumental variable that does not depend on customer industry characteristics. Specifically,
following Dhaliwal et al. (2016), we use the historical industry average customer concentration.
For each of our three measures of customer concentration, we calculate the two-year lagged in-
dustry average in the supplier’s industry based on its 2-digit SIC (excluding the supplier firm).
The instrumental variable, which captures the customer base structure of a supplier’s industry,
should be highly correlated with that of the individual supplier; hence, we expect the industry
average customer concentration to meet the relevance condition. Furthermore, it is unlikely that
a firm’s institutional ownership structure is driven by the historical industry average customer
concentration except through its effects on the firm’s customer base. The historical industry
average customer concentration is also unlikely to be an outcome of future pressure from insti-
tutional investors. Thus, it is likely to also satisfy the exclusion restriction. Accordingly, we
estimate the following two-stage model:
Customer Concentrationi,t = γ0 + γ1Ind Customer Concentration−i,k,t−2 + Σ
K
k=1λkXki,t + ηi,t




where Ind Customer Concentration−i,k,t−2 represents the two-year lagged average customer con-
centration for the industry k to which supplier i belongs, excluding supplier i itself, and all other
variables are previously defined above. We exclude the industry-year interacted fixed effects from
this model since industry average customer concentration should already correct for the unob-
served heterogeneity across industry-years. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. The
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estimates of model (1.8) are shown in Table 1.6.
Similar to those of Tables 1.4 and 1.5, the results of Table 1.6 further reinforce the baseline
evidence. The instrumented customer concentration has a positive and statistically significant
effect on short-term institutional ownership, while non-robust impact on long-term institutions
Taken together, our IV regression results establish a causal relationship between customer
concentration and institutional ownership, suggesting that customer clientele is shaped by in-
vestor clientele, especially short-term investors. The robustness of our main findings to various
IV approaches collectively suggests that short-term institutions value concentrated customer
clientele, rather than some omitted supplier characteristics that determine both its customer
distribution and institutional ownership. When a firm experiences shock that consolidates its
customer base, short-term investor clientele increases.
1.6 The information channel
So far, our findings have demonstrated that the larger a supplier’s customer-concentration base,
the greater the short-term investor ownership of the supplier’s stock. In this section, we explore
whether the information transfer channel could explain this relationship. Public information
about a firm’s customer base allows investors to evaluate its performance and inherent business
risk. For example, investors who are attentive to information about the identity and performance
of a supplier’s customers would be able to better assess the supplier’s own performance. We
therefore hypothesize that short-term institutional investors, who are sophisticated market play-
ers with superior information processing skills, exploit information about the customer-supplier
link when investing in firms with higher customer concentration, compared with other market
participants. Specifically, we examine the information role by (i) investigating how institutional
investors make their investment decisions under different information environments, and (ii) an-
alyzing how customer concentration affects another type of sophisticated investors – the short
sellers.
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1.6.1 Effects of fair disclosure regulation
To empirically test the information channel, we first investigate whether the relationship be-
tween short-term institutional investors and customer concentration changes when the overall
information environment in which the institutions operate undergoes an exogeneous change. In
particular, we consider the role of Fair Disclosure Regulation (Reg FD), which was implemented
by the SEC in October 2000. Reg FD prohibits selective disclosure of material non-public infor-
mation to a small subset of market participants (e.g., analysts and institutional investors) with-
out concurrently making it publicly available. Previous literature (e.g., Eleswarapu, Thomson,
and Venkataraman, 2004; Chiyachantana, Jiang, Taechapiroontong, and Wood, 2004) provides
evidence that Reg FD has reduced information asymmetries among different groups of investors.
This regulation has severely affected institutions as they could no longer access any selective
disclosure and benefit from private information. Moreover, Ke et al., (2008) focus on short-term
investors and demonstrate that after the reform implementation, transient, or short-horizon,
institutions no longer exhibit abnormal selling of stocks in the quarter before a bad news break.
These results further suggest that the reform has changed private information advantage of
short-term investors, and therefore, has potentially increased the benefits of slowly-transferred
public information. We conjecture that if institutional preferences are driven by a firm’s cus-
tomer information disclosure, short-term institutional investors would be more sensitive to the
firm’s customer base structure post-Reg FD. Long-term investors, on the other hand, are less
inclined to trade on public information for short-term gains. As long-term investors tend to use
supply-chain information for monitoring purposes, they would not necessarily find such infor-
mation to be more important post-Reg FD. To test our hypothesis, we re-estimate our baseline
model (1.5) across two subperiods. The first, pre-Reg FD, subperiod is based on the 1980-1999
period, whereas the second period spans the time period following the introduction of the reform
in October 2000.
The results, reported in Table 1.7, reveal the heterogeneous effects of customer concentration
on short- and long-term investors under the changing information environment. The coefficient
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on all three customer concentration variables is positive and significant at the 1% level during
the PostFD subsample, but insignificant and negligible in magnitude before the reform imple-
mentation. At the same time, the impact of concentration is not significantly different from zero
in the case of LT% as the dependent variable. Thus, during years following Reg FD, customer
concentration becomes valuable to short-term investors only, but not to long-term investors. The
cross-institutional differences are consistent with the idea that institutional preferences towards
customer-concentrated firms are driven by the information flow within the customer-supplier
network.
To summarize, the evidence using a quasi-natural experiment around the Reg FD reform
is supportive of the public information transfer channel. The findings suggest that short-term
institutions start relying more on slowly disseminated public information when potential sources
of profit due to private information exploitation becomes less available.
1.6.2 Effects of firm information environment
The evidence using a quasi-natural experiment around the Reg FD reform relies on a shock
to regulatory environment that improves the benefits of trading based on public information.
However, the shock is common to all stocks. Therefore, we further consider the role of in-
formation transfer channel by exploiting differences in information environments across firms.
Specifically, we ask whether the link between customer concentration and short-term investor
positions strengthens when a firm’s information diffusion is more gradual. Existing literature
demonstrates that news is incorporated into stock prices slower when information asymmetry
and opinion divergence are high (e.g., Zhang, 2006; Garfinkel and Sokobin, 2006). The slow
speed of information transfer, in turn, should provide short-term investors with more opportu-
nities to establish positions in a stock based on public information regarding the firm’s customers
before the rest of market participants react to the news. As a result, short-term investors should
be able to realize higher trading profits when information asymmetry is high. The higher gain
potential should, in turn, increase the preference of short-term investors towards firms with high
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customer concentration.
To empirically test this idea, we use a forecast error as a proxy for information environment
and opinion divergence. The forecast error is defined as the absolute value of the difference
between the reported earnings for the contemporary fiscal quarter and the median of analyst
forecasts (measured at the closest to the earnings announcement date), scaled by the stock price
at the beginning of the fiscal quarter. We split the overall sample into two subsamples based on
high versus low forecast error. To form the two groups, we calculate the median forecast error
for every industry-year, and divide firms into low forecast error group if their forecast error is
below industry-year median, and into high forecast error group if the error is equal to or higher
than the median. We then estimate the main regressions separately for each subsample, and
compare the customer concentration coefficients between high and low forecast error groups,
and well as between short and long-term investors.
The results, reported in Table 1.8, are consistent with our information channel hypothesis.
The link between customer concentration and institutional holdings continues to be significant
only for short-term investors, but not for their long-term peers. More importantly, the impact
of concentrated customer base is positive and significant at the 1% level only within the high
forecast error group subsample, and is insignificant and small in magnitude among the subsample
of firms with low forecast error. The cross-sectional differences across supplier firms with major
customers further support the idea that institutional preferences towards customer-concentrated
firms are driven by the information flow within the customer-supplier network. The slower
diffusion of supply chain information provides more opportunities for short-term investors to
implement short-horizon trading strategies ahead of other investors and thus, realize higher
gains.
1.6.3 Short-selling activity
As an alternative way to test the validity of the information channel in shaping the decisions
of short-term investors, we turn to analyzing another group of short-term informed investors
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– the short sellers. Short sellers sell borrowed stocks in the hope to profit from a decrease
in the stock price when they reverse their position at a later time. Since these strategies are
usually implemented for a period of several months only, short sellers can be viewed as one
type of short-term investors. Existing literature also shows that short sellers possess superior
information processing skill (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987; Dechow, Hutton, Maelbroek,
and Sloan, 2001; Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran, 2002; and Boehmer, Jones,
and Zhang, 2008). As a result, we predict that short sellers can also capitalize on the slowly
diffusing public supply chain information before such information gets impounded into the stock
price. Thus, if information is the underlying mechanism of our main findings, then concentrated
customer-base should also encourage more trading by short sellers in response to better access
to value-relevant information. To address the issue, we examine the intensity of short sellers’
trading activity. As more short sellers actively trade in a firm’s stock, the number of open short
positions for the firm should experience greater fluctuations. We measure open short positions
by constructing monthly short interest, defined as the number of shares shorted on the 15th
business day of each month (obtained from Compustat) scaled by the total number of shares
outstanding at the end of the month. We then compute the standard deviation of the monthly
short interest over the past 12 months and use it as a proxy for the fluctuation of short positions.
A positive association between customer concentration and the dispersion of short interest is in
line with the information channel.
To assess the relationship between customer concentration and the intensity of short-selling
activity, we estimate the following panel regression,
Disp Short Interesti,t+1 = α0 + α1Customer Concentrationi,t + Σ
K
k=1βkXki,t + εi,t. (1.9)
In Eq. (1.9), Disp Short Interesti,t+1 is measured using the standard deviation of monthly short
interests over year t + 1. Similar to our preceding analysis, we estimate the effect of customer
concentration on short sellers using both OLS and three IV approaches. Results are reported in
Table 1.9. For brevity, the table only reports the second-stage regression estimates of the three
IV regressions in columns (4)-(12), using customer industry M&As, customer regulation index,
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and industry average customer concentration as the respective instruments.
The table produces robustly significant and positive effects of customer concentration on
short-sellers’ activity using both the OLS and the IV approaches. The results suggest that short
sellers become more active in trading in firms with larger customer concentration. The findings
regarding the positive relation between the short interest positions of short-term investors and
customer clientele complements our previous findings, which establish the link between long
positions of short-term investors, as reported in the 13F database, and customer concentra-
tion. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the notion that information about the
customer base increases the likelihood of a firm to become a target of short-lived investment
strategies, whether through long or short positions in the stock.
1.7 Alternative explanations
The previous section has provided direct evidence in support of the information channel. In
this section, we further strengthen our argument by considering alternative explanations that
could potentially produce similar results. First, we ask whether institutional preferences towards
customer-concentrated firms are driven by changes in the risk-return profile of firms. Second,
we focus on the role of cross-ownership, and ask whether common holdings of both customer
and supplier firms can potentially explain our results.
1.7.1 Risk-Return Profile of Customer-Concentrated Firms
Perhaps the most intuitive alternative explanation of the link between customer concentration
and short-term clientele is the risk-return profile of concentrated firms. One strand of the
existing literature highlights the benefits of operating efficiency among firms with concentrated
customers due to lower selling expenses and higher asset turnover rates. These costs savings,
in turn, translate into higher profit margins and better returns (Patatoukas, 2012; Irvine et al.,
2016). At the same time, another group of researchers shows that reliance on a limited group of
customers increases the risk profile of a firm, leading to more frequent loan failures, and higher
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systematic and idiosyncratic risk (Campello and Gao, 2017; Dhaliwal et al., 2016). As a result,
a portfolio of customer concentrated firms may generate higher return and greater risk, which,
in turn, attracts return-seeking and risk tolerant investors. If short-term investors are able to
bear more risk so they can generate better performance, it is possible that they are attracted to
higher profitability of firms with customer concentration, while also willing to bear additional
risk associated with such investments.
We address this argument in several ways. First, all our regressions include measures of past
performance and risk, which should account for potentially different profiles of firms with various
levels of customer concentration. Second, it is worth noting that changes in risk-return profiles
induced by customer concentration do not explain our cross-sectional findings well. For example,
while Reg FD has changed the information environment of firms with customer concentration,
it is unlikely that the reform has also made firms with customer concentration more profitable
or risky, as it should not have any bearing on customer distribution of supplier firms.
To further mitigate the validity of the risk-return explanation, we examine the institutional
clientele of firms with government as major customer. Although the focus of our paper is on
the relation between a concentrated base of corporate customers and institutions, a supplier
can also be highly dependent on revenues from the U.S. federal government. Dhaliwal et al.
(2016) demonstrate that federal government customers are safer, as they are much less likely
to default or declare bankruptcy, and also operate based on longer-term procurement contracts.
The lower risk, in turn, translates into lower risk premium of government suppliers compared
to corporate suppliers. Hence, focusing on government customers provides a suitable laboratory
that allows us to disentangle the information transfer mechanism from the risk-return profile
channel. Since information on government initiatives and budget is, to a large extent, publicly
available knowledge, we expect that the public transfer mechanism should be at play, shaping
short-term investors’ preference towards firms with higher government customer concentration.
However, if the risk-return profile is the dominating explanation, we should find that short-term
investors exhibit significantly lower sensitivity towards government suppliers, as investment in
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these firms provide a lower return for a given unit of risk.
To test this prediction, we use the Compustat segment files to identify suppliers that report
a US federal government customer as accounting for at least 10% of the total annual revenues of
the supplier firm. Based on this data, we re-construct our three measures of customer concentra-
tion. For example, Corporate Customer Sales is the total share of sales of a supplier firm to all
major government suppliers. We then re-estimate the main specification (1) after augmenting it
with the proxies of government concentration. The results, reported in Table 1.10, show that our
measures of corporate customers concentration remain significant and similar in magnitude to
the main regressions. More importantly, the impact of government concentration is also positive
and statistically significant in all three specifications with short-term holdings as the dependent
variable. The F-test, reported at the bottom of the table, provides a formal comparison of the
two magnitudes. Low p-values across all specifications indicate that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal. Similar to the results of our earlier estimations,
neither corporate nor government concentration has a significant impact on long-term holdings,
further supporting our main argument, and indicating that these institutions may employ dif-
ferent investment strategies and focus on collecting private information. Thus, we conclude that
the significance of our results among government suppliers mitigates the concern that short-term
investors may choose those firms due the attractiveness of their risk-return profile.
1.7.2 Institutional cross-ownership
Another concern is that the observed relationship between customer concentration and institu-
tional ownership is the result of increased joint institutional ownership in firms with stronger
economic links. Institutional investors may own stocks of both customer and supplier firms
for several reasons. Cross-ownership can be information driven, as it would allow institutions
to become more informed about the trading firms and extract valuable information from the
supplier-customer relationships, especially if the link becomes stronger. Such motivation is con-
sistent with the information channel, but could be driven by both private and public information
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transfer. Moreover, cross-ownership can also be a result of the institutions’ intention to gain
control rights over both the customer and supplier so that they can pressure firms into undertak-
ing joint-value maximizing actions that may not necessarily be firm value maximizing (Hansen
and Lott, 1996). For example, institutional investors of customers may decide to own shares
of the supplier’s stock to encourage more stable cooperation between the firms, or to pressure
the supplier to provide more relationship-specific investments that would benefit the customer
they own. Hence, firms with stronger customer-supplier links may attract common ownership
for non-informational reasons.
Thus, although common ownership per se does not contradict our hypothesis, it may never-
theless be driven by private information benefits, as well as other incentives, such as pressure for
disclosure, activism, and corporate governance. Since disentangling these explanations can be
empirically challenging, we exclude all the cases of cross-ownership from our analysis. Specifi-
cally, we repeat the baseline regression analysis for the percentage of supplier’s shares owned by
institutional investors that do not simultaneously own any of the linked customers. This analysis
tests against the alternative explanation that our findings are driven by common institutional in-
vestors, who potentially make ownership decisions for purposes other than utilizing information
advantage. If public information transfer explains our key finding, we would expect the positive
effect on institutional ownership to remain after excluding institutional cross-ownership. To
test this effect, we rerun Eq. (1.5) by using non-cross institutional ownership as the dependent
variable.
NCross Inst%i,t = α0 + α1Customer Concentrationi,t + Σ
K
k=1βkXki,t + εi,t, (1.10)
where NCross Inst%i,t is non-cross short-term (NCross ST%) or long-term institutional owner-
ship (NCross LT%). Results are reported in Table 1.11. Except for those in columns (1)-(2),
customer concentration exhibits strongly significant and positive effects on non-cross institu-
tional ownership. For instance, the coefficients on Customer HHI and Largest Customer are
0.005 and 0.006, respectively, for non-cross short-term ownership (columns (3) and (5)) and
0.019 and 0.027 (columns (4) and (6)) for non-cross long-term ownership. These results re-
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inforce our key evidence that other mechanisms, potentially driving the common institutional
holdings, cannot fully explain our main findings.
1.8 Conclusion
All publicly-listed US firms are required to disclose the amount of sales derived from all major
customers that account for at least 10% of their total sales. Such disclosure improves the
information environment of the firms and can be critical to investor decision making. Yet,
not all investors are equally able to process this information, which, in turn, slows information
diffusion and creates return predictability. This study examines whether concentrated customer
clientele also shapes the investor clientele of the supplier firm by creating information processing
benefits to some groups of investors. Based on a large sample of 46,099 firm-year observations
for the 1980-2015 period, we find that short-term institutional investors exhibit preference for
firms with large customer concentration, and that the relation is economically significant. At
the same time, we find no evidence that long-term institutions exhibit the same preference. Our
baseline finding is robust to a multitude of alternative definitions of customer concentration,
alternative classifications of institutional investors, and to the possible endogeneity issues.
We next establish the channel of public information transfer as the key mechanism behind
the relationship between firms with concentrated customer base and institutional clientele. Our
results show that the link between the customer and short-term investor clientele is stronger
following the passage of Fair Disclosure regulation, which prohibits selective disclosure to small
investor groups. The relationship between the two clienteles is also more pronounced in the
environment of asymmetric information, when slower information diffusion helps short-term
investors establish positions in a stock ahead of less sophisticated market participants.
Our results have significant implications for disclosure policies of customer information. Prior
studies suggest that a firm’s stock price does not promptly incorporate its customers’ news (e.g.,
Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Menzly and Ozbaz, 2010). Our study suggests that a firm with
concentrated customer base attracts institutional investors who can, through active trading,
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potentially improve the firm’s stock price informativeness and thus, reduce such information
inefficiencies.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the descriptive statistics for our main variables. The sample includes all firms that
have at least one major corporate customer reported in Compustat Customer Segment Files from 1980
to 2015. A major customer is defined as a customer that accounts for at least 10% of its supplier’s total
sales. All variables are winsorized within 1st and 99th percentiles. See Table A.1 for variable definitions.
N Mean Median Std P25 P75
ST% 46,099 0.049 0.060 0.002 0.027 0.076
LT % 46,099 0.167 0.164 0.027 0.115 0.270
Total Customer Sales 46,099 0.404 0.249 0.190 0.350 0.570
Customer HHI 46,099 0.138 0.169 0.030 0.073 0.172
Largest Customer 46,099 0.289 0.184 0.152 0.230 0.360
Number of Customers 46,099 1.726 0.918 1.000 1.000 2.000
Log Age 46,099 2.503 0.725 1.946 2.485 3.045
Tobin’s Q 46,099 2.054 1.910 1.047 1.438 2.268
Size 46,099 4.765 2.164 3.182 4.639 6.223
Div. Yield 46,099 0.007 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log Price 46,099 1.991 1.329 1.163 2.122 2.968
Turnover 46,099 0.128 0.157 0.031 0.074 0.161
Volatility 46,099 0.162 0.095 0.097 0.139 0.200
Return−3,0 46,099 0.022 0.314 -0.162 0.000 0.164
Return−12,−3 46,099 0.112 0.601 -0.263 0.005 0.319
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Table 1.2: Correlation Matrix
This table presents the pairwise correlation coefficients for our main variables. The sample includes all firms that
have at least one major corporate customer reported in Compustat Customer Segment Files from 1980 to 2015. A
major customer is defined as a customer that accounts for at least 10% of its supplier’s total sales. All variables are
winsorized within 1st and 99th percentiles. See Table A.1 for variable definitions.
Customer Customer Largest Log Tobin’s Log
ST% LT% Sales HHI Customer Age Q Size Div. Yield Price Turnover Volatility Return−3,0
LT% 0.37
Total Customer Sales 0.13 0.18
Customer HHI 0.11 0.13 0.83
Largest Customer 0.09 0.10 0.80 0.94
Log Age 0.11 0.39 0.06 0.03 0.01
Tobin’s Q 0.05 -0.03 0.06 0.08 0.09 -0.16
Size 0.43 0.65 0.19 0.13 0.10 0.31 0.17
Div. Yield -0.02 0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.18 -0.12 0.19
Log Price 0.37 0.57 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.30 0.16 0.79 0.20
Turnover 0.34 0.23 0.13 0.11 0.09 -0.02 0.18 0.35 -0.06 0.23
Volatility -0.14 -0.33 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.30 0.16 -0.36 -0.24 -0.45 0.19
Return−3,0 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.15 -0.05 0.23 0.10 0.09
Return−12,−3 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.12 -0.03 0.23 0.11 0.14 0.02
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Table 1.3: Investor Clientele and Customer Concentration
This table presents results from our baseline OLS regression, as given below.




where Inst%i,t is short-term (ST%) or long-term institutional ownership (LT%), or transient (Tran%) or dedicated
institutional ownership (Dedi%), Customer Concentrationi,t is measured using total Customer Sales, Customer
HHI (Herfindahl Index), and Largest Customer, and Xki,t is a set of firm characteristics: Tobin’s q, Size, Age,
Div. Yield , Volatility, Turnover, Price, and Returns. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles and
their definitions are contained in Table A.1. In all specifications, we include industry-year fixed effects. Industry
classifications are based on 2-digit SIC. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. The sample includes all
firms that have at least one major corporate customer reported in Compustat Customer Segment Files from 1980
to 2015.
Measure of Institutional Ownership Using Churn Rates Bushee’s (1998) Measure of Investor Clientele
ST% LT% ST% LT% ST% LT% Tran% Dedi% Tran% Dedi% Tran% Dedi%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Customer 0.008*** 0.006 0.012*** 0.007
Sales (4.27) (1.31) (3.68) (1.13)
Customer 0.010*** 0.004 0.013*** 0.004
HHI (3.89) (0.55) (2.93) (0.48)
Largest 0.007*** 0.003 0.009** 0.001
Customer (3.21) (0.44) (2.45) (0.17)
Age -0.003** 0.030*** -0.003** 0.030*** -0.003** 0.030*** -0.009*** 0.030*** -0.009*** 0.030*** -0.009*** 0.030***
(-2.16) (11.91) (-2.23) (11.86) (-2.27) (11.86) (-4.58) (9.82) (-4.65) (9.72) (-4.66) (9.70)
Tobin’s Q -0.002*** -0.007*** -0.002*** -0.007*** -0.002*** -0.007*** -0.002*** -0.013*** -0.002*** -0.013*** -0.002*** -0.013***
(-11.62) (-8.53) (-11.52) (-8.49) (-11.32) (-8.48) (-4.01) (-13.57) (-3.97) (-13.54) (-3.89) (-13.51)
Size 0.008*** 0.033*** 0.008*** 0.033*** 0.008*** 0.033*** 0.016*** 0.051*** 0.015*** 0.051*** 0.015*** 0.051***
(13.56) (20.97) (13.49) (20.92) (13.44) (20.90) (19.31) (25.40) (19.20) (25.42) (19.14) (25.37)
Div. Yield -0.235*** -0.510*** -0.236*** -0.510*** -0.235*** -0.510*** -0.554*** -0.919*** -0.554*** -0.919*** -0.554*** -0.918***
(-7.59) (-4.96) (-7.61) (-4.95) (-7.60) (-4.95) (-10.35) (-5.78) (-10.36) (-5.77) (-10.35) (-5.76)
Price 0.005*** 0.025*** 0.005*** 0.025*** 0.005*** 0.025*** 0.011*** 0.036*** 0.011*** 0.036*** 0.011*** 0.036***
(5.83) (7.31) (5.82) (7.30) (5.80) (7.30) (5.83) (7.71) (5.81) (7.70) (5.80) (7.70)
Turnover 0.080*** 0.053*** 0.080*** 0.053*** 0.080*** 0.053*** 0.166*** 0.097*** 0.166*** 0.097*** 0.166*** 0.097***
(13.00) (5.08) (13.07) (5.10) (13.07) (5.10) (16.90) (6.68) (16.97) (6.70) (16.96) (6.70)
Volatility -0.027*** -0.050*** -0.028*** -0.050*** -0.027*** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.095*** -0.049*** -0.094*** -0.049*** -0.094***
(-4.50) (-3.18) (-4.50) (-3.17) (-4.48) (-3.17) (-6.17) (-4.31) (-6.16) (-4.30) (-6.13) (-4.30)
Return−3,0 0.004* -0.034*** 0.004* -0.034*** 0.004* -0.034*** 0.007*** -0.047*** 0.007*** -0.047*** 0.007*** -0.047***
(1.97) (-7.25) (1.98) (-7.25) (1.98) (-7.25) (2.91) (-7.24) (2.92) (-7.24) (2.91) (-7.24)
Return−12,−3 0.003*** -0.025*** 0.003*** -0.025*** 0.003*** -0.025*** 0.009*** -0.032*** 0.009*** -0.032*** 0.009*** -0.032***
(2.93) (-10.72) (2.95) (-10.72) (2.95) (-10.72) (6.30) (-10.89) (6.34) (-10.89) (6.34) (-10.89)
N 46,099 46,099 46,099 46,099 46,099 46,099 42,539 42,539 42,539 42,539 42,539 42,539
R̄2 0.30 0.54 0.30 0.54 0.30 0.54 0.46 0.59 0.46 0.59 0.46 0.59
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.4: Instrumental Variables Regressions: Customer Industry M&As
This table presents results from two-stage instrumental variables regressions, as follows:








where Inst%i,t is short-term (ST%) or long-term institutional ownership (LT%), Customer Concentrationi,t is
measured using total Customer Sales, Customer HHI (Herfindahl Index), and Largest Customer, and Xki,t is a
set of firm characteristics: Tobin’s q, Size, Age, Div. Yield , Volatility, Turnover, Price, and Returns. Customer
Industry M&Ai,t represents the weighted average industry M&A intensity across industries to which supplier i’s
major customers belong. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles and their definitions are contained
in Table A.1. Industry classifications are based on 2-digit SIC. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year.
The sample includes all firms that have at least one major corporate customer reported in Compustat Customer
Segment Files from 1980 to 2015.
Second-Stage Second-Stage Second-Stage
First-Stage ST% LT% First-Stage ST% LT% First-Stage ST% LT%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Customer Industry 16.327*** 13.165*** 13.896***
M&A (20.32) (21.31) (19.87)
Customer Sales 0.011** -0.008
(2.12) (-0.50)
Customer HHI 0.014** -0.010
(2.09) (-0.49)
Largest Customer 0.013** -0.010
(2.09) (-0.50)
N 18,546 18,546 18,546 18,546 18,546 18,546 18,546 18,546 18,546
R̄2 0.35 0.28 0.54 0.42 0.28 0.54 0.39 0.28 0.54
First-stage F-test 412.8 454.0 394.7
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.5: Instrumental Variables Regressions: Customer Regulation Index
This table presents results from two-stage instrumental variables regressions, as follows:








where Inst%i,t is short-term (ST%) or long-term institutional ownership (LT%), Customer Concentrationi,t is
measured using total Customer Sales, Customer HHI (Herfindahl Index), and Largest Customer, Customer Reg
Indexi,t−1 is the one-year lagged weighted average Regulation Index across all industries to which supplieri’s major
customers belong, and Xki,t is a set of firm characteristics: Tobin’s q, Size, Age, Div. Yield, Volatility, Turnover,
Price, and Returns. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles and their definitions are contained in
Table A.1. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. The sample includes all firms that have at least one
major corporate customer reported in Compustat Customer Segment Files from 1980 to 2015.
Second-Stage Second-Stage Second-Stage
First-Stage ST% LT% First-Stage ST% LT% First-Stage ST% LT%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Customer Reg 0.074*** 0.062*** 0.066***
Index (32.40) (30.12) (25.84)
Customer Sales 0.019*** 0.014
(3.10) (0.93)
Customer HHI 0.023*** 0.017
(3.07) (0.93)
Largest Customer 0.022*** 0.016
(3.07) (0.93)
N 12,569 12,569 12,569 12,569 12,569 12,569 12,569 12,569 12,569
R̄2 0.46 0.27 0.54 0.60 0.27 0.54 0.57 0.27 0.54
First-stage F-test 1049.0 907.5 667.5
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.6: Instrumental Variables Regressions: Industry Average Customer Con-
centration
This table presents results from two-stage instrumental variables regressions, as follows:








where Inst%i,t is short-term (ST%) or long-term institutional ownership (LT%), Customer Concentrationi,t is
measured using total Customer Sales, Customer HHI (Herfindahl Index), and Largest Customer, Ind Customer
Concentrationi,t−2 is the two-year lagged average customer concentration measure in the supplier’s 2-digit SIC
industry with supplier i itself excluded, and Xki,t is a set of firm characteristics: Tobin’s q, Size, Age, Div. Yield ,
Volatility, Turnover, Price, and Returns. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles and their definitions
are contained in Table A.1. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. The sample includes all firms that have
at least one major corporate customer reported in Compustat Customer Segment Files from 1980 to 2015.
Second-Stage Second-Stage Second-Stage
First-Stage ST% LT% First-Stage ST% LT% First-Stage ST% LT%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Industry Customer 0.656*** 1.109*** 0.445***
Concentration (0.050) (0.077) (0.060)
Customer Sales 0.039** 0.139**
(2.67) (2.71)
Customer HHI 0.055*** 0.091
(3.17) (1.37)
Largest Customer 0.079** 0.225*
(2.57) (1.85)
N 46,020 46,020 46,020 46,020 46,020 46,020 46,020 46,020 46,020
R̄2 0.08 0.25 0.45 0.09 0.25 0.48 0.06 0.22 0.43
First-stage F-test 174.0 207.4 54.1
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No No
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Table 1.7: Regulation Fair Disclosure, Investor Clientele, and Customer Concen-
tration
This table presents OLS regression results of firms during the pre- and post-Regulation (Reg) Fair Disclosure periods.
We estimate the following model:




where Inst%i,t is short-term (ST%) or long-term institutional ownership (LT%), Customer Concentrationi,t is
measured using total Customer Sales, Customer HHI (Herfindahl Index), and Largest Customer, and Xki,t is a set
of firm characteristics: Tobin’s q, Size, Age, Div. Yield , Volatility, Turnover, Price, and Returns. All variables
are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles and their definitions are contained in Table A.1. In all specifications, we
include industry-year fixed effects. Industry classifications are based on 2-digit SIC. Standard errors are clustered
by firm and year. The sample includes firms that have at least one major corporate customer reported in Compustat
Customer Segment Files from 1980 to 2015.
Panel A: Customer Clientele Effects on Investor Clientele
Short-Term Inst Ownership (ST%) Long-Term Inst Ownership (LT%)
Pre-Reg Fair Disclosure Post-Reg Fair Disclosure Pre-Reg Fair Disclosure Post-Reg Fair Disclosure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Customer Sales 0.002 0.012*** 0.001 0.016*
(1.41) (4.37) (0.16) (2.01)
Customer HHI 0.002 0.015*** -0.002 0.020
(0.95) (3.91) (-0.28) (1.73)
Largest Customer 0.001 0.012*** -0.004 0.019*
(0.34) (3.40) (-0.65) (1.77)
N 24,539 24,539 24,539 21,560 21,560 21,560 24,539 24,539 24,539 21,560 21,560 21,560
R̄2 0.258 0.258 0.258 0.251 0.250 0.250 0.456 0.456 0.456 0.477 0.477 0.477
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Test of the Difference in Customer Clientele Effects between Pre- and Post-Reg Fair Disclosure Periods
Short-Term Inst Ownership (ST%) Long-Term Inst Ownership (LT%)
Customer Sales Customer HHI Largest Customer Customer Sales Customer HHI Largest Customer
F-Statistics 10.05 9.41 8.96 3.20 3.04 3.85
(P-Value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06)
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Table 1.8: Forecast Errors, Investor Clientele, and Customer Concentration
This table presents results of the following OLS regression on subsamples of firms formed based on forecast errors,
where those above the median are classified as firms with high forecast errors, and those at or below are low. We
estimate the following model:




where Inst%i,t is short-term (ST%) or long-term institutional ownership (LT%), Customer Concentrationi,t is
measured using total Customer Sales, Customer HHI (Herfindahl Index), and Largest Customer, and Xki,t is a set
of firm characteristics: Tobin’s q, Size, Age, Div. Yield , Volatility, Turnover, Price, and Returns. All variables
are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles and their definitions are contained in Table A.1. In all specifications, we
include industry-year fixed effects. Industry classifications are based on 2-digit SIC. Standard errors are clustered
by firm and year. The sample includes firms that have at least one major corporate customer reported in Compustat
Customer Segment Files from 1980 to 2015.
Panel A: Customer Clientele Effects on Forecast Errors
Short-Term Inst Ownership (ST%) Long-Term Inst Ownership (LT%)
Low Forecast Error High Forecast Error Low Forecast Error High Forecast Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Customer Sales 0.002 0.012*** 0.001 0.013*
(0.71) (4.79) (0.07) (1.82)
Customer HHI 0.002 0.015*** 0.009 0.016
(0.58) (3.97) (0.72) (1.55)
Largest Customer 0.001 0.013*** 0.011 0.013
(0.22) (3.67) (1.05) (1.41)
N 13,311 13,311 13,311 12,840 12,840 12,840 13,311 13,311 13,311 12,840 12,840 12,840
R̄2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Test of the Difference in Customer Clientele Effects between Low and High Forecast Errors Groups of Firms
Short-Term Inst Ownership (ST%) Long-Term Inst Ownership (LT%)
Customer Sales Customer HHI Largest Customer Customer Sales Customer HHI Largest Customer
F-Statistics 10.05 9.41 8.96 3.20 3.04 3.85
(P-Value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06)
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Table 1.9: Short Selling Activity and Customer Concentration
This table presents results from regressing one-year-ahead short interest dispersion on customer concentration.
Columns (1)-(3) show estimates of the following model,




Disp Short Interesti,t is measured by the standard deviation of the monthly short interests over year t+1; Customer
Concentrationi,t is measured using total Customer Sales, Customer HHI (Herfindahl Index), and Largest Customer,
and Xki,t is a set of firm characteristics: Tobin’s q, Size, Age, Div. Yield , Volatility, Turnover, Price, and Returns.
Columns (4)-(12) show the second-stage estimates of IV regressions using Customer Industry M&A, Customer Reg
Index, and Industry Average Customer Concentration as instruments. All variables are defined in Table A.1. With
the exception of columns (10)-(12), we include industry-year fixed effects. Industry classifications are based on
2-digit SIC. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. The sample includes all firms that have at least one
major customer reported in Compustat Customer Segment Files from 1980 to 2015.
OLS IV - Customer Industry M&A IV - Customer Reg Index IV - Industry Customer Con
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Customer Sales 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.003* 0.011***
(4.38) (2.79) (1.86) (3.11)
Customer HHI 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.004* 0.018***
(3.99) (2.72) (1.86) (3.58)
Largest Customer 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004* 0.031**
(3.85) (2.74) (1.86) (2.60)
N 23,447 23,447 23,447 9,966 9,966 9,966 7,100 7,100 7,100 23,702 23,702 23,702
R̄2 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.14
First-stage F-test 494.7 582.2 620.1 718.7 745.0 663.5 73.7 95.1 18.3
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
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Table 1.10: Investor Clientele and Corporate/Government Customers
This table presents results from our baseline OLS regression, as given below.




where Inst%i,t is short-term (ST%) or long-term institutional ownership (LT%), Corporate and Government Cus-
tomer Concentrationi,t is measured using total Customer Sales, Customer HHI (Herfindahl Index), and Largest
Customer, and Xki,t is a set of firm characteristics: Tobin’s q, Size, Age, Div. Yield , Volatility, Turnover, Price,
and Returns. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles and their definitions are contained in Table
A.1. In all specifications, we include industry-year fixed effects. Industry classifications are based on 2-digit SIC.
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. The sample includes all firms that have at least one major corporate
customer reported in Compustat Customer Segment Files from 1980 to 2015.
Panel A: Effects of Corporate and Government Sales on Institutional Investors
ST% LT% ST% LT% ST% LT%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corporate Customer Sales 0.007*** 0.005
(4.11) (1.09)
Government Customer Sales 0.005** -0.002
(2.49) (-0.24)
Corporate Customer HHI 0.009*** 0.003
(3.76) (0.49)
Government Customer HHI 0.006* -0.004
(1.80) (-0.34)
Corporate Largest Customer 0.007*** 0.002
(3.09) (0.28)
Government Largest Customer 0.006** -0.005
(2.38) (-0.62)
N 50,760 50,760 50,760 50,760 50,760 50,760
R̄2 0.301 0.544 0.301 0.544 0.301 0.544
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Test of the Difference in Corporate vs. Government Effects on Institutional Ownership
ST% LT% ST% LT% ST% LT%
F-Statistics 0.622 0.607 0.490 0.285 0.179 0.443
(P-Value) (0.435) (0.441) (0.489) (0.597) (0.675) (0.510)
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Table 1.11: Non-Cross Institutional Ownership and Customer Concentration
This table repeats our baseline OLS regression by replacing using non-cross institutional ownership as the
dependent variable in a following way.




where NCross Inst%i,t is either non-cross short-term (NCross ST%) or long-term institutional ownership
(NCross LT%) of the supplier and its customers, Customer Concentrationi,t is measured using total Cus-
tomer Sales, Customer HHI (Herfindahl Index), and Largest Customer, and Xki,t is a set of firm char-
acteristics: Tobin’s q, Size, Age, Div. Yield , Volatility, Turnover, Price, and Returns. All variables are
winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles and their definitions are contained in Table A.1. In all specifications,
we include industry-year fixed effects. Industry classifications are based on 2-digit SIC. Standard errors are
clustered by firm and year. The sample includes all firms that have at least one major corporate customer
reported in Compustat Customer Segment Files from 1980 to 2015.
NCross ST% NCross LT% NCross ST% NCross LT% NCross ST% NCross LT%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Customer Sales -0.004** -0.041***
(-2.68) (-7.30)
Customer HHI 0.006*** -0.004
(2.75) (-0.50)
Largest Customer 0.006*** 0.007
(2.86) (0.98)
N 46,099 46,099 46,099 46,099 46,099 46,099
R̄2 0.21 0.28 0.21 0.28 0.21 0.28
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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2. Withholding Bad News When Competing Peers Have Com-
mon Customers
2.1 Introduction
Theoretical research suggests that different sources of competition have distinct effects on firms’
disclosure choices. One strand of literature (e.g., Verrecchia 1983; Clinch and Verrecchia 1997)
argues that competition from existing rivals increases the proprietary cost of private information
and, in turn, inhibits disclosure. Another strand (e.g., Darrough and Stoughton 1990; Wagen-
hofer 1990; Feltham and Xie 1992), on the other hand, predicts that competition from potential
entrants encourages information disclosure to deter entry. These seemingly conflicting effects
underscore the importance of distinguishing two sources of competition: threats from existing
rivals and threats from potential entrants. Yet there is still little research that incorporates
these distinct dimensions of competition, and this probably contributes to the mixed empirical
evidence on the relationship between competition and disclosures.8 In this study, we exploit
a newly available database on supply chains that allows us to disentangle competitive threats
posed by existing rivals from other sources of competition and to examine whether and how
existing rivals influence a firm’s strategic disclosure of unfavorable information. We also inves-
tigate how major stakeholders in financial and product markets – competitors, customers, and
investors – each play a role in inducing this relationship.
Our study focuses on the corporate customer-supplier network and utilizes firms’ shared
relationships with common corporate customers as a basis for distinguishing existing competition
from potential competition. Firms in the same product space, as defined by Hoberg and Phillips’s
(2010, 2016) Text-based Network Industry Classifications (TNIC), are classified as either existing
rivals if they supply to the same corporate customers (customer-connected peers/suppliers) or
potential competitors if they do not (non-connected peers/suppliers). Using common customers
as a market boundary to identify existing competitors, among others, enables us to capture
8For example, Bamber and Cheon (1998), Botosan and Stanford (2005), and Ali, Klasa, and Yeung (2014) find
that firms in competitive industries are more forthcoming with their disclosure. In contrast, Verrecchia and Weber
(2006) and Li and Zhan (2018) find a positive association between competition and information withholding.
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the essential distinguishing characteristic of existing competition adequately. First, customer-
connected peers are good representations of rival firms whose entry costs are sunk costs as they
have already made relationship-specific investments to serve the same market. Thus, connected
peers are expected to compete closely against one another for continued businesses with their
common customers and are immediate threats to each other. Second, customers may find it
easier to switch between their current suppliers (i.e., customer-connected suppliers) than to new
suppliers with no prior relationship (i.e., non-connected suppliers). Customers in an attempt
to establish new trading relationships may face frictions such as a higher level of information
asymmetry between them and their potential suppliers and fewer customer-tailored products
offered by these potential suppliers.9 Hence, the primary concern of a firm over its customer-
connected peers would be how the peers’ strategic moves jeopardize its position in existing
trading relationships with common customers. The firm’s main concern over non-connected
peers, however, would be their potential access to the common customers rather than how they
compete within their own existing market.
We contend that competitive threats from customer-connected peers would induce negative
news hoarding. As suggested by the “proprietory cost of disclosure” theory (Verrecchia 1983),
a firm facing competitive threats from existing rivals would be concerned over how these ri-
vals might use negative information in a manner that disadvantages the firm in the product
market. Intense existing competition would incentivize a firm to withhold such information
from its competitors (competitor-induced motives). There may also be increased concerns over
customers’ responses in light of disclosed information. To the extent that competition from
connected peers reflects a lower switching cost for the common customers, a firm under compet-
itive pressure would face a higher risk of losing its position in future contractual arrangements
with the customers. Such a firm would, in turn, have a stronger incentive to manage the
customers’ perceptions about its business prospects and hoard any negative information that
9Our univariate analysis finds that customer-connected peers are, on average, located closer to their common
customers than their non-connected peers, suggesting that these customers may have better access to information
on connected than non-connected suppliers. Results also indicate that products offered by connected peers have
a higher degree of similarity than those provided by non-connected ones, pointing to the connected peers’ efforts
in supplying tailored products to common customers in comparison with non-connected peers.
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would hamper such perceptions (customer-induced motives). Furthermore, the proprietary cost
of the disclosure may provide an opportunity for managers to conceal bad news from investors.
Investors expect firms that face competition from existing rivals to hide both favorable and un-
favorable information from competitors and hence would not interpret withholding information
as unambiguously negative and discount firm values as such (Verrecchia 1983). The existence
of proprietary cost in a competitive environment, thus, would enable a firm with more nega-
tive than positive information to take advantage of such expectations of investors and conceal
negative information without being adequately penalized (investor-induced motives).
To construct measures of existing competition, we exploit the recently available information
on customer-supplier relationships from the Factset Revere database and Compustat Customer
Segment files.10 More specifically, competition from existing rivals are proxied by the number
of customer-connected peers (Peer Count), their sales to the common customers (Peer Sales),
and the similarity between their products and the focal firm’s (Peer Similarity). Competition
from potential entrants is similarly estimated by the number of non-connected peers (Non-
Linked Peer Count) and the extent of their product similarity with the focal supplier’s (Non-
Linked Peer Similarity). We employ the formation of a stock price crash as a measure of
unfavorable information withholding, following the extant literature (e.g., Chen, Hong, and
Stein 2001; Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian 2009). It is argued that bad news withheld by
managers accumulates over an extended period until it reaches a tipping point beyond which
the cost of concealing the news exceeds the benefit. The managers would then be forced to
release the accumulated news at once, causing the stock price to crash. The three measures of
crash risk include the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly stock returns (NCSKEW), the
asymmetric volatility of negative versus positive returns (DUVOL), and the number of extremely
negative returns (Crash Count).
Using a sample of 28,598 firm-year observations from 4,436 unique supplier firms over the
1996-2015 period, we find that stock price crash risk is significantly higher for firms facing greater
10See Dai, Liang, and Ng (2020) for a more detailed description of the Factset Revere database.
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competition from connected peers, consistent with our prediction that existing competition in-
hibits the disclosure of unfavorable information. The results are strong and robust to controlling
for potential as well as overall competition. In contrast, we find a negative association between
competitive threats from non-connected peers and crash risk, indicating that potential compe-
tition encourages the disclosure of negative information. Combined, these findings highlight the
offsetting effects of existing and potential competition on disclosure decisions and provide vali-
dation for our new constructs in capturing the different dimensions of competition. Additional
analyses using other proxies of adverse news disclosure further substantiate our information
hoarding interpretation of crash risk, contrary to the alternative explanation that crash risk
is capturing firm fundamentals such as operating risk rather than consequences of withholding
negative news.
While we have established that existing competition increases the likelihood of a firm with-
holding adverse information, our causal inferences of this link may be subject to endogeneity
concerns. To alleviate such concerns, we exploit three different quasi-natural experiments to
capture large exogenous shocks to customer-connected peers. First, we employ the intensity of
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activities of customers as a source of an exogenous increase
in the number of peers supplying to the customers, and thus, the supplier’s heightened existing
rivalry. The acquiring customers would mechanically gain new trading partners through consol-
idation of purchasing accounts, which in turn would add new customer-connected peers to the
existing customer-supplier network. Next, we examine an exogenous reduction in competition
due to the bankruptcies of customer-connected peers. Customers tend to lose confidence in
bankrupt firms and would seek for safer alternatives (Altman 1984; Opler and Titman 1994;
Cheng and McDonald 1996). Thus, we expect that when a connected peer files for bankruptcy,
the common customers would rely less on the filing peer for inputs, if not switching away com-
pletely. Finally, we explore exogenous shocks related to major natural disasters that disrupt
the domestic operations of customer-connected peers. Such disruptions in local plant and es-
tablishment operations would reduce the competitive positions of customer-connected peers in
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the short-run, thereby temporarily relieving the focal firm from some of the competitive and
predatory threats from existing rivals. The findings from all three quasi-natural experiments
suggest that our baseline results are robust to potential endogeneity issues and that they capture
a causal effect of existing competition on a firm’s stock price crash risk.
Next, we investigate whether the positive association between existing competition and bad
news hoarding is driven, in part, by each of the three major participants in product and financial
markets – competitors, customers, and investors. First, we test competitor-induced motives by
examining whether less aggressive competition and more information sharing between the focal
firm and its connected peers reduce the need as well as the ability for a firm to hide bad news from
these competitors. Consistent with our conjecture, we find that establishing business alliances
with existing rivals weakens the impact of existing competition on crash risk while reducing
hostility and information asymmetry between the parties.11 Second, we examine customer-
induced motives by evaluating whether the positive impact from existing competition would
be less pronounced when customers have a lower propensity to switch away and/or are better
informed about the firm. Analyses on business alliances and trade credits with customers provide
supportive evidence on this motive. Finally, we investigate investor-induced motives by testing
whether investor informedness would have any moderating effects on the baseline relationship.
Using institutional ownership breadth, analyst forecast dispersion, and news coverage as proxies
for information asymmetry between a firm and its investors, we show that investor informedness
dampens the link between competition and crash risk. These findings lend support to our prior
that the more informed are the investors about the content of withheld information, the fewer
opportunities a firm may have in withholding adverse news without being fully penalized.
Closely related to our work is the study by Li (2010), who has also constructed variables to
capture existing competition and potential competition separately. More specifically, she uses in-
dustry concentration as a proxy for competitive threats from existing rivals and industry-average
11To the extent that operating conditions of customer-connected peers affect their competitiveness, the identi-
fication tests using peer bankruptcy and natural disaster incidences also indicate the significant role such peers
have in influencing a firm’s disclosure behavior.
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capital and R&D expenditures to measure threats from potential entrants. These measures
are, however, criticized for simultaneously reflecting both types of competitive threats (Karuna
2010). For instance, it is arguable that capital and R&D spending may both deter prospective
entrants and discourage existing rivals by altering production levels. In a similar vein, a low
industry concentration reflecting more intense competition among the incumbent firms may also
deter entrants. In contrast, our study constructs measures of existing and potential competitors
directly based on their product similarity and the customers they serve. Our measures, there-
fore, allow us to distinguish between threats from existing competitors and those from potential
competitors.
Our study makes several significant contributions to the disclosure literature. First, prior
research on the relationship between competition and disclosure primarily considers the costs
of disclosing information to competitors as the key underlying mechanism (e.g., Botosan and
Stanford 2005; Verrecchia and Weber 2006; Berger and Hann 2007; Li 2010; Ali et al. 2014;
Li and Zhan 2019). They make relatively little efforts to find direct evidence supporting this
competitor-induced motive and largely overlook motives associated with other market partici-
pants. We fill the gap in the literature by incorporating two additional mechanisms, the costs of
disclosing information to customers and the benefits of withholding information from investors,
into our analysis, and by providing empirical support to all three motives behind firms’ disclosure
decisions in competitive scenarios.
Second, our study contributes to the growing crash risk literature by documenting the effects
of trading relationships on a firm’s information withholding behavior. Two recent papers (Chen,
Hu, Yao, and Zhao 2018; Kim, Lee, and Song 2018) are closely related. They extract information
from the corporate customer-supplier network and examine whether crash risk is associated
with corporate customer concentration. Both studies reach the same conclusion that customer
concentration, which proxies for a firm’s dependence on a few large customers, increases crash
risk. Unlike these papers, we employ the identities of both the customers and suppliers to
determine each customer’s network of suppliers. Such detailed information allows us to focus on
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a pool of suppliers connected through common customers and investigate how their relationships
in the product market affect crash risk beyond that of customer concentration.
Finally, we validate stock price crashes as a measure of negative news hoarding. Extant
research on agency theory-based arguments of managerial incentives for hoarding information
(e.g., Kim, Li, and Zhang 2011a,b; Kim, Li, and Li 2014; Kim, Wang, and Zhang 2016) relies
heavily on the prior work by Jin and Myers (2006), Bleck and Liu (2007), and Hutton, Marcus,
and Tehranian (2009) to motivate the use of crash risk measures as proxies for adverse infor-
mation withholding. However, stock price crashes can be driven by many other factors such
as heterogeneity in investors’ beliefs (Hong and Stein 2003) and the nature of firm operations,
among others (Habib, Hasan, and Jiang 2017). By showing that an effect on crash risk coincides
with a similar effect on other measures of negative news hoarding, we complement earlier work
and confirm the information hoarding interpretation of stock price crash risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 develops testable hypothe-
ses. Section 2.3 describes data sources, sample construction, and variable definitions. Section
2.4 examines the impact of existing competition on adverse information withholding. Section
2.5 establishes the causal relationship between existing competition and crash risk. Section
2.6 investigates the underlying mechanisms driving the baseline relationship, and Section 2.7
concludes.
2.2 Hypothesis Development
Theories suggest that more intense competition from existing rivals inhibits disclosure of unfavor-
able information. For instance, Verrecchia (1983) models a post-entry game in which incumbent
firms in a product market compete among themselves. He argues that disclosure decisions are
determined by the trade-offs between countervailing incentives from product and financial mar-
kets. On the one hand, a firm is concerned over the costs associated with disclosing proprietary
information to its competitors. Existing rivals may use the revealed information to strategize
competitive actions against the disclosing firm. Thus, the high cost of releasing proprietary
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information discourages the firm from divulging any of its negative information. On the other
hand, a firm is also concerned about uninformed investors rationally discounting firm value to
the extent that they expect the non-disclosed information withheld to contain bad news. The
investors’ conjecture about the content of such information may be so unfavorable that the firm
is better off disclosing the adverse news. Such concerns from the capital market encourage disclo-
sure.12 However, as competitive pressure from existing rivals mounts, both forces provide more
incentives for a firm to withhold information. First, the proprietary cost of disclosure increases
with the competition, as incumbents are more likely to take aggressive actions in response to the
disclosed information. Second, investors adjust their inferences to account for changes in pro-
prietary costs. They expect that firms with higher proprietary costs are more likely to conceal
both favorable and unfavorable information and hence would not interpret withheld information
as unambiguously negative and discount firm values accordingly.
Clinch and Verrecchia (1997) similarly predict a positive association between existing com-
petition and detrimental news withholding. In a post-entry duopoly game, the incumbents
competing in a product market each have private information about the aggregate future de-
mand for a product. Since knowledge of aggregate demand affects the level of production, firms
are inclined to withhold extremely damaging information, such as dismal future demand, to
exploit incorrect production decisions made by their rivals. As competition between firms inten-
sifies, so are their incentives for concealing low demand information. Hence, both the amount
of information disclosed and the likelihood of information being released decrease as the level of
existing competition increases.
The above arguments give rise to the following hypothesis:
H1a: Competitive threats from existing rivals are positively associated with bad news with-
holding.
In contrast, theoretical evidence suggests that threats from potential entrants encourage in-
12In addition to a value discount, firms may also be concerned about stockholder litigation and reputational
costs when investors are surprised by material negative information. Hence, firms would be inclined to make
preemptive bad news disclosures to avoid the accumulation of unfavorable information (Skinner 1994; 1997).
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cumbent firms’ disclosure of unfavorable information to reduce the attractiveness of the product
market (e.g., Darrough and Stoughton 1990; Wagenhofer 1990; Feltham and Xie 1992). Unlike
in the post-entry game, disclosure could still affect the probability of entry for potential com-
petitors in an entry game model. In this context, prospective entrants would only enter the
product market if their expected return exceeds the cost of entry, and unfavorable information
from incumbents reduces such expected return. Thus, incumbent firms facing threats from po-
tential entrants are inclined to reveal negative information as a way to deter entry. Accordingly,
we expect existing and potential competition to have offsetting effects on information hoarding
behavior. This argument leads to the following hypothesis:
H1b: Competitive threats from potential rivals are negatively associated with adverse news
withholding.
We then explore the mechanisms behind the positive association between existing compe-
tition and bad news hoarding. As suggested by Verrecchia (1983), one such mechanism is the
increased cost associated with disclosing information to competitors. As competition intensifies,
existing rivals are more likely to use the disclosed information in devising competitive strategies
against the disclosing firm. Negative information, in particular, may additionally encourage
predatory actions by rivals. Engaging predation can be costly, so predatory actions would only
be taken when there is sufficient information to suggest reasonable costs and the probability
of success associated with them (Bernard 2016). Disclosure of unfavorable information helps
the competitors in resolving these uncertainties and informing them of the target firm’s lower
ability to withstand and survive aggressive actions. While firms with increasing concerns over
rivals’ competitive efforts are more inclined to hoard information, they could also mitigate such
concerns by forming alliances with rivals. We contend that establishing business alliances with
rival firms would lead to less hostility but more information sharing between a firm and its
competitors, thereby reducing the need or incentive for the firm to hide adverse information
from these competitors. We test this competitor-induced motive in the following hypothesis:
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H2: The positive association between competitive threats from existing rivals and bad news
withholding is less pronounced when business alliances are formed between the focal firm
and its rival(s).
Firms may also have customer-induced motives for withholding adverse news in a competitive
environment. As the competition among existing rivals increases, firms become increasingly
concerned over maintaining stable relationships with their customers. When customers have
more alternative suppliers to choose from, they face lower switching costs and gain bargaining
power over their suppliers. The latter, in turn, face higher risks of losing their positions in
future contracts with the former. To the extent that existing competition captures such risk
of a supplier firm, it provides incentives for the firm to manage customers’ perceptions about
its business prospects and hide any negative information that would hamper such perceptions.
One testable implication of such motives is that the effect of existing competition on bad news
hoarding would become weaker when the firm builds a cooperative relationship with its customers
through forming business alliances and providing trade credits. We posit that in the presence of
customer-induced motives, a lower propensity to switch away would reduce the need for the firm
to influence the customers’ perceptions, and a lower degree of information asymmetry between
them would limit the firm’s ability to conceal information. We formally test the customer-
induced motive hypotheses as follows:
H3a: The positive association between competitive threats from existing rivals and bad news
withholding is less pronounced when business alliances are formed between the focal firm
and its corporate customers.
H3b: The positive association between competitive threats from existing rivals and bad news
withholding is less pronounced when the focal firm offers trade credits to its corporate
customers.
Finally, competitive threats from existing rivals may give rise to investor-induced motives
for information hoarding behavior. As argued above, higher proprietary costs of disclosure in-
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duced by intense competition provide an opportunity for firms to conceal negative information
from investors. Investors’ conjecture about the content of the withheld information depends
on the firm’s motivation for withholding it (Verrecchia 1983). When proprietary costs of the
disclosure are low, investors expect that information hoarding behavior is possibly driven by
capital market concerns and hence anticipate the information withheld to be likely bad news.
As proprietary costs increase, however, investors expect the behavior to be more likely moti-
vated by product market threats, thereby anticipating the information withheld to consist of
both good and bad news. With a broader range of possible interpretations of withheld informa-
tion, investors discount the withholding of negative information less heavily. Therefore, more
competitive pressure (and higher proprietary costs) allows a firm with more negative than pos-
itive news to take advantage of investors’ rational expectations and hide negative information
without being adequately penalized. One important testable implication of the investor-induced
motive is that the more informed the investors are about the content of withheld information,
the fewer opportunities firms would have in withholding negative information even in a com-
petitive environment where proprietary costs are higher. Formally, the investor-induced motive
hypothesis is stated as follows:
H4: The positive association between competitive threats from existing rivals and bad news
withholding is less pronounced for firms with greater investor informedness.
2.3 Data and Sample Construction
We construct our sample from several data sources: (i) supplier-customer relationship data
from both the Factset Revere and Compustat’s Customer Segments data, available through the
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS); (ii) stock return data from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP); (iii) product market classification and firm relatedness information
developed in Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016), which is made available via Hoberg and Phillips’s
data library; (iv) information on M&A deals from the SDC Platinum; (v) Chapter 11 bankruptcy
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filings data from Ma, Tong, and Wang (2019);13 (vi) county-level disaster data from Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); (vii) firm employment data by establishment from
Dun and Bradstreet via Mergent; (viii) firm disclosure events from Capital IQ Key Development;
(ix) the SEC comment letter and restatement records from Audit Analytics; (x) institutional
holdings data from Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13f); (xi) financial analyst forecast
information from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES); (xii) firm-specific press
articles from Ravenpack full package; and (xiii) financial statement data from Compustat. Our
primary sample intersects these databases with non-missing values for our main variables of
interest. We exclude financial and regulated utility firms (SIC codes 4900-4999 and 6000-6900).
This merging of databases yields a final sample of 28,598 firm-year observations, consisting
of 4,436 unique supplier firms over the period between 1996 and 2015. The sample period is
bounded by the availability of Hoberg and Phillips’ industry classification and firm product
relatedness data; their coverage ranges from 1996 to 2015. The actual number of observations
varies across analyses, given different data availability. The definitions of all the key variables
are depicted in Table A.2.
2.3.1 Customer-supplier networks
We use both the Revere and Customer Segments data to identify customer-supplier relation-
ships. Under SEC Regulation S-K Item 101, all public firms in the United States are required
to disclose the existence and identities of major customers representing more than 10% of their
sales, while suppliers can also voluntarily disclose minor customers that account for less than
10% of the revenues. The Customer Segments data rely on such regulation to obtain supply
chain information from suppliers’ annual 10-K filings and hence contain mainly information on
firms’ major customers. A critical shortcoming of this database is that it does not assign unique
company identities (GVKEYs) to publicly-listed customer firms, whose names are as reported
in the original filing and are abbreviations or even subsidiary names. To circumvent these data
challenges, we strictly follow Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008) and Cen, Maydew, Zhang,
13We thank Wei Wang for generously sharing the bankruptcy data with us.
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and Zuo (2017) in manually matching the customer names with their unique GVKEYs that
would allow us to link customer information with other databases.14 Unlike Customer Segments
data, Revere gathers information from multiple sources, including corporate quarterly and an-
nual filings (e.g., 8-K, 10-Q, and 10-K), investor presentations, websites, and press releases. The
database identifies customer-supplier relationships based on both direct disclosure by the report-
ing company and indirect disclosure by companies doing business with the reporting company.
It thus offers a more comprehensive supply chain information consisting of both major and mi-
nor customers. No manual matching is necessary given that Revere data provide GVKEYs for
publicly-listed customers. We complement Revere data, which start coverage from 2003, with
Customer Segments data to obtain corporate customer-supplier pairs over our 1996-2015 sam-
ple period. For illustration purposes, we show in Figure 2.1 a portion of the 2014 supply chain
network containing Texas Instruments Inc. The figure depicts the linkages between Texas In-
struments, its customers, and other firms in the same product space supplying to its customers.
Leveraging such comprehensive information, we construct our measures of existing and potential
competition based on the connectivity among suppliers through common customers.
2.3.2 Measures of competition
To construct measures of competition, we first identify competing peers for each supplier firm
Si. Specifically, peers are defined as firms within the same product space as Si, based on Hoberg
and Phillips’ (2010; 2016) Text-based Network Industry Classifications (TNIC). Such a classifi-
cation system allows us to identify competitors based on their product similarity. To the extent
that firms offering similar products can replace one another, this approach reasonably captures
substitutability relationships in which Si faces competitive pressure from its peers rather than
complementarity relationships in which the firms are supplying different components of a final
product.15 We then classify the peers as existing rivals if they have at least one common corpo-
14We thank Ling Cen for providing us his matched Customer Segments data for calibration purposes.
15While one may still be concerned that the minimum similarity threshold required by TNIC is not sufficient to
tease out all complementary peers, we further address this issue by explicitly constructing competition measures
based on product similarity scores as discussed later in this section.
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rate customer as Si (customer-connected peers/suppliers) and potential competitors otherwise
(customer-connected peers/suppliers).
As an example, suppose supplier firms S1, S2, S3, and S4 produce similar products. S1
and S2 supply to customer C1, whereas S3 and S4 supply to customer C2. While all four
suppliers are in the same product space, only S2 shares a common customer with S1 and is,
thus, considered as S1’s existing competitor. S3 and S4 are considered as potential rivals of
S1 who may establish new relationships with C1 in the future. This approach enables us to
highlight two key distinguishing characteristics of competition among existing rivals. First,
customer-connected peers are good representations of rival firms that have already incurred
costs associated with market entry. For instance, an existing relationship between S2 and C1
suggests that S2 has already made considerable relationship-specific investments in supplying
to the same customer as S1. Hence, S1 is competing with an existing rival that is committed
to optimizing its position in the same product market. It is in clear contrast to competing
with the potential entrants S3 and S4 that have not invested in establishing relationships with
C1. Second, the classification suggests a lower switching cost associated with existing rivals
than with potential competitors. A common customer such as C1 that maintains simultaneous
relationships with both S1 and S2 may find it easier to switch between the two existing suppliers
than to other potential suppliers. Consequently, any strategic moves by S2 would jeopardize S1’s
position in its relationship with C1. In contrast, a customer may incur significant costs when
switching to new suppliers due to frictions such as information asymmetry between the parties
and a lack of customer-tailored products offered by the potential suppliers. Thus, C2 would be
considered as a different market by S1, and the main concern S1 has over S3 and S4 would be
their potential access to C1 rather than how they compete within their own market for C2.
Focusing on the customer-connected peers, we construct three measures of existing compe-
tition. These proxies capture the extent to which Si’s corporate customers are simultaneously
dependent on alternate suppliers offering similar products as Si. Intuitively, the more relation-
ships that customers are concurrently maintaining with other sources of supply, the greater the
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competitive pressure that Si would face in maintaining its current positions and seizing future
contractual opportunities with the common customers. For our first measure, Peer Count, we
count the number of customer-connected peers that Si obtains in year t through each of its
customers Cj and take the log average of the counts across the all customers as shown in Eq.
(2.1) below.16 The other competition measures are averaged in the same fashion.






where supplier Si has ni customers in year t, and each customer Cj has mj alternate suppliers
other than Si in the same TNIC industry. The intuition behind Peer Count is illustrated
in Figure 2.2, which exemplifies a scenario where supplier S1 is, on average, competing with
four other industry peers through each of the customers, whereas supplier S2 is only competing
against two other suppliers. Hence, a higher value of Peer Count corresponds to a more significant
competitive threat from the customer-connected peers.
Our second measure, Peer Sales, similarly captures Cj ’s existing relationships with the
customer-connected peers of Si, but further accounts for the extent to which Cj depends on
those alternate suppliers by taking the sum of the peers’ sales to Cj as a percentage of Cj ’s










where Salesj,k is the percentage of peer firm Pk’s sales attributed to each customer Cj of supplier
Si in year t, and COGSj is Cj ’s cost of good sold.
For our third measure of existing competition, we consider the scarcity of Si’s products
relative to those of the existing rivals. More specifically, we take the average of the product
similarity scores between Si and its customer-connected peers, where the scores measure the
relatedness of two firms based on their product descriptions in 10-K filings. The higher the
16Over 70% of the customer-supplier pair observations have missing sales distribution information. We work
with equally-weighted average measures instead of sales-weighted averages to avoid eliminating a large portion of
the sample.
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where Peer Similarityi,k is the product similarity score between Si and its connected peer Pk in
year t. Using product similarity, and hence substitutability, to measure competitive threats, this
proxy alleviates the concern that our measures may be capturing non-competitive relationships
among firms who produce complementary products.
In addition, we construct two measures of potential competition to capture the threats from
non-connected peers who may potentially establish new trading relationships with Si’s customers
and reduce Si’s profits. In particular, we define Non-Linked Peer Count as the log number of
non-connected peers Si has in year t and Non-Linked Peer Similarity as the average product
similarity scores between Si and its non-connected peers.
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2.3.3 Measures of bad news withholding
Following the existing literature (Chen, Hong, and Stein 2001; Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian
2009; and Kim, Li, and Zhang 2011a, b), we employ three firm-specific measures of stock price
crash risk for each firm-year as proxies for bad news withholding. To construct the measures, we
first run the following regression for each firm-year using weekly returns during the 12 months
ending three months after the supplier’s fiscal year-end. The three-month lag is used to ensure
that financial information is available to investors and is, in turn, incorporated into stock prices
at the time of measurement.
ri,τ = αi + β1,irm,τ−2 + β2,irm,τ−1 + β3,irm,τ + β4,irm,τ+1 + β5,irm,τ+2 + εi,τ , (2.4)
where ri,τ is the return on stock i in week τ , rm,τ is the return on CRSP value-weighted market
index in week τ , and εi,τ is the firm-specific residual return in week τ after removing the impact of
17One may be concerned that the TNIC classification is insufficient to ensure a high degree of product similarity
between non-connected peers and Si, and as a result, these peers may contain a subset of unrelated firms who
have little incentive to enter into Si’s product market. To address this issue, we further require the non-connected
peers to share at least one common product-based Revere Industry classification code with Si.
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market fluctuations. The lead and lag market returns are included to account for nonsynchronous
trading (Dimson 1979). We calculate the firm-specific weekly return for supplier i in week τ as
the natural logarithm of one plus residual return (Wi,τ = ln(1 + εi,τ )) from Eq. (2.4).
The first measure of crash risk is the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns
(NCSKEW). It is defined as the negative of the ratio of the third moment to the standard
deviation cubed of Wi,τ for each firm-year. A higher value of NCSKEW corresponds to a more
left-skewed distribution of supplier i’s weekly returns, indicating a higher incidence of a crash.
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where n is the number of observations of Wi,τ during year t.
The second measure is the down-to-up volatility measure (DUVOL). For each firm-year, we
separate all weeks into two groups based on whether the weekly returns are above or below
the annual mean. Those returns above the mean are grouped into up weeks, and those below
are categorized into down weeks. We then compute DUVOL as the log ratio of the standard
deviation of Wi,τ of the down weeks to that of the up weeks as illustrated in Eq. (2.6). Similar
to NCSKEW, a higher value of DUVOL corresponds to a more left-skewed distribution of Wi,τ ,















where nd is the number of down weeks for supplier i in year t, and nu is the number of up weeks.
The third measure is based on the number of firm-specific weekly returns Wi,τ exceeding 3.09
standard deviations above and below the mean weekly return over the entire fiscal year for each
supplier i. The 3.09 standard deviation is chosen so that the crash incidents account for 0.1%
of frequency in the normal distribution. The measure Crash Count is defined as the difference
of downside and upside counts (Callen and Fang, 2015, 2017), so a higher value corresponds to
a higher frequency of crashes.
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2.3.4 Control variables
We also follow the above-mentioned prior studies to identify control variables that affect stock
price crash risk. Specifically, our analyses control for firm-specific variables, including firm size
(Size), market-to-book ratio of equity (MB), leverage ratio (Leverage), profitability (ROA), and
cumulative discretionary accrual (AbAccr). These studies show that the likelihood of future
stock price crashes tends to be positively correlated with Size, MB, and AbAccr and nega-
tively associated with Leverage. While the existing literature documents a significant ROA
effect on crash risk, the direction of its effect is unclear. For example, Hutton, Marcus, and
Tehranian (2009) and Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011a, b) find a negative relationship between ROA
and crash risk, whereas Kim and Zhang (2016) and Li and Zhan (2019) document a positive
relationship. We also control for stock-specific characteristics, including the change in stock
turnover (∆Turnover) computed as the average of the monthly turnover within a fiscal year
minus its counterpart in the previous year, firm-specific average weekly return within a fiscal
year (Return), firm-specific weekly return volatility computed within a fiscal year (Sigma), and
one-year-lagged negative skewness measure (NCSKEW). We expect crash risk to be higher for
stocks with greater heterogeneity in investor opinions and higher past returns, past stock volatil-
ity, and past return skewness. The detailed definitions of the control variables are provided in
Appendix Table A.2.
2.3.5 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for the key variables used in our analysis; Panels A, B,
and C report the distributions for the existing competition measures, stock price crash risk, and
control variables, respectively. The mean value of Peer Count is 1.015, indicating that a firm’s
customers are, on average, also trading with about two of its existing rivals simultaneously (i.e.,
ln(1 + 1.760) = 1.015). The mean value of Peer Sales, as expressed in percentage of inputs,
suggests that, on average, the customers rely on these rivals to produce about 1.6% of their
inputs. A supplier has an average product similarity score, Peer Similarity, of 0.022 with its
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customer-connected peers, and the interquartile range is between zero and 0.033.
The table also reveals that at least 25% of the sample has a zero value for both Peer Count
and Peer Similarity, where a zero value indicates that the focal firm has no other competing
peers supplying to its customers. Over 50% of the sample has a zero value for Peer Sales,
since many suppliers do not disclose their sales figures by individual customers. While we
include observations with zero values in our main analyses, unreported results suggest that our
findings are robust to excluding those observations from the three existing competition measures.
Moreover, it is important to stress that the competition measures are persistent over time, so
incorporating firm fixed effects into the regression models may mask the effects of competition
given a much smaller within-firm variation than between-firm variation. For these considerations
and consistency with existing studies, only industry and year fixed effects are reported in all
tables throughout this paper.
The mean values of NCSKEW and DUVOL are 0.057 and 0.042, respectively. The positive
values indicate that, on average, a supplier’s weekly returns are left-skewed. The mean value of
Crash Count is -0.008, suggesting that a supplier firm has, on average, 0.008 more upside weeks
than downside crash weeks during a year. All control variables are within reasonable ranges and
are comparable with the statistics reported in the prior studies mentioned earlier.
2.4 Competitive Threats and Bad News Hoarding
In this section, we test whether existing competition compels a supplier to withhold negative
information by examining the relationship between competitive threats from connected peers and
stock price crash risk. Next, we investigate whether competition from potential entrants would
have an offsetting effect on such information hoarding behavior. We also conduct a multitude
of empirical tests on other measures of managerial disclosure practices to further substantiate
our information hoarding interpretation of the crash risk measures.
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2.4.1 Baseline evidence
To empirically examine the relationship between existing competition and supplier stock-price
crash risk, we regress each crash risk measure on a competition measure constructed from
customer-connected peers, firm-level controls, and year and industry fixed effects as follows:
Crash Riski,t+1 = α0 + α1Connected Peer Threati,t +
K∑
k=1
βkXki,t + FEt + εi,t, (2.7)
where Crash Riski,t+1 is a measure of one-year-ahead crash incidences of supplier i (i.e., NCSKEW,
DUVOL, or Crash Count); Connected Peer Threati,t is one of the proxies for competitive threats
from customer-connected peers (i.e., Peer Count, Peer Sales, or Peer Similarity) faced by supplier
i in year t; Xki,t is a vector of firm-specific control variables defined earlier, measured in year
t. We also control for industry, defined by two-digit SIC classification, and year fixed effects
(FE) in all regressions to account for unmodeled heterogeneity across industries and years.18
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Results from our baseline model Eq. (2.7) are reported in Table 2.2. The dependent variables
are NCSKEWi,t+1 in Columns (1)-(3), DUVOLi,t+1 in Columns (4)-(6), and Crash Counti,t+1
in Columns (7)-(9). Consistent with H1a, all three measures of Connected Peer Threat generate
statistically significant and positive coefficients for each of the crash risk measures. For instance,
the coefficient on Peer Count is 0.029 for NCSKEW, corresponding to an increase in the negative
skewness of supplier returns by 0.029 for each one-standard-deviation increase in Peer Count.
This magnitude is large compared to the mean NCSKEW of 0.057. The coefficients on Peer Sales
and Peer Similarity are 0.417 and 1.151, respectively, corresponding to increases in NCSKEW
by 0.016 and 0.031 (i.e., 27.8% and 54.5% of the NCSKEW mean) for a one-standard-deviation
change in the competition variables. The effects on DUVOL and Crash Count are also sizable
and economically significant. For example, a one-standard-deviation change in Peer Count, Peer
Sales, and Peer Similarity leads to 36.3%, 21.8%, and 40.0% increases in DUVOL relative to
18Habib, Hasan, and Jiang (2017) suggest that some industries may potentially be more prone to crashes than
others due to the fundamental nature of their operations. Industry fixed effects are used to control for such
heterogeneities.
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the sample mean. These findings indicate that firms are more inclined to withhold unfavorable
information as competition from existing rivals intensifies.
The control variables yield the same signs and similar coefficients as those reported in the
previous studies mentioned in the earlier section. Specifically, the coefficients on Size, MB,
∆Turnover, AbAccr, NCSKEW, Sigma, ROA, and Return are all positive and significant. The
coefficients on Leverage are negative, but they are statistically insignificant in all regressions.
2.4.2 Potential competition and other sources of competitive threats
To test whether threats from existing rivals have distinct effects from other sources of competitive
threats, we add each measure of potential and overall competition, one at a time, to our regression
model (2.7). Panels A and B of Table 2.3 show regression results that include each measure
of non-connected peers proxying for potential competition (i.e., Non-Linked Peer Count and
Non-Linked Peer Similarity), whereas Panels C and D of the same table present the results
that include, respectively, measures of the overall competition, namely, Hoberg, Phillips, and
Prabhala’s (2014) Fluidity and the traditional Herfindahl Index (HHI). Fluidity captures the
extent to which firms with similar product vocabulary as supplier i’s are changing their product
descriptions. A higher value corresponds to increased product market instabilities arising from
competitor actions and hence more intense competition. Incorporating these measures into our
model enables us to examine the effects from distinct sources of competition separately and to
alleviate the concern that Connected Peer Threat measures may potentially capture competition
of other dimensions than existing rivalry.
The overall results further substantiate our prior stated in H1a that the positive association
between existing competition and crash risk is not subsumed by other dimensions of competitive
threats. The coefficients on the three Connected Peer Threat proxies remain positive and sta-
tistically significant for all crash risk measures. Another important observation from the table
is that competition from potential rivals, as proxied by Non-Linked Peer Count and Non-Linked
Peer Similarity, appears to have a negative effect on crash risk. The coefficients on Non-Linked
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Peer Count are negative across all nine sets of regressions and are statistically significant in six
of them. Results for Non-Linked Peer Similarity are considerably weaker, but the signs of the
coefficients remain negative for most of the regressions. These findings are consistent with H1b
and lend support to validating our new competition constructs.
We observe that the coefficients of Connected Peer Threat remain materially unaffected af-
ter adding HHI to the model and are somewhat weaker for the Crash Count estimations after
factoring in Fluidity. Importantly, none of the coefficients on HHI and Fluidity are statistically
significant, suggesting that no other dimensions of competition have incremental effects in in-
ducing the bad news hoarding behavior beyond that already captured by the Connected Peer
Threat measures.
In summary, the results indicate that competition from customer-connected peers is the
primary motive for firms to avoid bad news disclosure, and that they are consistent with the
notion that competition from existing and potential rivals have distinct effects on disclosure
decisions.
2.4.3 Managerial strategic disclosure behavior
While we have established the effects of existing competition on crash risk, one may criticize
that crash risk is but an indirect measure of negative information hoarding subject to alternative
interpretations. For instance, price crashes can be driven by the fundamental nature of a firm’s
operations, irrespective of whether negative information about the firm is withheld. In address-
ing such skepticism, we construct other proxies for managerial strategic disclosure behavior and
examine their relationships with existing competition.
First, we exploit firm-specific corporate disclosure events, including conference presentations,
earnings calls, earnings announcements, client announcements, product-related announcements,
and corporate guidance, to construct three measures capturing managers’ tendencies to releasing
bad news. Each of these events is classified as a positive-news (negative-news) disclosure event
if the cumulative abnormal return CAR(-1,1) during the 3-day window surrounding the event
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is positive (negative). All News, defined as the ratio of the number of firm-specific negative-
news events to the number of firm-specific positive-news events, gauges firm managers’ overall
propensity to release negative information, incorporating both material and immaterial informa-
tion. In contrast, 5% Significant News and 10% Significant News are intended to only capture
the propensity of disclosing material news that results in significantly large investor reactions.
Specifically, 5% Significant News (10% Significant News) is the ratio of the number of firm-
specific negative-news events with CAR(-1,1) less than -5% (-10%) to positive-news events with
CAR(-1,1) more than 5% (10%). We replicate our baseline analysis using these three proxies
measured one year ahead as the outcome variables and report the results in Panel A of Table
2.4.
The panel reveals some distinct findings. The coefficients on All News, as shown in Columns
(1)-(3), are negative and statistically significant across all connected peer competition measures,
indicating that firms facing intense competition from existing rivals tend to release less negative
news in general. In contrast, the coefficients on extreme news ratios tend to be positive, suggest-
ing that intense competition is associated with more material information disclosure. Columns
(4)-(9) show that the coefficients are mostly statistically significant. For example, the coefficient
on Peer Count is 0.017 (t = 3.20) for 5% Significant News estimation and 0.020 (t = 4.16) for
10% Significant News estimation. The results are consistent with the notion that firms under
competitive pressure stockpile negative news until it becomes material information; at which
point, it is disclosed at the cost of stronger negative investor reactions.
Second, we examine whether managers are urged to make bad reporting choices in their
mandatory filings to conceal adverse information about their firms. One ex post identification
of company filing deficiencies is the comment letters sent by SEC. The SEC’s Division of Cor-
poration Finance has an oversight role of financial reporting through its review of company
filings (e.g., Form 10-Ks, Form 10-Qs, Form S-1s, and DEF 14A) to ensure compliance with
“the applicable disclosure and accounting requirements.” The Division conducts three levels of
reviews: (i) a complete review of all of a firm’s filings; (ii) a financial statement review that
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involves financial statements, notes, and related disclosure such as the management discussion
and analysis or MD&A; or (iii) a targeted review examining particular issues in a filing. If a
report flags potential deficiencies, the SEC sends a comment letter to the firm requesting clar-
ification, additional information, or disclosure adjustments in the filing or future filings. Due
to limited time and resources, the Division only conducts reviews on a chosen subset of firms
registered with the SEC. We exploit these comment letters to evaluate the quality of a firm’s
mandatory financial reporting in response to competitive threats. If existing competition incites
detrimental information withholding, then the required financial filings may lack clarity and, in
turn, trigger SEC feedback.
The comment letters are obtained from the Audit Analytics for the 2005-2015 period, from
which we define the number of SEC comment letters as the number of different corporate filings
from a firm that triggered a comment letter. Firm-year observations not receiving any comment
letters would have a value of zero. We conduct two sets of regressions using the same specifi-
cations as Eq. (2.7) and report the results in Columns (1)-(6), Panel B of Table 2.4. The first
set analyzes the full sample, whereas the second set focuses on only the sample of firm-years re-
viewed by the SEC. The coefficients on all three measures constructed from customer-connected
peers are positive and strongly significant at the 1% level, consistent with our prediction that
competitive pressure from existing rivals motivates the strategic disclosure of bad news.
Finally, we examine the material restatements of a firm’s financial reporting as another ex
post measure of deliberate information hoarding behavior. Effective 2004, all firms are required
to disclose restatements of any SEC filing via Item 4.02 in Form 8-K. Compared to those in other
filings (also known as stealth restatements), restatements disclosed in 8-Ks are associated with
significant adverse market reactions, indicating the materiality of such information (Irani and
Xu 2011). Using these restatements available in Audit Analytics, we conduct logit regressions
with a dependent variable indicating the occurrence of material restatements. Columns (7)-(9)
of Panel B report our findings. The positive and statistically significant coefficients indicate
increased withholding of information, which ultimately precipitates financial restatements.
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The overall evidence validates the bad news hoarding interpretation of stock price crash risk
and confirms our prediction stated in H1a. While these constructs have the advantage of directly
measuring disclosure behavior over the crash risk proxies, they suffer essential drawbacks. For
instance, the disclosure events with significant adverse investor reactions are rare in occurrence,
and the likelihood of identifying them is highly dependent on the overall number of disclosure
events held by a firm. Firms exhibit considerable heterogeneity in a number of these events,
and the decisions of holding them may be endogenously determined, potentially confounding our
causal inferences of the relationship. Similarly, SEC reviews, let alone comment letters, are rarely
found in our sample, and SEC’s decisions to review may be endogenous. Furthermore, material
restatements also capture extreme practices of disclosure that cannot be observed regularly. To
circumvent any potential issues that arise from extreme observations and endogeneity, our study
uses these disclosure proxies only for validation purposes and focuses on crash risk hereafter.
2.4.4 Other robustness tests
We conduct additional analyses to exhaust alternative interpretations of the baseline findings.
Results are reported in Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4. First, one may argue that the customer-
connected peer competition measures potentially capture the customer concentration of a firm
(Chen, Hu, Yao, and Zhao 2018; Kim, Si, Xia, and Zhang 2018). However, we contend that
such issues are not critical since (i) we examine all customer-supplier relationships irrespective
of whether the customers are major or minor; and (ii) our proxies do not depend on a firm’s
number of major customers nor do they rely on the percentage of sales attributed to these
customers. Nonetheless, we test against these possibilities by controlling for the sum of squared
sales percentages to a firm’s major corporate customers, a measure of firm dependence on major
customers. Panel A of Table A.3 shows that the coefficients on Customer Concentration are
positive and statistically significant in Columns (1)-(6), but not in Columns (7)-(9). More
importantly, the coefficients on all three measures of connected peer threats remain robust to
the additional control variable.
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Second, we test whether our findings are driven by difficult times when the likelihood of
relationship termination is higher. For instance, Cen, Maydew, Zhang, and Zuo (2017) argue that
when facing a greater risk of losing its customers, a firm is more inclined to manage detrimental
news disclosure. In addressing this concern, we exclude financial crisis years (2008-2009) from
the sample to remove the influences of extreme economic conditions. As shown in Panel B, the
coefficients on all three existing competition measures remain statistically significant.19
Additionally, we perform tests to rule out the possibility that our key results are driven
by firms that are more prone to stock price crashes due to the fundamental nature of their
operations. We construct three proxies to capture operating and business risks, namely, (i)
the price-cost margin scaled by sales as a measure of market power; (ii) the annual standard
deviation of operating income before depreciation over total assets as a measure of operating
risk; and (iii) the contemporaneous operating performance defined as the number of negative
news articles net of positive news articles available in Ravenpack on topics related to a firm’s
demand guidance, demand, production outlook, supply guidance, supply, market guidance, and
market share. We repeat our analysis of Eq. (2.7), while controlling for the three constructs
separately. Results shown in Table A.4 suggest that our main evidence is not driven by operating
risks.
2.5 Identification strategies
Thus far, the results underscore a strong positive association between existing competition and
stock price crash risk. However, our causal inferences of this relationship may be subject to
endogeneity concerns such as reverse causality and confounding factors. To alleviate these con-
cerns, we exploit three quasi-natural experiments to capture large exogenous shocks to customer-
connected peers.
19We also replicate Li and Zhan’s (2019) study by constructing a sample similar to theirs and find that their
evidence based on Fluidity as a measure of product market competition is specific to their time period employed,
but that Fluidity becomes statistically insignificant when the crisis period is removed from the sample.
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2.5.1 Customer M&A intensity
Our first identification strategy uses the intensity of customer M&A activities as an exogenous
source of an increase in the number of customer-connected peers and, thus, the focal supplier’s
existing competition. Through the consolidation of purchasing accounts, the acquiring customers
would mechanically gain new trading partners, which in turn would add new customer-connected
peers to the existing customer-supplier network. Hence, intense customer M&A activities should
correspond to an increase in the competitive pressure from customer-connected peers. Such an
instrumental variable (IV) of existing competition satisfies not only the relevance condition but
also the exclusion restrictions. First, customer M&A activities are as good as randomly assigned
across suppliers since they are likely independent of suppliers’ corporate decisions. There may be
a concern that customers undertake M&As to counteract the monopoly power of their suppliers,
which is, in part, determined by the suppliers’ product market competition (Galbraith 1952).
However, it can be alleviated by excluding all vertical M&As, which can potentially be motivated
by customers’ responses to the market power of upstream firms (Spengler 1950). Second, it is
reasonable to assert that customer M&A activities would only affect the suppliers’ crash risk
through their effects on the suppliers’ competitive pressure. One possible concern is that merger
waves could have contagion effects through customer industries to supplier industries and, in
turn, capture the impact of supplier M&As on crash risk. While plausible, this argument
of M&A propagation along the supply chain industries is less critical in our setting. Ahern
and Harford (2014) show that the effect of customer consolidation on the supplier industry
is much less than the impact of supplier industry consolidation on customer M&A activity.
Nevertheless, we control for the supplier industry fixed effects in the IV analyses to address all
remaining concerns and to remove any unobserved industry-wide effect that may contaminate
the exclusion restriction.
Our empirical procedure is based on a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimation. In the
first stage, we regress a supplier’s existing competition proxy on the customer M&A intensity
measure. The second stage tests the effect of instrumented competitive threats on the stock
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price crash risk. Formally, we estimate the following two-stage model:
Connected Peer Threati,t = γ0 + γ1Instrumental Variablei,t +
K∑
k=1
λkXki,t + FE + ηi,t
Crash Riski,t+1 = α0 + α1 ̂Connected Peer Threati,t +
K∑
k=1
βkXki,t + FE + εi,t,
(2.8)
where Instrumental Variablei,t is the average M&A intensity across all customers of firm i, and
all other variables are defined as above. To construct the M&A intensity measure, we first obtain
M&A deals from the SDC database and apply the following restrictions for each transaction:
(i) the deal must be completed; (ii) the acquirer purchases at least 50% of the target and owns
at least 90% after the transaction; (iii) the transaction value is no less than $1 million; (iv) for
each customer-supplier pair, the target of the acquiring customer must be in a different 2-digit
SIC industry from the focal supplier.20 We then exclude all firm-year observations where the
suppliers are in the same industry as the customers. Taking a similar approach as Campello and
Gao (2017), the M&A intensity for each customer is measured as the aggregate M&A transaction
values scaled by the customer’s total sales in a year and averaged over the last five years.21 For
each supplier, the IV Customer M&A Intensity is defined as the weighted-average M&A intensity
across all its customers, where the supplier’s sales percentage determines the weights to each
customer. The results are shown in Table 2.5.
Panels A, B, and C of the table present 2SLS regression results based on each Connected
Peer Threat proxy. In Columns (1), (3), and (5), the first-stage results show positive and
statistically significant coefficients on the average customer M&A intensity, consistent with the
notion of increased competitive pressure following intense customer M&A activity. The first-
stage regressions’ F-statistics are well above 10, further indicating that the instrument satisfies
the relevance condition. In Columns (2), (4), and (6), the second-stage estimates show that
the predicted competitive threat measures measures have positive and significant effects on the
20Restriction (iv) may result in the exclusion of an M&A deal in some customer-supplier pairs but the inclusion
of it in other customer-supplier pairs, depending on the 2-digit SIC industry of each supplier firm.
21To properly exclude the effects of vertical M&As from each firm-year observation, we consider a customer
M&A as vertical if the target firm is in the same 2-digit SIC industry as the supplier, as long as the supplier-
customer relationship is established within the next 5 years of the merger deal.
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crash risk measures.
Overall, the customer M&A intensity IV approach corroborates our earlier findings and lends
support to a causal interpretation of a positive relationship between the competitive threats that
a firm faces and its bad news hoarding behavior.
2.5.2 Peer firm bankruptcy
Our second identification strategy exploits an exogenous reduction in existing competition due
to the bankruptcies of customer-connected peers. Customers tend to lose confidence in bankrupt
firms and would seek for safer alternatives (Altman 1984; Opler and Titman 1994; Cheng and
McDonald 1996). Thus, we expect that when a connected peer files for bankruptcy, the common
customers would rely less on it for inputs, if not switching away completely, given concerns over
the peer’s ability to fulfill its commitments. Competition among existing rivals would, in turn,
decline considerably due to reductions in the common customers’ dependence on those peers who
file for bankruptcy. We use such exogenous shocks to connected peer threats in a difference-in-
differences framework and expect to find a negative treatment effect on crash risk.
One might argue that corporate bankruptcies are endogenous to product market competi-
tion. However, to the extent that bankruptcies of connected peers are driven by the intense
competition they face, these shocks also suggest fierce competition for the focal supplier that is
in the same product space as those peers. Thus, a shock reflecting intense competition would
work against us finding negative treatment effects on the crash risk measures. Another potential
concern is confounding factors. For instance, peer bankruptcy may reflect adverse conditions
within the industry (Warner 1977) and hence coincide with a higher crash risk for the focal firm.
Such a concern is less critical in our setting, because it would also lead to an underestimation of
the negative treatment effect. Alternatively, firms with bankrupt connected peers may benefit
from increases in customer demand. Thus, a negative association between the shocks and stock
price crashes may reflect a positive effect on the focal firm’s operational performance rather than
a negative effect on the incentives to withhold negative information. To account for such factors,
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we control for the focal firm’s market share in the year its peers have filed for bankruptcy.
The Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings data are from Ma, Tong, and Wang (2019) that cover all
U.S. public firms from 1980 to 2016. We define our treated group as suppliers whose customer-
connected peers have filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in year t+1, where the customer-connected
peers are those linked to the suppliers in year t. Our sample of Chapter 11 cases is not confined to
any particular type of bankruptcy outcomes, such as liquidation, acquisition, or reorganization.
We anticipate that irrespective of the final court decision, all bankruptcies would have almost
immediate adverse effects on the firm’s ability to compete in the product market. All other
suppliers with no bankrupt peers are considered as our control group. The treatment period
is defined as the year during which bankruptcies are filed, allowing us to test the immediate
effect of the shock on the focal firm’s competitive threats. Formally, we estimate the following
regression model:




βkXki,t + FE + εi,t, (2.9)
where Treati is a dummy variable indicating whether firm i’s connected peers have filed for
bankruptcy; Postt+1 is a dummy variable covering the year during which the bankruptcies are
filed;22; Xki,t includes the same set of firm-level controls as that in Eq. (2.7); and Additional
Controls include Bankruptcyi,t+1 and MktSharei,t+1. Detailed definitions of these variables are
provided in Appendix Table A.2.
In Table 2.6, the estimation results of (2.9) show that Bankruptcyi,t+1 and MktSharei,t+1
bear the expected signs, suggesting that a firm’s own bankruptcy filing has positive effects on
crash risk, whereas its market share has negative effects. Furthermore, the resulting coefficients
on the interaction term, Treat ×Post, are negative and statistically significant across all crash
risk measures. The negative treatment effect of peer bankruptcy lends further support to our
prior that firms are more inclined to withhold negative information in response to competitive
22The variable Post is dropped from the actual regression estimation due to its perfect collinearity with the
year fixed effect dummies.
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threats from existing rivals.
2.5.3 Peer firm disruptions by natural disasters
Our third approach explores the effects of major natural disasters on the operations of customer-
connected peers. Similar to bankruptcies, natural disasters cause disruptions to a firm’s pro-
duction if they occur in locations where the firm’s plants and establishments reside. However,
we expect such disruptive events to differ from bankruptcies in a vital way – disruptions of a
firm’s operations caused by natural disasters tend to be temporary and hence would have, if
any, short-term effects on the relationship with its customers. Thus, it is unlikely for disaster
events to induce a sizeable shift in customer dependence to alternate suppliers as would be for
bankruptcies.23 We contend that, instead of affecting the three connected peer threat mea-
sures, peer disaster events would capture temporary reductions in the peers’ competitiveness
through adverse effects on their operating performance and disruptions in their competitive ac-
tions against others. Specifically, for any given level of customer dependence on the connected
peers, the competitive threats posed by the troubled peers are expected to decline considerably
following the events. Hence, our approach is to examine whether the competition-crash risk re-
lationship weakens when connected peers are suffering from natural disasters. Our analysis has
the same spirit as a difference-in-differences model. However, to emphasize the key feature that
the treatment does not directly affect the existing competition variables but instead captures
the nonlinearity in their impact, we interact the treatment indicator with the connected peer
threat measures.
We obtain information on all federally declared disasters from the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency (FEMA). The database includes information on the incident start and end
dates as well as the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code for all affected coun-
ties. Following Barrot and Saugvanat (2016) and He (2018), we focus on major disasters lasting
23Barrot and Saugvanat (2016) provide evidence supporting this argument. The authors find that the disaster-
induced disruptions of a supplier do not result in increases in the sales growth of other suppliers servicing the
same customer.
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less than 30 days with total estimated damages above $1 billion.24 The resulting 28 major
disaster events include hurricanes, blizzards, floods, and wildfires. Crucial to our analysis is the
identification of affected firms by the disasters. We first collect plant- and establishment-level
data from the Mergent Data Explr database, which is an annual snapshot data available in Dun
and Bradstreet. Data Explr contains yearly information on employment and location by plant
and establishment for all U.S. firms from 1985 to 2017. We then match the FEMA and Data
Explr datasets by the location of each firm and measure the impact of natural disasters on the
firm based on the percentage of its employees in the event area. Specifically, we consider a firm’s
operations to be disrupted by an event if at least 20% of the firm’s total employees reside in the
affected county.
We test the differential effects of existing competition when the customer-connected peers
are affected by natural disasters as follows:
Crash Riski,t+1 = α0 + α1Connected Peer Threati,t × Peer Disasteri,t+1 + α2Connected
Peer Threati,t + α3Peer Disasteri,t+1 +
K∑
k=1
βkXki,t + FE + εi,t, (2.10)
where Peer Disasteri,t+1 is a binary indicator that takes the value of one for firm i in year t+ 1
if its connected peers are affected by a disaster occurred in t+ 1. In addition to the previously
employed control variables, we also include a dummy variable indicating whether firm i itself is
affected by a disaster in t+ 1 (Disasteri,t+1). It accounts for the possibility that firm i is located
close to its peers and hence is affected by the same disaster.
Results, as reported in Table 2.7, reveal the heterogeneous effects of existing competition.
The coefficients on all three connected peer threat measures are positive and significant, in-
dicating that competitive effects remain strong and robust for firms with peers unaffected by
disasters. In contrast, the coefficients on the interaction term are significantly negative, produc-
ing a less pronounced competitive effect when peer operations are disrupted by natural disasters.
Hence, exogenous disruptions to supplier peers’ operations weaken their competitive threats to
24Major events are identified by manually matching the FEMA data with the list of major disasters provided
in the two studies by Barrot and Saugvanat (2016) and He (2018).
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the extent that they reduce the supplier’s crash risk, consistent with our prediction that firms
are more inclined to disclose negative news when facing less competitive threats from existing
rivals.
Overall, the evidence from all three quasi-natural experiments suggests that our baseline
results are robust to potential endogeneity concerns and that existing competition has causal
effects on a firm’s crash risk.
2.6 Bad News Withholding and Underlying Motives
We now investigate the mechanisms behind the bad news hoarding behavior of a firm facing
competitive pressure from existing competitors. In particular, we examine how existing com-
petitors, customers, and investors each play a role in motivating the strategic disclosure of
negative information.
2.6.1 Competitor-induced motives
As stated in Section 2.2, we posit that a firm under competitive pressure is increasingly concerned
about the proprietary costs of disclosing unfavorable information to existing competitors and
is, thus, more inclined to hide bad news from its competitors. To test such competitor-induced
motives, we examine whether the impact of existing competition on information hoarding be-
havior would be attenuated by less hostility and more information exchange between a firm and
its competitors, as proxied by business alliances formed between them. We construct three new
measures of connected peer threats that have formed at least one type of business alliance with
the focal firm (hereafter CompAl), including research collaboration, integrated product offering,
joint venture, cross-ownership in equity stakes, products, patents, and intellectual property li-
censing, and the use of each other’s manufacturing, marketing, and distribution services.25 We
25The identification of CompAl peers is based on the relationship information obtained from the Revere
database.
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then run the following panel regression.




βkXki,t + FE + εi,t, (2.11)
where Connected Peer Threat (CompAl) is a subsample of our earlier defined Connected Peer
Threat, except peers in the former have formed business alliances with firm i. In (2.11), Con-
nected Peer Threat (CompAl) captures the incremental effects of CompAl peers relative to all
other connected peers.
As reported in Table 2.8, the coefficients on all Connected Peer Threat proxies remain
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that competitive threats from non-CompAl con-
nected peers motivate negative information withholding. In contrast, the coefficients on all
Connected Peer Threat (CompAl) measures are negative and statistically significant for Peer
Count (CompAl) and Peer Similarity (CompAl). These findings indicate that firm-peer business
alliances have moderating effects on the positive relationship between existing competition and
crash risk, consistent with our H2 prediction.
2.6.2 Customer-induced motives
We also contend that a firm under competitive pressure is less willing to share negative infor-
mation with its customers due to increased concerns over the latter’s response to such adverse
information. To test the customer-induced motives of information hoarding, we examine whether
the effects of existing competition on crash risk are less pronounced for firms establishing coop-
erative relationships with their customers through forming business alliances and offering trade
credits.
We construct three new measures of connected peer threats based solely on common cus-
tomers who have formed at least one type of business alliances with the focal supplier (here-
after CusAl). We then re-estimate Eq. (2.11) with Connected Peer Treat (CustAl) replacing
Connected Peer Threat (CompAl) and report our findings in Table 2.9. The coefficients on
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Competitive Peer Threat (CusAl) measures are negative and statistically significant for all but
one regression. The results are consistent with H3a that competitive pressure from CusAl peers
dampens the overall competitive effects on crash risk.
We next construct AccRec, defined as log of one plus accounts receivable, to proxy for the
credits extended by a firm to its customers and regress the following model:
Crash Riski,t+1 = α0 + α1Connected Peer Threati,t ×AccReci,t + α2Connected Peer
Threati,t + α3AccReci,t +
K∑
k=1
βkXki,t + FE + εi,t, (2.12)
The regression results, as shown in Table 2.10, are consistent with H3b that AccRec has a
dampening effect on the positive association between existing competition and stock price crash
risk. The coefficients on the interaction term, α1, are negative and mostly statistically significant.
2.6.3 Investor-induced motives
We now investigate the investor-induced motives of withholding adverse news by examining the
cross-sectional impact of investor informedness on the link between existing competition and
stock price crash risk.
Prior work demonstrates that institutional owners trade on superior information and, in
turn, accelerate the incorporation of such information into stock prices (El-Gazzar 1998; Ji-
ambalvo, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam 2002; Piotroski and Roulstone 2004). Thus, a greater
institutional presence should reflect a higher investor informedness about the true content of
withheld information and, in turn, limit the ability for a firm to conceal bad news without being
discounted for it. We test our prediction by rerunning Eq. (2.12) using institutional ownership
breadth (# Insti,t), defined as the log number of institutions holding firm i’s shares in year t,
as a proxy for institutional presence in firm i in place of AccRec. Results reported in Panel A
of Table 2.11 show that connected peer threats continue to exhibit a positive impact on crash
risk for firms with low institutional presence. But, consistent with H4, the positive effect is
weakened for firms with a higher level of institutional breadth, as revealed by the negative and
statistically significant coefficients on the interaction term across different model specifications.
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Firm opacity impairs the ability for analysts to interpret the currently available information
and reach a consensus on their predictions of a firm’s future performance. Hence, more dispersed
analyst opinions suggest a higher information asymmetry between the covered firm and its
investors. Using the IBES data, we compute analyst forecast dispersion as the standard deviation
of annual earnings per share (EPS) forecasts for a fiscal year t, scaled by the stock price at the
beginning of the fiscal year. Following Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Gu and Wang (2005),
we take the one-year-ahead consensus forecasts six months before the fiscal year-end to ensure
that all analysts have access to the financial information from the previous fiscal year and have
the same forecast horizon. We then define a binary variable High Dispersion to capture firms
with forecast dispersion above the fourth quartile of all firms in the same industry-year. We
re-estimate Eq. (2.12) with High Dispersion in place of AccRec and present the results in
Panel B. The variable of interest is the interaction term, and its coefficients are all statistically
significant and positive. When facing intense competition, opaque firms are more motivated to
hoard unfavorable information than do their transparent peers.
Bushee, Core, Guay, and Hamm (2010) find that greater news coverage reduces the informa-
tion asymmetry of a firm. Through the timely dissemination of firm-initiated information as well
as the packaging of information from multiple sources, the business press provides information to
investors incremental to firm disclosures and other information intermediaries. Thus, news cov-
erage is another appropriate proxy for investor informedness. We obtain data on press articles
from Ravenpack full package, which includes articles from over 150,000 press releases, regulatory
disclosures, web aggregators, and blog sites. We utilize the log number of unique Ravenpack
news sources covering each firm over its fiscal year as a proxy for news coverage breadth, Media
Coverage. Panel C presents results from the estimation of Eq. (2.12) and corroborates the
attenuating effects of investor informedness on the baseline relationship.
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2.7 Conclusion
We exploit the network of supplier-customer links to provide insights on the strategic bad news
disclosure behavior of firms facing intense competition from rivals producing similar products
and supplying to common corporate customers. Our study employs a newly available database
on detailed firm-level information of customer-supplier relationships that enables us to construct
firm-specific competition measures that distinguish between competition from existing rivals (i.e.,
customer-connected peers) and competition from potential rivals (i.e., non-linked peers). We
find that competitive threats from customer-connected peers play an essential role in a firm’s
stock price crash risk, a proxy for the accumulation of unfavorable information. This evidence
suggests that firms strategize to withhold adverse news that has detrimental effects on their
stock prices, and that such effects are further supported by three quasi-natural experiments
that capture large exogenous shocks to linked peers. Our analyses also show that potential
competitors, or non-customer-connected peers, exhibit a negative, while considerably weaker,
influence on managers’ behavior to withhold or delay bad news disclosure, implying that firms
facing intense threats from potential entrants are likely to disclose adverse news as a means to
deter entry. Finally, the findings suggest that firms’ bad-news disclosure decisions are driven by
their stakeholders, namely, customers, customer-connected peers, and investors.
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Figure 2.1: A Snapshot of Texas Instruments, Inc’s Network of Suppliers
This graph illustrates a portion of the supply-chain network of Texas Instruments, Inc in 2014. It includes corporate customers and peer suppliers of those
customers that could be identified by Revere and Compustat data. We restrict all the firms in this graph to be a part of CRSP and Compustat universe. The
red node indicates Texas Instruments Inc; the blue nodes represent the corporate customers of Texas Instruments Inc; and the orange nodes represent the
customer-connected peers in the same industry as Texas Instruments, Inc according to Hoberg and Phillips's (2010; 2016) TNIC classification. In addition,














Figure 2.2: A Supplier’s Customer Network and Peer Firms
Focal Firms(S) Customers (C) Peers (P)
𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛
∑ 𝑚
𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 =
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 ,
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆











Firm (Si ) has ni customers; each customer (Cj ) has mj suppliers, including Si and Si’s industry peer Pk, where industry is defined in Hoberg and Phillips (2010; 
2016). 
where 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 , is the sales from Pk to Cj, 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 is the cost of goods sold of Cj, and 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 , is Hoberg-Phillips industry similarity between Si and Pk.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports the number of observations (NObs), the mean and standard deviation of the variable, as well
as the distribution in different percentiles of 5%, 25%, 50% (median), 75%, and 95%. Panel A contains summary
statistics of the three proxies for existing competition, namely (1) the log average number of customer-connected
peers in the same product market based on TNIC classification (Peer Count); (2) the ratio of a supplier’s sales to
customer’s cost of goods sold, summed across all customer-connected peers (Peer Sales); (3) the average product
similarity score with the customer-connected peers (Peer Similarity). Panel B shows summary statistics of three
measures of stock price crash risk: (1) the negative conditional skewness of stock returns (NCSKEW); (2) the log of
the standard deviation of down weekly returns divided by the standard deviation of up weekly returns (DUVOL);
(3) the number of firm-specific weekly returns exceeding 3.09 standard deviation below the mean firm-specific weekly
return over the fiscal year (Crash Count). Panel C contains summary statistics of firm-specific control variables,
including size, market-to-book equity value (MB), leverage, return on assets (ROA), change in stock turnover,
abnormal accruals (AbAccr), standard deviation of returns (Sigma), and past stock return. The construction of the
variables is presented in Appendix Table A.2. The sample period is from 1996 to 2015.
Percentiles
Variable NObs Mean Std Dev 5% 25% Median 75% 95%
Panel A: Connected Peer Threats
Peer Countt 28,598 1.015 1.015 0.000 0.000 0.693 1.792 2.952
Peer Salest 27,136 0.016 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.086
Peer Similarityt 28,598 0.022 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.033 0.079
Panel B: Measures of Stock Price Crash Risk
NCSKEWt+1 28,585 0.057 0.849 -1.294 -0.426 0.019 0.480 1.589
DUVOLt+1 28,585 0.042 0.542 -0.840 -0.320 0.024 0.380 0.982
Crash Countt+1 28,598 -0.008 0.656 -1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Panel C: Control Variables
Sizet 28,598 6.551 2.176 3.074 4.981 6.452 8.022 10.398
MBt 28,598 3.307 3.983 0.676 1.338 2.168 3.649 9.371
Leveraget 28,598 0.153 0.164 0.000 0.000 0.109 0.257 0.480
ROAt 28,598 -0.003 0.167 -0.338 -0.018 0.038 0.078 0.159
∆Turnovert 28,598 -0.003 0.070 -0.116 -0.038 -0.005 0.029 0.122
AbAccrt 28,598 0.216 0.184 0.038 0.090 0.160 0.277 0.604
Sigmat 28,598 0.057 0.031 0.020 0.034 0.049 0.071 0.119
Returnt 28,598 -0.205 0.249 -0.702 -0.249 -0.118 -0.055 -0.020
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Table 2.2: Existing Competition and Supplier Negative News Hoarding
This table reports results from regressing supplier stock price crash risk on each measure of connected peer threats
and firm-specific controls as follows:
Crash Riski,t+1 = α0 + α1Connected Peer Threati,t +
K∑
k=1
βkXki,t + FEt + εi,t.
where Xki,t is a vector of controls, including size, market-to-book equity value (MB), leverage, return on assets
(ROA), change in stock turnover, abnormal accruals (AbAccr), standard deviation of returns (Sigma), past stock
return, as well as year and industry fixed effects (FE). The three proxies for existing competition include Peer
Count, Peer Sales, and Peer Similarity. The three measures of stock price crash risk are NCSKEW, DUVOL,
and Crash Count. t−statistics of the regression coefficients are shown in parentheses and are computed based on
standard errors clustered at the firm-level. The number of observations (NObs) and adjusted R2 are reported. The
construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.2.
NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 Crash Countt+1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Peer Countt 0.029*** 0.015*** 0.019***
(5.45) (4.28) (4.64)
Peer Salest 0.417*** 0.241*** 0.197*
(2.92) (2.72) (1.87)
Peer Similarityt 1.151*** 0.622*** 0.562***
(5.61) (4.83) (3.57)
Sizet 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(11.25) (11.03) (11.10) (10.58) (10.36) (10.43) (10.25) (10.13) (10.24)
MBt 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002* 0.002 0.002*
(3.24) (2.95) (3.23) (3.90) (3.76) (3.89) (1.80) (1.58) (1.81)
Leveraget -0.032 -0.028 -0.042 -0.019 -0.019 -0.024 -0.012 -0.009 -0.018
(-0.91) (-0.78) (-1.19) (-0.85) (-0.82) (-1.08) (-0.46) (-0.34) (-0.67)
ROAt 0.267*** 0.255*** 0.272*** 0.153*** 0.145*** 0.156*** 0.193*** 0.185*** 0.193***
(7.38) (6.92) (7.56) (6.70) (6.27) (6.87) (7.20) (6.76) (7.21)
∆Turnovert 0.500*** 0.540*** 0.506*** 0.308*** 0.328*** 0.311*** 0.326*** 0.359*** 0.329***
(5.78) (6.19) (5.85) (5.66) (5.95) (5.72) (4.87) (5.33) (4.92)
AbAccrt 0.079** 0.096*** 0.079** 0.056*** 0.065*** 0.056*** 0.049** 0.057** 0.050**
(2.48) (2.97) (2.49) (2.82) (3.24) (2.82) (1.99) (2.26) (2.05)
NCSKEWt 0.013* 0.017** 0.013* 0.005 0.008* 0.005 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.014***
(1.84) (2.45) (1.90) (1.18) (1.76) (1.23) (2.63) (3.00) (2.70)
Sigmat 5.347*** 5.475*** 5.317*** 3.012*** 3.049*** 2.985*** 2.872*** 3.076*** 2.908***
(7.99) (7.99) (7.93) (7.12) (7.02) (7.05) (5.58) (5.81) (5.64)
Returnt 0.611*** 0.622*** 0.610*** 0.332*** 0.333*** 0.331*** 0.369*** 0.390*** 0.373***
(8.19) (8.20) (8.16) (6.95) (6.84) (6.91) (6.40) (6.59) (6.47)
NObs 28,585 27,123 28,585 28,585 27,123 28,585 28,598 27,136 28,598
Adj-R2 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.018 0.017 0.017
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.3: Existing Competition vs. Other Competitive Threats
This table reports results from regressing supplier stock price crash risk on each proxy for existing competition as
well as a proxy for other source of competition, as follows:
Crash Riski,t+1 = α0 + α1Connected Peer Threati,t + α2Other Competitive Threati,t +
K∑
k=1
βkXki,t + FEt + εi,t,
where Xki,t is a vector of controls, such as size, market-to book equity value (MB), leverage, return on assets (ROA),
change in stock turnover, abnormal accruals (AbAccr), standard deviation of returns (Sigma), past stock return,
as well as year and industry fixed effects (FE). Panels A-D replicate the analysis as Table 2 in the presence of a
proxy for other sources of competition, namely, non-linked peer count, non-linked peer similarity, HHI, and fluidity,
respecitively. The three proxies for the existing competition include Peer Count; Peer Sales; and Peer Similarity,
whereas the three measures of stock price crash risk are NCSKEW, DUVOL, and Crash Count. t−statistics of
the regression coefficients are shown in parentheses and are computed based on standard errors clustered at the
firm level. The number of observations (NObs) and R-squared (R2) are reported. Construction of the variables is
presented in Appendix Table A.2.
NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 Crash Countt+1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Proxy for Potential Competition: Non-Linked Peer Count
Non-Linked Peer Countt -0.031*** -0.013 -0.028*** -0.022*** -0.013** -0.021*** -0.017** -0.005 -0.012
(-2.85) (-1.17) (-2.63) (-3.25) (-2.02) (-3.15) (-2.06) (-0.56) (-1.44)
Peer Countt 0.034*** 0.018*** 0.022***
(6.04) (5.04) (5.02)
Peer Salest 0.449*** 0.275*** 0.208*
(3.07) (3.05) (1.93)
Peer Similarityt 1.317*** 0.745*** 0.635***
(6.20) (5.58) (3.84)
NObs 28,546 27,084 28,546 28,546 27,084 28,546 28,546 27,084 28,546
R2 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.027 0.026 0.028 0.018 0.017 0.017
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.3: Existing Competition vs. Other Competitive Threats – Continued
NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 Crash Countt+1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel B: Proxy for Potential Competition: Non-Linked Peer Similarity
Non-Linked Peer Similarityt -0.030 -0.084 -0.073 -0.068 -0.021 -0.103 -0.015 0.068 -0.011
(-0.22) (0.59) (-0.52) (-0.77) (-0.24) (-1.15) (-0.14) (0.64) (0.11)
Peer Countt 0.028*** 0.015*** 0.019***
(5.05) (4.14) (4.30)
Peer Salest 0.402*** 0.248*** 0.184*
(2.75) (2.74) (1.71)
Peer Similarityt 1.125*** 0.644*** 0.529***
(5.25) (4.75) (3.14)
NObs 28,555 27,093 28,555 28,555 27,093 28,555 28,555 27,093 28,555
R2 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.018 0.017 0.018
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Proxy for Other Competitive Threats: Fluidity
Fluidityt 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.77) (1.34) (0.51) (0.54) (1.12) (0.20) (0.63) (1.14) (0.81)
Peer Countt 0.018*** 0.009** 0.011**
(2.76) (2.04) (2.22)
Peer Salest 0.289* 0.169* 0.104
(1.92) (1.80) (0.94)
Peer Similarityt 0.814*** 0.457*** 0.274
(3.46) (3.09) (1.51)
NObs 24,111 22,664 24,111 24,111 22,664 24,111 24,121 22,674 24,121
R2 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.020 0.020 0.020
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Proxy for Other Competitive Threats: HHI
Supplier Industry HHI 0.239 0.204 0.226 0.193 0.189 0.188 0.259 0.234 0.241
(0.90) (0.75) (0.85) (1.15) (1.09) (1.12) (1.35) (1.18) (1.25)
Peer Countt 0.030*** 0.015*** 0.020***
(5.48) (4.32) (4.69)
Peer Salest 0.421*** 0.245*** 0.202*
(2.94) (2.76) (1.91)
Peer Similarityt 1.157*** 0.627*** 0.569***
(5.63) (4.86) (3.60)
NObs 28,582 27,120 28,582 28,582 27,120 28,582 28,595 27,133 28,595
R2 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.018 0.017 0.017
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.4: Negative News, SEC Comment Letters, and Restatements
Panel A of this table reports results from regressing the ratio of the number of negative-news events to the number of
positive-news events on each proxy for existing competition. All News accounts for all events with positive and neg-
ative CAR(-1,1), where CAR(-1,1) is a 3-day cumulative return in market reaction to news of management-involved
events in year t+ 1. Number of 5% (10%) Significant News counts only key events with |CAR(−1, 1)| > 5%(10%).
Panel B reports results from regressing the number of SEC comment letters on mandatory disclosures including an-
nual and quarterly financial reports (Form 10-Ks, Form 10-Qs), material news disclosures (Form 8-Ks), registration
and prospectus filings (e.g., Form S-1), and proxy filings (e.g., Def 14A), or the occurrence of material restatements
of the different filings submitted by a supplier in year t+1 on each proxy for existing competition. In all regressions,
we control for firm-specific variables, including size, market-to-book equity value (MB), leverage, return on assets
(ROA), change in stock turnover, abnormal accruals (AbAccr), standard deviation of returns (Sigma), past stock
return, as well as year and industry fixed effects (FE). The three measures of existing competition include Peer
Count, Peer Sales, and Peer Similarity. In Columns (1)-(6), the analysis is based on a sample period from 2004 to
2015, because SEC comment letters are available starting in 2005. t−statistics are shown in parentheses and are
computed based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. The number of observations (NObs) and adjusted
R2† (adj R2 in Columns (1)-(6) and pseudo-R2 in Columns (7)-(9)) are reported. The construction of the variables
is presented in Appendix Table A.2.
All Newst+1 5% Significant Newst+1 10% Significant Newst+1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Negative-Over-Positive Management Disclosure at t+ 1
Peer Countt -0.022*** 0.017*** 0.020***
(-4.60) (3.20) (4.16)
Peer Salest -0.393*** 0.219 0.201*
(-3.18) (1.58) (1.74)
Peer Similarityt -0.439** 0.754*** 0.674***
(-2.17) (3.54) (3.69)
NObs 23,556 22,216 23,556 23,556 22,216 23,556 23,556 22,216 23,556
R2 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.108 0.107 0.108
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full Sample Firms with Comment Letters Occurrence of Restatementst+1
Panel B: Comment Letters and Material Restatements t+ 1
Peer Countt 0.053*** 0.067*** 0.007***
(6.27) (6.36) (4.97)
Peer Salest 0.870*** 0.907*** 0.105***
(3.86) (3.46) (2.86)
Peer Similarityt 1.804*** 2.121*** 0.242***
(5.52) (5.36) (3.75)
NObs 19,055 17,941 19,055 8,757 8,283 8,757 23,154 21,816 23,154
Adj-R2† 0.063 0.060 0.063 0.098 0.094 0.097 0.026 0.025 0.025
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.5: Customer M&A and Supplier Stock Price Crash Risk
The table conducts two-stage least squares analysis using M&A as an instrumental variable, and reports a weak
ID F−test. Similarly that of Table 2, each measure of the supplier stock price crash risk is regressed on a proxy
for existing competition, while controlling for firm-specific variables, including size, market-to-book equity value
(MB), leverage, return on assets (ROA), change in stock turnover, abnormal accruals (AbAccr), standard deviation
of returns (Sigma), past stock return, as well as year and industry fixed effects (FE).
Connected Peer Threati,t = γ0 + γ1Instrumental Variablei,t +
K∑
k=1
λkXki,t + FE + ηi,t,
Crash Riski,t+1 = α0 + α1 ̂Connected Peer Threati,t +
K∑
k=1
βkXki,t + FE + εi,t.
The three measures of connected peer threats are Peer Count, Peer Sales, and Peer Similarity. The three measures of
stock price crash risk are NCSKEW, DUVOL, and Crash Count. t−statistics of the regression coefficients are shown
in parentheses and are computed based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. The number of observations
(NObs) and weak ID F−statistics are reported. Construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.2.
First-Stage NCSKEWt+1 First-Stage DUVOLt+1 First-Stage Crash Countt+1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Peer Count
Customer M&A Intensityt 1.355*** 1.355*** 1.359***
(6.23) (6.23) (6.25)
Peer Countt 0.288*** 0.158** 0.139*
(2.81) (2.49) (1.84)
NObs 25,089 25,089 25,089 25,089 25,100 25,100
Weak ID F-stat 38.87 38.87 39.01
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Peer Sales
Customer M&A Intensityt 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042***
(5.53) (5.53) (5.53)
Peer Salest 9.117*** 4.950** 4.481*
(2.64) (2.36) (1.75)
NObs 23,901 23,901 23,901 23,901 23,912 23,912
Weak ID F-stat 30.53 30.53 30.60
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Peer Similarity
Customer M&A Intensityt 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.021***
(4.15) (4.15) (4.16)
Peer Similarityt 19.097** 10.474** 9.170*
(2.51) (2.27) (1.74)
NObs 25,089 25,089 25,089 25,089 25,100 25,100
Weak ID F-stat 17.24 17.24 17.34
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.6: Difference-in-Differences Analysis: Peer Bankruptcy
The table presents a difference-in-differences analysis of supplier stock price crash risk based on peer bankruptcy
shocks. The independent variables are Post, Treat, Bankruptcy, MktShare, as well as firm-specific controls.




βkXki,t + FE + εi,t.
Treati is an indicator equal to one if any of the supplier i’s peers files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and 0 if otherwise.
Postt+1 is an indicator that equals one during the year in which the peer files for bankruptcy, and 0 if otherwise.
Bankruptcyt+1 is an indicator that equals one if the firm files bankruptcy in t + 1 and 0 if otherwise. The three
measures of stock price crash risk are NCSKEW, DUVOL, and Crash Count. Firm-specific variables include size,
market-to-book equity value (MB), leverage, return on assets (ROA), change in stock turnover, abnormal accruals
(AbAccr), standard deviation of returns (Sigma), past stock return, as well as year and industry fixed effects (FE).
t−statistics of the regression coefficients are shown in parentheses and are computed based on standard errors
clustered at the firm level. The number of observations (NObs) and adjusted R-squared (R2) are reported. The
construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.2.
NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 Crash Countt+1
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Posti,t+1 × Treati -0.155*** -0.132*** -0.096**
(-2.91) (-3.38) (-2.40)
Treati 0.027 0.019 0.023
(1.10) (1.18) (1.23)
Bankruptcyi,t+1 0.843*** 0.508*** 0.445***
(3.40) (2.84) (2.66)
MktSharei,t+1 -0.644*** -0.408*** -0.403***
(-3.68) (-3.72) (-3.12)
NObs 19,222 19,222 19,227
Adj-R2 0.022 0.027 0.014
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.7: Peer Disaster and Supplier Stock Price Crash Risk
This table reports results from regressing supplier stock price crash risk on each proxy for existing competition,
Peer Disaster indicator, and the interaction between the latter two variables, while controlling for firm-specific
variables (Xki,t), including size, market-to-book equity value (MB), leverage, return on assets (ROA), change in
stock turnover, abnormal accruals (AbAccr), standard deviation of returns (Sigma), past stock return, as well as
year and industry fixed effects (FE), as follows.




βkXki,t + FE + εi,t,
The three measures of connected peer threats include Peer Count, Peer Sales, Peer Similarity. The Peer Disaster
indicator takes the value of one if a major disaster occurred in the county where the firm’s peers had at least 20%
of their employees and zero if otherwise. The three measures of stock price crash risk are NCSKEW, DUVOL,
and Crash Count. t−statistics of the regression coefficients are shown in parentheses and are computed based on
standard errors clustered at the firm level. The number of observations (NObs) and adjusted R-squared (R2) are
reported. The construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.2.
NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 Crash Countt+1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Peer Countt × Peer Disastert+1 -0.045** -0.024* -0.028*
(-2.00) (-1.65) (-1.70)
Peer Countt 0.033*** 0.020*** 0.022***
(3.63) (3.36) (3.11)
Peer Salest × Peer Disastert+1 -0.588* -0.388* -0.396*
(-1.81) (-1.82) (-1.71)
Peer Salest 0.455** 0.315*** 0.205
(2.53) (2.75) (1.57)
Peer Similarityt × Peer Disastert+1 -1.051* -0.283 -0.955**
(-1.69) (-0.71) (-2.10)
Peer Similarityt 1.061*** 0.603*** 0.436**
(3.91) (3.56) (2.13)
Peer Disastert+1 0.073 0.014 0.034 0.032 0.005 0.002 0.043 0.009 0.034
(1.42) (0.64) (1.15) (1.00) (0.37) (0.12) (1.13) (0.55) (1.50)
Disastert+1 0.018 0.014 0.019 0.014 0.008 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.013
(0.67) (0.49) (0.68) (0.83) (0.43) (0.84) (0.67) (0.56) (0.63)
NObs 19,230 17,768 19,230 19,230 17,768 19,230 19,235 17,773 19,235
Adj-R2 0.022 0.020 0.022 0.026 0.024 0.026 0.014 0.013 0.014
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.8: Peer Alliances and Supplier Stock Price Crash Risk
This table reports results from regressing supplier stock price crash risk on each proxy for competition among
existing rivals who formed business alliances with the supplier, while controlling for general existing competition
and firm-specific variables, including size, market-to-book equity value (MB), leverage, return on assets (ROA),
change in stock turnover, abnormal accruals (AbAccr), standard deviation of returns (Sigma), past stock return, as
well as year and industry fixed effects (FE).




βkXki,t + FE + εi,t
The three measures of connected peer threats among rivals with business alliances include Peer Count (CompAl),
Peer Sales (CompAl), and Peer Similarity (CompAl). The three measures of general connected peer thrats include
Peer Count, Peer Sales, Peer Similarity. The three measures of stock price crash risk are NCSKEW, DUVOL,
and Crash Count. t−statistics of the regression coefficients are shown in parentheses and are computed based on
standard errors clustered at the firm level. The number of observations (NObs) and adjusted R-squared (R2) are
reported. The construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.2.
NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 Crash Countt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Peer Count (CompAl)t -0.120** -0.077** -0.112***
(-2.46) (-2.57) (-2.91)
Peer Countt 0.033*** 0.016*** 0.024***
(5.20) (4.06) (4.98)
Peer Sales (CompAl)t -0.031 -0.041 -0.034
(-0.49) (-0.99) (-0.59)
Peer Salest 0.416*** 0.239** 0.238**
(2.59) (2.36) (2.00)
Peer Similarity (CompAl)t -1.653*** -1.079*** -1.461***
(-2.58) (-2.69) (-2.97)
Peer Similarityt 1.290*** 0.738*** 0.683***
(5.31) (4.85) (3.68)
NObs 22,904 21,554 22,904 22,904 21,554 22,904 22,915 21,565 22,915
Adj-R2 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.012 0.011 0.012
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.9: Customer Alliances and Supplier Stock Price Crash Risk
This table reports results from regressing supplier stock price crash risk on each proxy for existing competition
formed based on common customers who formed business alliances with the supplier, while controlling for general
connected peer threats and firm-specific variables, including size, market-to-book equity value (MB), leverage, return
on assets (ROA), change in stock turnover, abnormal accruals (AbAccr), standard deviation of returns (Sigma),
past stock return, as well as year and industry fixed effects (FE).




βkXki,t + FE + εi,t
The three measures of connected peer threats from common customers who formed alliances include Peer Count
(CusAl), Peer Sales (CusAl), and Peer Similarity (CusAl). The three measures of general connected peer thrats
include Peer Count, Peer Sales, Peer Similarity. The three measures of stock price crash risk are NCSKEW, DUVOL,
and Crash Count. t−statistics of the regression coefficients are shown in parentheses and are computed based on
standard errors clustered at the firm level. The number of observations (NObs) and adjusted R-squared (R2) are
reported. The construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.2.
NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 Crash Countt+1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Peer Count(CusAl)t -0.018** -0.012** -0.013**
(-2.51) (-2.50) (-2.32)
Peer Countt 0.038*** 0.020*** 0.025***
(6.13) (5.06) (5.28)
Peer Sales(CusAl)t -0.060** -0.054*** -0.023
(-2.35) (-3.11) (-1.02)
Peer Salest 0.454*** 0.275*** 0.211**
(3.14) (3.06) (1.98)
Peer Similarity(CusAl)t -0.471* -0.353** -0.312*
(-1.95) (-2.30) (-1.67)
Peer Similarityt 1.370*** 0.786*** 0.708***
(6.05) (5.56) (3.99)
NObs 28,585 27,123 28,585 28,585 27,123 28,585 28,598 27,136 28,598
Adj-R2 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.018 0.017 0.017
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
95
Table 2.10: Customer Trade Credit and Supplier Stock Price Crash Risk
This table reports results from regressing supplier stock price crash risk on each proxy for existing competition,
customer trade credit (AccRec), and the interaction between the two variables, while controlling for firm-specific
variables (Xki,t), including size, market-to-book equity value (MB), leverage, return on assets (ROA), change in
stock turnover, abnormal accruals (AbAccr), standard deviation of returns (Sigma), past stock return, as well as
year and industry fixed effects (FE), as follows.




βkXki,t + FE + εi,t,
AccRect is defined as ln(1+ RecTr), where RecTr is the accounts receivable at year t. The three measures of
connected peer threats include Peer Count, Peer Sales, Peer Similarity. The three measures of stock price crash
risk are NCSKEW, DUVOL, and Crash Count. t−statistics of the regression coefficients are shown in parentheses
and are computed based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. The number of observations (NObs) and
adjusted R-squared (R2) are reported. The construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.2.
NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 Crash Countt+1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Peer Countt × AccRect -0.006** -0.003 -0.004*
(-2.34) (-1.58) (-1.91)
Peer Countt 0.048*** 0.024*** 0.031***
(4.20) (3.12) (3.56)
Peer Salest × AccRect -0.170** -0.090** -0.094*
(-2.55) (-2.10) (-1.91)
Peer Salest 1.103*** 0.604*** 0.604**
(3.38) (2.91) (2.51)
Peer Similarityt × AccRect -0.248*** -0.109* -0.175**
(-2.75) (-1.88) (-2.57)
Peer Similarityt 1.983*** 1.003*** 1.154***
(4.50) (3.60) (3.53)
AccRect -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.012** -0.007** -0.010*** -0.006** -0.008** -0.012*** -0.008**
(-2.71) (-4.03) (-2.52) (-2.14) (-3.24) (-2.00) (-2.17) (-3.47) (-2.09)
NObs 26,379 24,936 26,379 26,379 24,936 26,379 26,392 24,949 26,392
Adj-R2 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.015 0.015 0.015
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.11: Investor Informedness and Supplier Stock Price Crash Risk
This table reports results from regressing supplier stock price crash risk on each proxy for existing competition,
investor informedness, and the interaction between the two variables, while controlling for firm-specific variables,
including size, market-to-book equity value (MB), leverage, return on assets (ROA), change in stock turnover,
abnormal accruals (AbAccr), standard deviation of returns (Sigma), past stock return, as well as year and industry
fixed effects (FE).




βkXki,t + FE + εi,t,
The three measures of connected peer threats include Peer Count, Peer Sales, Peer Similarity. The three measures
of stock price crash risk are NCSKEW, DUVOL, and Crash Count. The proxies for investor informedness include
# Inst, which captures the log number of institutional investors; High Dispersion, taking a value of one if the
dispersion of analyst forecast is above 75% percentile of firms in the same industry-year and zero otherwise; the
media coverage, which measures the log number of news articules covering the supplier in year t. t−statistics of
the regression coefficients are shown in parentheses and are computed based on standard errors clustered at the
firm level. The number of observations (NObs) and adjusted R-squared (R2) are reported. The construction of the
variables is presented in Appendix Table A.2.
NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 Crash Countt+1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Breadth of Institutional Ownership
Peer Countt × # Instt -0.014*** -0.006** -0.009***
(-3.42) (-2.34) (-3.07)
Peer Countt 0.080*** 0.037*** 0.053***
(4.41) (3.08) (3.78)
Peer Salest × # Instt -0.403*** -0.222** -0.211**
(-3.00) (-2.51) (-2.15)
Peer Salest 2.203*** 1.230*** 1.103**
(3.36) (2.83) (2.32)
Peer Similarityt × # Instt -0.521*** -0.221** -0.409***
(-3.30) (-2.14) (-3.32)
Peer Similarityt 3.175*** 1.456*** 2.145***
(4.35) (3.05) (3.76)
# Instt 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.040***
(7.65) (7.84) (7.75) (6.16) (6.61) (6.19) (7.51) (7.82) (8.04)
NObs 28,585 27,123 28,585 28,585 27,123 28,585 28,598 27,136 28,598
Adj-R2 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.019 0.019 0.019
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.11: Investor Informedness and Supplier Stock Price Crash Risk –
Continued
NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 Crash Countt+1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel B: Dispersion in Analyst Forecasts
Peer Countt × High Dispersiont 0.025** 0.015** 0.016
(2.25) (2.35) (1.49)
Peer Countt 0.007 0.001 -0.001
(0.60) (0.19) (-0.05)
Peer Salest × High Dispersiont 0.861** 0.463* 0.509**
(2.65) (2.03) (2.12)
Peer Salest -0.030 -0.059 -0.101
(-0.11) (-0.34) (-0.45)
Peer Similarityt × High Dispersiont 0.591* 0.358* 0.145
(1.81) (2.07) (0.42)
Peer Similarityt 0.496 0.195 0.184
(1.58) (1.17) (0.65)
High Dispersiont -0.050* -0.037 -0.039* -0.020 -0.010 -0.014 -0.031 -0.020 -0.019
(-1.87) (-1.69) (-1.76) (-1.09) (-0.64) (-0.96) (-1.53) (-1.23) (-1.05)
NObs 10,685 10,106 10,685 10,685 10,106 10,685 10,687 10,108 10,687
Adj-R2 0.017 0.015 0.017 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.011 0.010 0.011
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Media Coverage
Peer Countt × Media Coveraget -0.006** -0.003 -0.006**
(-2.08) (-1.33) (-2.50)
Peer Countt 0.048*** 0.023*** 0.036***
(4.93) (3.58) (4.69)
Peer Salest × Media Coveraget -0.187** -0.079 -0.107*
(-2.28) (-1.56) (-1.74)
Peer Salest 0.973*** 0.479*** 0.514**
(3.36) (2.69) (2.41)
Peer Similarityt × Media Coveraget -0.214** -0.065 -0.252***
(-2.17) (-1.02) (-3.21)
Peer Similarityt 1.782*** 0.821*** 1.292***
(5.17) (3.70) (4.69)
Media Coveraget -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 0.002 0.003 0.003
(-0.57) (-0.28) (-0.49) (-1.18) (-0.76) (-1.23) (0.33) (0.53) (0.60)
NObs 28,585 27,123 28,585 28,585 27,123 28,585 28,598 27,136 28,598
Adj-R2 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.018 0.017 0.018
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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3. Do Environmental Regulations Do More Harm Than Good?
Evidence from Competition and Innovation
“Today, 63% of U.S. adults say stricter environmental regulations are “worth the
cost,” while 30% say such regulations “cost too many jobs and hurt the economy.””
The February 2019 Survey by Pew Research Center26
3.1 Introduction
Do environmental regulations do more harm or good? The above quote from the 2019 survey
conducted by Pew Research Center shows that a majority of Americans say stricter environmen-
tal laws and regulations are “worth the cost.” While the survey suggests that most Americans
consider environmental regulations to do more good than harm, the question remains one of the
most controversial political issues that society faces today as combating climate change becomes
a growing global concern. U.S. leaders and policy makers have different views on the economic
impact of environmental regulations. Some fear that environmental policies would threaten the
competitiveness of business sectors and hamper economic growth.27 They argue that regula-
tions place firms at a competitive disadvantage as pollution reduction and cleanup costs lead to
higher prices and reduced market share (e.g., McGuire 1982). Others, however, argue that regu-
latory pressures could enhance firm performance by encouraging innovation, thereby increasing
economic prosperity (e.g., Porter 1991; Porter and van der Linde 1995). Yet there is limited
research that looks at the underlying forces driving firms’ varying responses to environmental
regulations. Thus, the goal of this paper is to examine whether and how competition plays a
crucial role in shaping corporate environmental policies when firms face stringent regulations
and whether such policies bear significant economic consequences.
The conventional wisdom is that environmental regulations pose adverse consequences to
26https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/07/more-republicans-say-stricter-environmental-
regulations-are-worth-the-cost/
27Following Bristow (2005), competitiveness is loosely defined as the ability of a firm to survive, compete, and
grow in its market.
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many U.S. companies. The severity of such effects may vary with firms’ product market compe-
tition. Firms that enjoy market power should experience a minimal negative economic impact
on their product markets’ competitive position as increased regulatory costs are passed through
to product prices with little concerns for losing market share. Also, the opportunity cost for
productive investments crowd out by abatement should be small as firms facing less competition
have fewer incentives to invest in innovation due to the “replacement effect” (Tirole 1988).28
However, the negative consequences can be exceptionally costly for firms in fiercely competitive
product markets. Economic theory posits that these firms are incentivized to develop innovation
as a differentiation strategy to gain competitive advantages over their rivals (e.g., Aghion et al.
2005). Such benefits arising from innovative activity would result in better product-market per-
formance and, in turn, a lower regulatory burden. Hence, product market competition ought to
strengthen environmental regulations in promoting new pollution-reducing technologies (here-
after “green innovation”).
We exploit the “nonattainment” status of U.S. counties as an exogenous source of variation
in environmental regulation to examine whether competition affects firms’ strategic responses
to increased regulatory pressures. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) establishes
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for six widespread pollutants to act as a
benchmark in assessing regional air quality. Counties whose pollutant concentrations are above
(below) the specified threshold are designated as nonattainment (attainment) areas. Nonat-
tainment counties are subject to much stricter regulatory monitoring and enforcement than
attainment counties. Furthermore, we leverage the granularity of the recently available plant
location data from Dun & Bradstreet and innovation output data from PATSTAT to construct
a sample of innovative firms residing in 2,951 different counties during the 1996-2017 period.
Using county-level nonattainment designations as a quasi-natural experiment in a triple-
difference setting, we study whether competition drives firms’ green innovations when facing
tight environmental regulation. Green innovations are identified as environmentally-sound tech-
28A monopolist gains less from innovating than a competitive firm as the former is replacing itself as a monop-
olist.
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nologies (ESTs) by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).29
Based on 523,791 firm-county-year observations and two different widely-employed firm-specific
competition measures,30 we find that competitive firms generate significantly more green in-
novation in response to an exogenous increase in environmental regulatory stringency than less
competitive firms. For example, firms in the top competition-ranked decile experience an approx-
imately 8% increase in green innovation output relative to firms in the bottom decile following
a nonattainment shock to one of their production locations. This evidence is robust to both
two- and three-year-ahead innovative activity, more rigorous controls for county characteris-
tics through county×year fixed effects, alternative classifications of pollution emitters, and the
removal of firm-specific control variables.
One possible concern would be the endogeneity of nonattainment designations and regulatory
stringency. Plausibly, a nonattainment status is not randomly assigned but hinges on county-
specific characteristics such as the intensity of local business activity. Similarly, regulatory
stringency could be endogenously driven by unobserved county-wide determinants, including
the lobbying power of residing firms and strategic considerations of local governments, among
others. However, the rigorous county×year fixed effects should largely alleviate such issues by
controlling for all systematic differences across counties that may confound the causality of a
nonattainment-induced regulatory shock. Nevertheless, to address any remaining concerns, we
repeat the baseline analysis while restricting the sample to include only county-years whose
pollutant concentrations are marginally above or below the NAAQS standards. In doing so,
we reasonably ensure that any status change in a county arises from small variations in local
emissions rather than heterogeneity in regional attributes. Alternatively, our results could also
be spurious if the competition is endogenous. To mitigate such concern, we exploit large import
tariff reductions to provide exogenous variations in a competitive environment. Import tariffs
act as a barrier to entry for foreign rivals, so large cuts could lead to sharp shifts in competitive
pressure that U.S. firms face from abroad. The findings from both quasi-natural experiments
29The list of ESTs is obtained from WIPO’s website, https://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/green inventory/.
30The competition measures are developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010; 2016) and Hoberg, Phillips, and Prab-
hala (2014), namely, product market fluidity measure (Fluidity), and total product similarity score (Similiarity).
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suggest that our baseline results are robust to potential endogeneity issues and that they capture
a causal effect of competition on firms’ strategic responses to regulatory changes.
Our analysis further shows that the relocation cost is a crucial mechanism that compels firms
to innovate when responding to tightened environmental policies and heightened competitive
pressure. In particular, we contend that competitive firms facing higher relocation costs would
be more determined to foster green innovation in reacting to regulations than those facing lower
costs. The reasons are twofold. First, firms facing high costs cannot readily shift their local
production and must remain in areas undergoing nonattainment classifications and face the
associated adverse consequences. These firms tend to bear a higher regulatory burden than
companies with more mobility but choose to stay following policy shocks. In combating such
negative regulatory impacts, locally entrenched competitive firms would have stronger incentives
to innovate relative to those that can easily relocate. Second, the relocation cost would induce
innovation as an alternative means to minimize compliance costs. Hence, regulations are more
effective in triggering innovative activity among less mobile firms. Using plant fixed costs and the
extent of agglomeration economies to measure relocation costs, we find evidence supporting the
mechanism. Specifically, the baseline relationship is significantly more pronounced for industries
that are less geographically mobile.
Next, we explore the possible sources of gain in competitive strengths arising from green
innovation. In particular, competitive firms’ innovative response to environmental regulations
may lead to increased product differentiation and better customer attraction than other firms in
less competitive markets. Consistent with this idea, we show that firms at the top competition-
ranked decile achieve a 6% reduction in product similarity and a 5% increase in the number
of corporate customers relative to firms in the bottom competition-ranked decile after a reg-
ulatory shock. Further analyses show that business expansion is concentrated in corporate
customers that are unable to generate green innovation themselves, suggesting that newly de-
veloped emissions-cutting technologies can help competitive firms in accessing markets with
strong demand for green inventions and products.
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Finally, we evaluate the economic consequences of the heterogeneous firm responses to envi-
ronmental regulations. Our results suggest that competitive firms achieve better post-regulatory-
shock operating performance than their less competitive counterparts. Specifically, a higher level
of competition is associated with significant increases in the treatment effects of a nonattain-
ment shock on market share growth, pricing power, and profitability. We interpret the better
product-market performance as an outcome of competitive firms’ stronger incentives to inno-
vate and differentiate, thereby reducing and, at times, even outweighing the compliance cost.
Their performance in the financial market further substantiates this interpretation. We find
that the market reacts more favorably to firms facing intense competition as measured by their
buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the one year following a nonattainment shock. Also, in line
with better performance, competitive firms are less likely to cut jobs in the regulated regions,
challenging the conventional view that environmental regulations decrease labor demand.
This study makes an important contribution to the real impact of environmental regulations
on firm competitiveness. One strand of the literature studies the effects of environmental regu-
lations on green innovation. For example, Lanjouw and Mody (1996), Jaffe and Palmer (1997),
and Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) find that stricter regulations lead to higher R&D expendi-
tures and more environmental patents. Gray and Shadbegian (1998), Popp and Newell (2012),
and Aghion et al.(2016) show that increased green inventions crowd out other productivity-
improving innovation and hence can be detrimental to firm competitiveness. In contrast, Calel
and Dechezleprêtre (2016) find no evidence of firms diverting investments from productivity to
abatement. Lanoie et al. (2011) also suggest a positive link between environmental innovation
and business performance. Our paper advances this research by showing that competition plays
a vital role in the interplay between regulatory stringency and innovative activity. Our study is
the first to look at competition as a critical underlying mechanism that shapes corporate envi-
ronmental policies in firms’ response to stringent environmental regulations. Furthermore, our
comprehensive approach to examining the innovation policies and a series of economic conse-
quences allows us to better draw conclusions on the overall impact of environmental regulations
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and firm responses on competitiveness.
Our work also helps to address the criticism that value-enhancing innovation triggered by
environmental regulations would be inconsistent with firm value-maximization (e.g., Palmer,
Oates, and Portney 1995). Thus far, prior research takes a theoretical approach to show that
this is not the case. For example, Ambec and Barla (2007) and Ambec et al. (2013) argue
that asymmetric information about environmental quality creates a “market for lemons” where
only dirty products would be supplied, and green investments would be curbed. Environmental
regulations can reduce such information asymmetry and encourage green innovation by revealing
information that benefits those who supply clean products. Other theoretical work such as
Simpson and Bradford (1996) and Mohr (2002) similarly provide certain conditions under which
post-regulatory value-enhancing innovation is consistent with value-maximizing goals. However,
little is known whether these theoretical predictions hold in the data. Our study provides new
empirical evidence that, under a competitive environment, regulations foster value-enhancing
innovation for profit-maximizing firms. A recent study by Bartram, Hou, and Kim (2019) is
related to our work. The authors empirically show that financial constraints play an important
role in plant closure decisions when firms face environmental regulations. However, their study
focuses on abatement performance rather than the competitiveness of affected firms.
Our paper also contributes to the corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature. Prior
studies suggest that firms can “do well by doing good” as they benefit from high product quality
signaling (e.g., Fisman, Heal, and Nair 2006; Siegel and Vitaliano 2007), increased customer
willingness to pay (e.g., Bagnoli and Watts, 2003; Baron 2008, 2009), improved employee morale
and retention (e.g., Turban and Greening 1997), and positive CSR spillovers to suppliers (e.g.,
Dai, Liang, and Ng 2020) among others. Fernandez-Kranz and Santalo (2010) and Flammer
(2015) also document that firms under intense competition tend to strategically engage in CSR
practices searching for competitive advantages. Our study expands this line of research by
showing that competitive firms foster green innovation to better differentiate themselves from
their rivals.
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Finally, our results have important policy implications. They suggest that policy efforts
to protect environments could benefit firms in competitive markets. Stringent environmental
policy improves the environment and competitiveness by pushing competitive firms into de-
veloping cost-reducing clean technologies and more efficient ways to produce green products.
Therefore, environmental regulations promote growth through green innovation that is more
environmentally friendly.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 details the nonattainment
designation. Section 3.3 describes the data and construction of the main sample. Section 3.4
formulates the empirical methodology used to conduct the main analyses and reports the results.
Section 3.5 investigates a potential mechanism behind the relationship. Section 3.6 explores
possible gains in firms’ strategic positions, and Section 3.7 analyzes the resulting corporate
environmental policies’ economic consequences. The final section concludes.
3.2 Identification Strategy - Nonattainment Designations
Following the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act (CAA), EPA mandates every county
in the United States to be classified as either an attainment or a nonattainment zone using
the NAAQS standards as a benchmark. The NAAQS is established by EPA for six widespread
pollutants (carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, total suspended particulates,
and ozone), specifying the maximum level of concentrations allowed without harming public
health and the environment. EPA reviews, and if necessary, revises the NAAQS every five years
to ensure adequate protection of air quality. Once a new set of standards is enforced, it triggers
a classification process in which counties whose pollutant concentrations above (below) the
most recent thresholds are designated as nonattainment (attainment) areas. The nonattainment
areas are required to provide State Implementation Plans (SIPs) detailing the implementation,
maintenance, and enforcement of local air quality management programs to better comply with
the standards. When these counties attain the regulatory standards, they get reclassified as
attainment zones. They remain at this status until the next NAAQS revision and classification
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process. While SIPs vary state-by-state, they generally follow EPA’s guidelines in curbing
emissions. Beyond the necessary emissions control, inspections and regulatory oversight are also
more frequent in nonattainment areas. Thus, the existing polluting plants in nonattainment
counties face significantly more stringent environmental regulations than similar polluters in
attainment counties.
Such regulatory variations across attainment and nonattainment counties provide an ap-
propriate setting for our study’s identification strategy. First, it is reasonable to assume that
regulations in nonattainment counties are significantly more stringent than those in attainment
counties and effectively enforced on polluting plants. All SIPs must be approved by EPA to
ensure a sufficient level of regulatory stringency for nonattainment areas. Failure to provide
a satisfactory plan would result in the enforcement of the Federal Implementation Plan (FIP)
developed by EPA. Upon approval, those control measures would be enforceable in state and
federal courts, giving both the states and EPA legal standings to monitor progress and fine non-
compliers. Furthermore, EPA can penalize states that do not sufficiently enforce the regulations,
such as withholding federal grants and suspending new facility constructions (e.g., Dancy 1994;
Becker and Henderson 2000; Greenstone 2002). These abatement programs in nonattainment
areas are effective, as evident in the decline of emissions and the increase in plant operating
costs relative to attainment areas (Becker and Henderson 2001; Chay and Greenstone 2005).
Second, nonattainment designations are as good as randomly assigned across counties. All
counties are evaluated on the same NAAQS standards, so a nonattainment status should be
exogenous to all county-specific characteristics other than local air quality conditions. While
one might argue that economic activities affect air quality, such concern is less critical given a
low correlation between the nonattainment status and the number of local production facilities.
Existing studies also alleviate such concern by showing that nonattainment is often related to
wind patterns, causing air pollutants to travel and accumulate in certain regions (Cleveland et
al. 1976; Cleveland and Graedel 1979). Furthermore, only exogenous revisions of NAAQS rather
than any substantial changes in county-level conditions can trigger a change from attainment
106
to nonattainment designation. This regulatory design is consistently depicted in Figure 3.1.31
Each panel of the figure illustrates the number of counties experiencing status change for one
pollutant. A positive (negative) value indicates a net switch from attainment (nonattainment)
to nonattainment (attainment) status. According to Figure 1, a net switch always reaches a local
peak in few years following a standard revision but tends to stay non-positive for the remaining
period, suggesting that only NAAQS revisions would drive nonattainment classifications. Nev-
ertheless, we address any remaining concerns by restricting the sample to county-years, where
the regional pollutant concentration is marginally above or below the standards. Our approach
reasonably ensures that a status change is as good as randomly assigned while holding other
county-specific conditions constant.
Lastly, the induced regulations are free from county-wide influences. EPA’s approval of
SIPs limits the variance in regulatory stringency across counties, and its enforcement power
curbs the states’ ability to overlook non-compliers. Thus, county-wide influences, such as local
firms’ collective lobbying power, the county’s political environment, and other local government
considerations, would have little effects on regional regulations. We also eliminate any remaining
endogeneity concern by including county×year fixed effects, which remove all unobserved time-
varying county characteristics.
3.3 Data and Sample Construction
This study employs data from several different sources: (i) plant and location data from Dun &
Bradstreet made available via Mergent; (ii) innovation output data from World Patent Statis-
tical Database (PASTAT) maintained by European Patent Office (EPO); (iii) product market
competition measures developed in Hoberg et al. (2014) and Hoberg and Phillips (2010; 2016),
which are made available via Hoberg and Phillips data library; (iv) historical CAA nonattain-
ment designations information from EPA Green Book; (v) criteria pollutant emissions data from
EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO); (vi) supplier-customer relation-
31Historical NAAQS are obtained from the EPA website: https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants/naaqs-
table.
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ship data from Factset Revere and Compustat’s customer segment files; (vii) stock returns from
CRSP; and (viii) firm financial information from Compustat.
We match the information on plants with a minimum of ten employees with publicly traded
parent companies in Compustat using a linking table between plant DUNS numbers and CUSIP
identifiers provided by Mergent. The matched data is used to form an initial sample of firm-
county-level observations describing the number of plants a public firm has in a county each
year. We restrict the sample to innovative firms with at least one patent filed (and granted) two
years ahead to construct green innovation. Since nonattainment-induced regulatory shocks are
only effective towards local “polluters”, our sample further excludes non-emitting plants. Data
limitations in ECHO render classifications of “polluters” and “nonpolluters” at the firm-level
improbable. Plant-level emissions information on the six criteria pollutants is only available for
years 2005, 2008, 2011, and 2014, and less than 10% of such data can be matched to a plant
DUNS number.32 To circumvent such data challenge, we define “polluters” at the industry-
level, specifically, as those 3-digit SIC industries with positive total emissions over the four years
during which ECHO data is available. Finally, we remove any observations with missing values
for control variables and exclude financial and regulated utility firms (SIC codes 4900-4999 and
6000-6900). The selection process yields a sample of 523,791 firm-county-year observations,
consisting of 1,932 unique innovative firms residing in 2,951 counties over the 1996-2017 period.
Our sample period is bounded by the availability of Hoberg and Phillips’ competition data. The
actual number of observations varies across analyses, given different data availability for the
main variables of interest. The definitions for all the key variables are depicted in Appendix
A.5.
3.3.1 Measures of green innovation
We construct measures of green innovation using data drawn from PATSTAT. The database
contains more than 100 million patent records from over 40 patent authorities worldwide filed as
32Using a linking table between ECHO’s unique identifier FRS and DUNS number made available on EPA’s
website https://echo.epa.gov/tools/data-downloads, about 25,000 of over 260,000 plant-county-year observations
are matched to Dun & Bradstreet.
108
far back as 1844. It provides detailed information on each of the patent applications, including
the date of the application, the applicant’s (owner’s) name, citations made (backward) and
received (forward) by each patent, the patent’s technology field identified using International
Patent Classification (IPC), and the grant status. We manually match the applicant information
with firms in Compustat to obtain patents owned by U.S. corporations. Since most of a patent’s
value is achieved when the patent is granted and the owner can enforce its exclusive right, we
focus on patent applications that are eventually granted.
From our sample of patent applications, we extract those relating to clean technologies. Our
selection relies heavily on the work by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
The WIPO constructs a comprehensive list of IPCs considered environmentally-sound technolo-
gies (ESTs) from the information on essential green technologies provided by the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The list, also known as the IPC Green Inventory,
contains 200 topics on alternative energy production, energy conservation, transportation, waste
management, agriculture and forestry, and nuclear power generation.
Focusing on these ESTs, we construct four measures to capture green innovation output. The
first measure is the total number of EST patent applications a firm files in a given year (Green
Patents), following earlier studies (e.g., Brunnermeier and Cohen 2003; Aghion et al. 2016). It
suffers from a truncation problem due to the lag between a patent’s application year and its
grant year. Many patent applications filed in the last few years of the sample period were still
under review and hence are not included in our sample. In fact, we observe a gradual decline in
the number of patents since 2015, which coincides with about two years of application-grant lag
on average. Following Hall et al. (2001; 2005), we correct for this truncation bias using weight
factors estimated from the application-grant lag distribution of the patents filed and granted
between 2010 and 2015.
The second measure is the total number of forward citations a firm’s EST patents receive
in subsequent years (Green Cites). Green Cites is a better metric to assess the quality of green
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patents by distinguishing breakthrough green innovation from incremental discoveries.33 This
citation measure also suffers from a truncation problem, whereby patents continue to be cited
after the end of our sample period, but we only observe citations received up to 2017. To
address this issue, we scale the citation measure by the technology-field-average citation counts
(measured at the 3-digit IPC level) each year, following Hall et al. (2001; 2005).
Besides the firm-specific measures of green innovation, we take similar approaches to con-
struct two more firm-county-specific proxies. Specifically, a slight variation of Green Patents
is the number of a firm’s EST patent applications cited by its local corporate customers with
at least one plant residing in the same county (Green PatentsLocal). Such a localized measure
serves two purposes: (1) to gauge the impact of a regulatory shock on local innovative activity;
and (2) to capture a firm’s innovative efforts in maintaining or accessing the local product mar-
ket. Similarly, Green CitesLocal is defined as the number of citations on a firm’s green patents
received from local customers. All measures are adjusted for truncation biases.
We use the natural logarithm of the above four measures in our analysis. To avoid los-
ing observations with zero green patents and citations, we add one to the actual values when
calculating the log form.
3.3.2 Measures of product market competition
This study employs two firm-specific measures of product market competition.34 First, we use
the product market fluidity measure ( Fluidity) introduced in Hoberg et al. (2014). The authors
analyze product descriptions in 10-K filings and construct Fluidity to capture the extent to which
rivals with similar product vocabulary as a firm are changing their product keywords in the next
year. It captures competitive threats from two dimensions: (1) the overlap of keywords between
the firm and its rivals; and (2) the dynamic changes of rivals’ products. Thus, fluidity reflects
33In a previous version of the working paper, we construct another green innovation measure that considers all
patents filed by a firm and count the number of forward citations they receive from other firms’ green patents
(Cites By Green). Such a measure accounts for inventions that may not necessarily classify as ESTs but are
crucial components on which other green technologies are built. Analyses using Cites By Green yield similar
findings as other proxies. Results can be provided upon request.
34We additionally employ Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as another measure of competition in a previous version
of the paper. The analysis results are qualitatively similar as those from using the firm-level competition measures.
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both the degree of product similarity with competitors and the product market’s instabilities
arising from competitor actions. A higher value is associated with a more significant competitive
threat for a firm.
The second measure is the total product similarity score (Similarity) constructed by Hoberg
and Phillips (2010, 2016). It also relies on the information drawn from 10-K filings. Using
product keywords, the authors compute firm-by-firm pairwise cosine similarities to group firms
into industries, known as text-based network industries (TNIC). The similarity score is then
obtained by taking the sum of cosine similarities across all firm rivals in the same TNIC industry.
It increases with both the number of competitors and product relatedness of each competitor,
thereby reflecting the level of competitive pressure that a firm faces.
3.3.3 Summary statistics
Table 3.1 reports county-level characteristics by state. Columns (1) and (2) document the
average number of firms and plants per county in each state. Massachusetts has the highest
number of innovative firms and plants per county on average (46 and 109, respectively), whereas
South Dakota has the lowest (2 and 3, respectively). This observation comes as no surprise
given that Massachusetts is ranked as one of the most innovative states and South Dakota the
least.35 Column (3) shows the number of counties in each state that was nonattained at least
once during the sample period. Column (5) reports the number in Column (3) as a percentage
of the total number of counties in the sample. Hawaii, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
and Vermont have the lowest percentage of nonattainment counties (0%) in the sample, an
indication of their healthy air quality conditions according to the NAAQS. On the other hand, all
the counties in Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island were once
nonattained. Prior research attributes the low air quality in Connecticut, Delaware, and New
Jersey to the pollution transported from upwind states (e.g., Cleveland et al. 1976, 1979).36 The
last column documents the average period of nonattainment status in each state. Mississippi,
35An example of such ranking would be Bloomberg’s annual State Innovation Index.
36https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/state-impact/issues/clean-air/clean-air-act-and-upwind-pollution.
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Iowa, Florida, and Minnesota have the shortest average duration of 4 years, while Connecticut,
Delaware, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island have the longest of 20 years).
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics of the key variables used in this study. About 46%
of the firm-county-years in the sample are in nonattainment counties. Conditioning on having
plants in a county, an average firm owns about two plants in an area and employs over 50 workers
(ln(1+50)=3.932). On average, a firm has 2.3 (ln(1+2.293)=1.192) granted EST patents per
year, which is comparable to previous studies (e.g., Brunnermeier and Cohen 2003), and these
patents receive about one technology-field-adjusted citation (ln(1+0.924)=0.654). The Fluidity
measure has an average of 0.058 and a median of 0.052, which is consistent with the statistics
reported in Hoberg et al. (2014).37 Similarity takes on an average value of 0.024 and a median
value of 0.013.
Drawn from the innovation literature, we control for a set of firm characteristics that may
affect innovation output. They include the natural logarithm of total assets (Size), growth
opportunities as measured by Tobin’s Q (TobinQ), leverage ratio (Leverage), asset tangibility
(Tangibility), R&D expenditures (R&D), capital expenditures (CapEx), profitability (ROA);
and the natural logarithm of the number of a firm’s local employees (Employees). An average
firm has a book value of $5.412 billion, a Tobin’s Q of 1.995, a leverage ratio of 23.8%, and a
ROA of 0.140. In addition, R&D expenditures, capital expenditures, and tangible assets account
for 3.4%, 4.6%, and 25.3% of an average firm’s total assets, respectively.
3.4 Environmental Regulation, Competition, and Green Innovation
In this section, we examine whether competition influences corporate environmental policies
when firms face stricter pollution regulations. Specifically, we investigate the effect of competi-
tion on a firm’s green innovative output in its response to an exogenous increase in environmental
regulatory stringency. We also conduct several tests to ensure robustness of our baseline evi-
dence.
37Fluidity and Similarity are scaled by 100 in this study.
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3.4.1 Baseline evidence
To examine the role of competition in shaping a firm’s innovative response to environmental
regulation, we estimate the following triple-difference model using pooled ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions:
Green Innovationy,t+z = α0 + α1Postc,t × Treatc × Compi,t−1 + α2Postc,t × Treatc
+α3Treatc × Compi,t−1 + α4Postc,t × Compi,t−1 + α5Postc,t
+α6Treatc + α7Compi,t−1 +
K∑
k=1
βkXki,c,t + FE + εi,c,t, (3.1)
where Green Innovationy,t+z denotes firm i’s or firm-county i, c’s green innovation outcomes at
years t + 2 and t + 3, including Green Patents, Green Cites, Green PatentsLocal, and Green
CitesLocal. To reflect the long-term nature of investment in innovation, we consider the inno-
vation output generated two and three years ahead. Compi,t denotes one of the competition
measures Fluidity and Similarity at year t− 1. Lagged competition measures are used to allevi-
ate reverse causality concerns or omitted variables simultaneously affecting a firm’s competitive
environment and the regional regulatory stringency.Treatc is a binary indicator that equals 1 if
the county c has ever been classified as a nonattainment county during the sample period and
0 otherwise. Postc,t is a binary variable that equals 1 for county c during the years in which
c has a nonattainment status and 0 otherwise. Xi,c,t is a vector of control variables defined
earlier, measured for firm i in county c at the end of year t. A detailed definition of all variables
is provided in Appendix Table A.5. We control for firm, county, and year fixed effects, which
subsume the time-invariant Treat. Since Treat would always equal to 1 when Post is 1, Post is
perfectly correlated to Post×Treat and Post× Comp is perfectly correlated to Post×Treat×
Comp. Thus, Post and Post× Comp are omitted in regressions. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm-year level.
Table 3.3 contains the results of our main tests. Panels A and B of the table show the regres-
sion results where the dependent variables are firm-level and firm-county level green innovation
at year t + 2, respectively. The primary coefficient of interest is α1, the triple interaction term
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Post × Treat× Comp, which captures the difference in treatment effects of a nonattainment
shock across firms with varying degrees of competition. The α1 estimates are all positive across
different green innovation output measures. These estimates are mostly statistically significant
at the 1% level, suggesting that competitive firms generate more green innovation in response
to a regulatory change than firms with less competitive concerns. For example, Columns (1)-(2)
of Panel A indicate that firms in the top competition-ranked decile produce about 2% (e.g.,
0.343/1.192×(0.103-0.024)=0.023, where 0.024 and 0.103 are the 10th and 90th percentile val-
ues of Fluidity, respectively) more EST patents than firms in the bottom decile following a
nonattainment shock to one of their production locations. Such an effect has a significant
bearing on a firm’s overall green innovative investments since a median firm operates in eight
nonattainment counties simultaneously, resulting in an aggregate impact of about 16%. The
differential treatment effects on patent quality are also large. Columns (3)-(4) show that top
competition-ranked decile firms receive about 4%-5% (e.g., 0.411/0.654×(0.103-0.024)=0.050)
more post-shock citations for their EST patents relative to bottom decile firms.
Panel B reveals strong influences of regional environmental regulations on local innovative
activity. The triple interaction coefficients for Green PatentsLocal are positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that competitive firms are more likely to adopt green
innovation locally under stringent regulations than firms facing less competitive pressure. In
terms of economic magnitude, the relative difference in the treatment effects between the top
and bottom competition-ranked decile firms ranges from 23% to 42%. The findings on Green
CitesLocal further substantiate the importance of competition in encouraging post-shock local
green innovation. The α1 estimates are positive and significant in all specifications. Specifically,
the point estimates are 0.025 (t−stat= 2.81) in Column (3) and 0.027 (t−stat= 3.41) in Column
(4).
The difference-in-difference coefficient of Post × Treat, α2, on the other hand, indicates
a negative treatment effect on less competitive firms. As shown in Panels A and B, the α2
estimates are negative and statistically significant across all specifications. Such results, at
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the minimum, suggest that, without competitive pressure, environmental regulations alone are
ineffective in encouraging green innovation, consistent with our prior. Interestingly, rules can
go as far as to inhibit innovative activity for these firms. One potential explanation for such
a negative impact on innovation would be the crowding-out effects of compliance costs. As
previously hypothesized, less competitive firms have fewer incentives to innovate and can easily
forego innovative investments for abatement expenditure.
We repeat our above tests using firm- and firm-county level green innovation at year t + 3
and report these results in Panels C and D. While the findings are broadly consistent with those
shown in Panels A and B, the α1 estimates are slightly weaker, indicating that competitive firms’
green innovative output occurs within the first two years following the shock. Taken together,
our results provide strong and consistent evidence that product market competition strengthens
environmental regulation in promoting green innovation. However, to conserve space, we shall
report only results using two-year-ahead innovation in subsequent sections.
Our above findings advance the existing literature on the relationship between environmental
policies and green innovation. While existing studies (e.g., Lanjouw and Mody 1996; Jaffe and
Palmer 1997; Brunnermeier and Cohen 2003) point to an overall increase in green innovation
activity for firms affected by environmental regulations, our results attribute such a boost to
mainly competitive firms. Our findings suggest that regulations do more good for competitive
firms than for other affected companies to the extent that green innovation may lead to enhanced
firm performance and more robust growth.38
3.4.2 Robustness tests
We undertake a rich set of robustness tests for our baseline results. First, to control for any omit-
ted county-specific characteristics, we repeat the baseline analysis using firm and county×year
fixed effects. Such specification accounts for all systematic differences across counties, includ-
ing factors that may potentially confound the causal relationship between regulations and firm
38We show in later sections that green innovation indeed contributes to the improvement of firm competitiveness.
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behaviors. This approach helps to alleviate potential endogeneity concerns one may have over
nonattainment designations and local regulatory stringency. Panel A of Table 3.4 presents the
estimated results for firm-level green innovation measures. The multiplicative fixed effects sub-
sume all the time-variant county-level variables, including the interaction term Post×Treat, but
the coefficient of Post× Treat× Comp remains strongly positive. The coefficient estimates are
statistically significant across all four sets of regressions, confirming our baseline findings on the
asymmetric regulatory effects across firms in different competitive environments. Unreported
analyses of firm-county-level green innovation measures yield a similar conclusion. That is, they
generate significant results in all specifications.
Second, we test our findings against alternative classifications of polluting industries. One
may argue that the current definition is incapable of eliminating all the non-polluters from the
sample, and hence the baseline results could be driven by those non-polluters. While plausible,
it should underestimate our coefficients since non-polluters are not subject to stricter regulations
induced by nonattainment shocks. Nonetheless, to alleviate this concern, we apply more rigid
definitions of polluting industries: (1) industries with average emissions of at least 100 tons
per firm; (2) industries with above-median industry-total emissions. As shown in Panels B and
C of Table 3.4, the results suggest that while the two alternative classifications, respectively,
eliminate about 9% and 19% of the main sample, the α1 estimates remain materially unaffected.
Finally, we address the potential issues arising from bad controls. To the extent that regional
environmental regulations have other influences on a firm than its corporate environmental
policies, firm-specific controls may themselves be outcomes of nonattainment treatment effects.
For example, a firm’s growth opportunities, as measured by Tobin’s Q, may hinge on regulations
and their impacts on corporate investment decisions. Having those endogenous variables as
controls would produce biased estimates. To rule out such concerns, we remove the vector of
time-variant control variables Xi,c,t from the regression models and repeat our baseline analysis.
The results, reported in Panel D of Table 4, show more robust estimates of the triple interaction
variable in terms of both the magnitude and statistical significance than their baseline regression
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counterparts.
Overall, our key evidence is robust to a battery of tests and consistently suggests that
competitive firms generate significantly more green innovation output following nonattainment
shocks than their less competitive peers.
3.4.3 Additional endogeneity tests
As discussed in earlier sections, there should remain little concerns over the endogeneity of
nonattainment designations and regulatory stringency. Nevertheless, we conduct an additional
robustness check to support the causal interpretation of our baseline findings. Specifically, we
re-estimate the baseline regressions using only the subsample of county-years whose pollutant
concentrations are marginally above or below the NAAQS. Such an approach reasonably cap-
tures county status changes arising from small variations in local emissions rather than the
heterogeneity in regional attribute, thereby, in effect, randomly assigns regulatory shocks across
counties.
We employ county-level emissions data available in EPA’s Air Quality System (AQS) database.
For each of the six pollutants, we define a bandwidth around the NAAQS threshold as 10%
above and below the threshold values and restrict the sample to county-years falling within
the bandwidth.39 Since NAAQS are revised every few years, so are the bandwidths. For ex-
ample, between 1997 and 2007, the EPA requires the annual 4th highest daily maximum (4th
maximum) 8-hour ozone concentration of fewer than 0.08 parts per million (ppm). The band-
width of ozone concentration is, therefore, set to 0.072 and 0.088 ppm during the ten years.
When the standard drops to 0.075 ppm in 2008, the revised bandwidth becomes 0.068-0.083
ppm. The restricted sample consists of about 150,603 firm-county-year observations. Table 3.5
presents the regression results. The estimates of α1 are qualitatively similar to what we have
found in the baseline analysis, with statistical significance in three of the four regressions on
firm-level outcomes. Untabulated firm-county-level regression results reach a similar conclusion.
39Applying a narrower bandwidth at 5% around the threshold eliminates about 90% of the main sample and
yields similar, albeit weaker, results as those from using 10%.
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These findings underscore the causal relationship between environmental regulations and green
innovativeness.
Another potential endogeneity concern arises from product market competition. Our results
could be spurious if the competition is endogenously determined by regulatory pressure or other
unobservable shocks. To allay this concern, we exploit large import tariff reductions in the
U.S. to provide exogenous variations in a competitive environment. Prior literature suggests
that significant reductions in tariff rates will expose domestic firms to foreign rivals, leading
to sharp increases in competition faced by U.S. corporations (e.g., Frésard 2010; Valta 2012).
Using import data from Schott (2008), we compute the tariff rate for each industry-year as the
collected duties divided by the custom value of imports.40 Following Huang et al. (2017) and
Chen et al. (2020), we identify large tariff reduction events as industry-years that experience
tariff rate decreases relative to the previous year by more than four times the median tariff
rate reduction during our sample period. To ensure that these tariff rate reductions reflect only
non-transitory changes in the competitive environment, we exclude declines preceded or followed
by a tariff increase greater than 80 percent of the reduction. Our robust test uses a dummy
indicator, Tariffi,t−1, which equals to 1 for the two years after the industry has experienced a
large tariff cut and 0 otherwise, in place of Compi,t−1 in Eq. (3.1).
As reported in Table 3.6, the estimates on Post × Treat× Comp are positive and mostly
statistically significant at the 5% level. The results confirm our prediction that competitive
firms generate more green innovation in response to increased regulatory pressure than their less
competitive counterparts. For instance, as shown in Column (1), an analysis of Green Patents
yields an α1 estimate of 0.035, indicating that firms in industries with tariff reductions develop
about 3% (0.035/1.192=0.029) more EST patents following a nonattainment shock relative to
other firms in industries without tariff reductions. In contrast, the coefficient on Post× Treat
is negative and statistically significant, suggesting a reduction in green innovation for those
firms not experiencing tariff reductions. Such a finding is also consistent with our prior that
40The U.S. import data for the period 1996-2017 is obtained from Peter K. Scott’s website:
https://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/international-trade-data/.
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environmental regulations are ineffective in stimulating green innovation without competitive
pressure.
Overall, the various endogeneity tests reported in this section support the causal interpreta-
tion of the combined effects of environmental regulation and competitive pressure on corporate
environmental policies.
3.5 A Key Mechanism
In this section, we explore whether the cost of relocation is a critical underlying mechanism that
compels firms to innovate when responding to tightened environmental policies and heightened
competitive pressure. We posit that such a cost would intensify the real impacts of regulatory
and competitive pressures for two reasons. First, firms facing higher relocation costs are ge-
ographically less mobile. These firms would be forced to remain in the local region following
policy shocks and face the associated adverse consequences. In contrast, relocation would be
easier for firms with more mobility to avoid significant compliance costs. Consequently, among
the companies that remain following regulatory changes, those with less mobility tend to bear
the disproportionate regulatory burden than their counterparts with greater mobility and, in
turn, react more strongly to policy shocks. Second, higher relocation costs would induce alter-
native means of minimizing compliance costs, including integrating green innovation into their
business strategies. Hence, the more geographically entrenched the firms are, the more likely
they will respond through innovative activity.
If the cost of relocation is a crucial mechanism, our baseline relationship ought to be more
pronounced for firms with less mobility. In particular, immobility should provide stronger incen-
tives for competitive firms to innovate when facing severe negative consequences of regulations.
Conversely, it would have little stimulating effects on less competitive firms given limited regula-
tory impacts on their competitiveness and a lack of desire for these firms to invest in innovation
due to the “replacement effect”. If anything, the higher regulatory costs induced by immobil-
ity may further divert resources from innovation to abatement through stronger crowding out
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effects.
To empirically test this mechanism, we conduct subsample analyses based on two alternative
definitions of industry mobility. Our first measure of immobility is the industry-total plant fixed
costs. Industries that sink a large amount of investments into local plants are less likely to close
and relocate their local production, and hence, face a higher relocation cost. Following Eder-
ington, Levinson, and Minier (2005), we use data from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry
Database developed by Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray (2013) and define industry mobility as
real structures capital stock scaled by the total value of shipments.41 To overcome the coverage
limitation of the data, we compute the industry means over the data period in constructing a
time-invariant measure of plant fixed costs.
Another measure of immobility is the extent of agglomeration economies of an industry. Ex-
isting literature (e.g., Marshall 1920; Ellison and Glaeser 1999; Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr 2010)
demonstrate that firms concentrated in the same geographic area may benefit from economies of
agglomeration in the form of reduced costs of transporting goods, people, and ideas. Such gains
represent opportunity costs for those firms moving their plants away from the region. Thus,
industries that enjoy agglomeration economies also face a high cost of relocation. Taking a
similar approach as Ellison et al. (2010), we estimate each industry’s geographic concentration.
The measure is defined in Eq. (3.2) as shown below.
Agglomerationl,t =
∑C







where sl,c,t is the share of industry l’s employment contained in county c during year t; and xc,t is
the mean employment share in county c across all industries. The construct measures deviations
from randomly distributed employment patterns. It equals to zero when industry employment is
randomly distributed across all C counties but increases with geographic clustering of employees
in industry l. To identify industries with higher cost of relocation, we divide the sample into
terciles every year based on each of the immobility measures. Industries in the top tercile of
41The plant fixed cost data is available at the 3-digit SIC industry level for the period 1996-2011 on the NBER
website: https://www.nber.org/research/data/nber-ces-manufacturing-industry-database.
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the distribution is grouped into the most mobile subsample, while those in the bottom tercile
is grouped into the least mobile subsample. We re-estimate the main regressions separately for
each subsample and present the results in Table 3.7.
Analyses based on plant fixed costs and agglomeration economies are reported in Panels A
and B, respectively. Consistent with our prediction, the significant impact of environmental
policies and competition is primarily concentrated in immobile industries. The estimates on the
triple-interaction term are positive and mostly significant at the 5% level within the least mobile
subsample, as shown in Columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) of both panels. An inter-decile increase in
competition is associated with about a 2%-5% (e.g., 0.694/1.192×(0.103-0.024)=0.050) increase
in post-regulatory green patents and 4-6% (e.g., 0.496/0.654×(0.103-0.024)=0.060) increase in
forward citations. These results are in clear contrast to the insignificant α1 estimates within the
most mobile subsample, as shown in Columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8). The mobile estimates are also
generally smaller in magnitude relative to those in the immobile group.
As predicted, the coefficient on Post × Treat tends to be negative and are marginally sig-
nificant within the least mobile industry subsample, suggesting a slightly negative regulatory
impact on the innovative responses of less competitive and immobile firms (Columns (1)-(2) and
(5)-(6)). The regulatory impact on more mobile industries is similarly negative but largely in-
significant (Columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8)). Such findings support the notion that environmental
regulations have limited stimulating effects on green innovation for firms with little compet-
itive concerns. It is also consistent with our conjecture that immobility may further reduce
post-regulatory innovation output for these firms through crowding-out effects.
Taken together, the results in subsample analyses indicate that environmental regulations can
trigger stronger reactions from firms with less mobility. These findings provide strong support
to the cost of relocation mechanism.
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3.6 Possible Gains in Competitive Firms’ Strategic Positions
Thus far, the results demonstrate that competition plays a vital role in firms’ strategic re-
sponses to environmental regulations. In this section, we explore the possible sources of gains
in competitive strengths arising from these responses. More specifically, we examine whether
regulation-induced green innovation would help competitive firms better achieve product differ-
entiation and attract more corporate customers than less competitive firms.
3.6.1 Product differentiation
We contend that firms fostering green innovation after regulatory shocks would benefit from
better product differentiation. To test this prediction, we construct two alternative proxies of
product differentiation. Our first measure is the patent originality score proposed by Trajten-
berg, Jaffe, and Henderson (1997). This score gauges the novelty of an invention by examining
the breadth of technology domain on which the invention relies, as defined in Eq. (3.3) shown
below.




where pj,k,t is the percentage of backward citations made by patent j to patent class k (at the
3-digit IPC level) out of n patent classes. Patent Originalityj,t takes on a higher value when
patent j is built on a large number of diverse technology fields, and vice versa. As suggested
by Trajtenberg et al. (1997), innovation advanced from a broad diversity of knowledge sources,
as opposed to the same technology domain, should lead to more original output. Hence, a
higher originality score indicates a greater degree of product novelty. We average the originality
measure across all patents filed by firm i at year t+2 to proxy for product differentiation arising
from green innovation.
Another measure of novelty is the product similarity score. To the extent that green inno-
vation is an effective differentiating strategy, the product similarity score (Hoberg and Phillips
2010; 2016) between a competitive firm and its rivals should be reduced following a nonattain-
ment shock. To facilitate comparison, we take the negative average value of the scores between
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firm i and its peers in the same industry at year t + 2 (Product Dissimilarity). Similar to the
Patent Originality score, a greater Product Dissimilarity value signifies more product novelty.
We next evaluate the differential treatment effects of nonattainment shocks across firms with
varying degrees of competition by re-estimating Eq. (3.1) with a product differentiation measure
in place of Green Innovation, as follows.
Product Diffi,t+2 = α0 + α1Postc,t × Treatc × Compi,t−1 + α2Postc,t × Treatc
+α3Treatc × Compi,t−1 + α4Postc,t × Compi,t−1 + α5Postc,t
+α6Treatc + α7Compi,t−1 +
K∑
k=1
βkXki,c,t + FE + εi,c,t, (3.4)
where Product Diffi,t+2 denotes firm i’s product differentiation measure at year t+ 2.
Table 3.8 presents the results. The estimates of the Post × Treat× Comp coefficient are
consistently positive in Columns (1)-(2) when Patent Originality is the dependent variable and
in Columns (3)-(4) when Product Dissimilarity is the outcome variable. These α1 estimates are
mostly statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that competitive firms achieve more
originality or dissimilarity following a nonattainment shock than their less competitive peers.
In terms of the economic magnitude, there is a 1.3% relative difference in the treatment effects
between the top and bottom Similarity-ranked decile firms,42 which translates to an aggregate
impact of about 10% (e.g., 0.013×8 nonattainment counties ≈ 0.10; or 0.017×8 ≈ 0.14). Further-
more, in Column (3), an estimate of 0.029 (t−stat=3.64) on the triple-interaction term indicates
that firms at the top Fluidity-ranked decile achieve a 7% (0.029/0.032×(0.103-0.024)=0.071),
where 0.032 is the mean value of Product Dissimilarity) reduction in product similarity rela-
tive to firms in the bottom Fluidity-ranked decile after a regulatory shock. Regressions using
Similarity further suggest an approximately 2% (0.013/0.032×(0.048-0.010)=0.015) reduction.
In contrast, the coefficient on Post × Treat is, in general, not significantly different from zero,
indicating minimal post-regulatory product differentiation achieved for less competitive firms.
This finding is not surprising given a lack of innovative response from these firms.
42In Column (2), a relative difference of 1.3% is obtained from 0.102/0.310×(0.048-0.010)=0.013, where 0.310 is
the mean value of Patent Originality, and 0.010 and 0.048 are the 10th and 90th percentile values of Similarity,
respectively.
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The combined results support our prediction that regulation-induced green innovation allows
competitive firms to better differentiate their products than others.
3.6.2 Corporate customer attraction
To the extent that green innovation can generate more business through product differentiation
and quality signaling, we expect competitive firms to gain more customers following a nonat-
tainment shock than less competitive firms. We employ two measures to capture such an effect.
The first measure is the natural logarithm of each firm’s total number of corporate customers at
year t+2. This metric evaluates the regulatory and competitive impacts on the overall firm-level
customer attraction. The other measure is the natural logarithm of the number of corporate
customers owning at least one plant in county c during year t+ 2. It is used to gauge the local
impact on affected counties.
We re-estimate Eq. (3.4) using either customer count measure as the dependent variable
and report the results in Panel A of Table 3.9. The panel provides supportive evidence that
firms facing intense competition are better able to attract customers following regulatory shocks
compared to less competitive firms. As seen in Columns (1)-(2), the estimated coefficients for
the triple-interaction term are positive but statistically significant when Fluidity is employed as
a proxy for competition. These findings indicate that firms at the top competition-ranked decile
achieve a 1.7% increase in the overall firm-level number of customers relative to firms in the
bottom competition-ranked decile following a nonattainment shock, or an aggregate increase of
about 14% given a median of eight nonattainment counties per firm-year. Such results are con-
sistent with the notion that new clean technologies can help attract customers interested in green
innovation and products. Columns (3)-(4) report the local attraction of customers drawn in by
the green innovativeness of firms’ local facilities. They show positive and statistically significant
coefficients on Post×Treat× Comp in the two specifications, indicating a 4%-6% increase in the
treatment effects on the number of local customers from bottom to top competition-ranked decile
firms. These results are consistent with our previous findings that competitive firms produce
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more green innovation adopted by local corporate customers following a regulatory shock.
The Post×Treat coefficient estimates are negative across all four sets of regressions but are
only statistically significant in Columns (3)-(4). While less competitive firms tend to experience
a loss in local customers who may switch to greener and more innovative products, such a loss has
a limited impact on the total customer count at the firm-level. These findings are line with the
notion that environmental regulations have little negative influences on the competitive position
of those firms facing less intense competition.
We further investigate which corporate customers are more attracted to post-shock compet-
itive firms. In particular, we compare the effects on customers who are unable to generate green
innovation themselves (hereafter “non-green customers”) with those who are able to (hereafter
“green customers”). Non-green customers are defined as those who do not have any EST patent
applications in a given year, whereas green customers are those with at least one EST patent
application. We then replicate our triple-difference OLS regressions in Panel A using the ratio
of non-green customers to green customers as the dependent variable and present the results in
Panel B. The dependent variable for Columns (1)-(2) is the ratio of a firm’s total number of
non-green customers to its total number of green customers at year t+2, whereas the dependent
variable for Columns (3)-(4) is the ratio of a firm’s number of local non-green customers in
county c to its number of local green customers.
Panel B shows positive and significant triple interaction coefficients, suggesting that a com-
petitive firm’s business increases through its corporate customers that do not generate green
technologies themselves. The α1 estimates range between 0.924 in Column (1) and 1.072 in
Column (3) and are significant at the 10% level, indicating that competitive firms can better
access these markets that are likely more reliant on external sources of green inventions. In
particular, a significant increase in the number of local non-green customers would come as no
surprise since they are also subject to the same regulatory shock as their local suppliers. These
non-green customers would, in turn, have a strong demand for green innovation and green prod-
ucts to comply with the regulation. The results complement our previous findings and support
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our prediction that green innovation can help more competitive firms generate more business.
In sum, contrary to conventional wisdom, environmental regulations can do good to firms,
particularly to those in highly competitive product markets. Tighter pollution policies incen-
tivize these firms to exploit green innovation as a competitive strategy to boost their business.
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3.7 Economic Consequences of Corporate Environmental Policies
In the preceding sections, we have established that firms facing intense competition invest in
green innovation in response to stricter environmental regulations and, simultaneously, achieve
competitive strengths in their respective product markets. We now turn to investigate the
economic consequences of such a strategic decision. This issue is of paramount importance
to economists and policy makers interested in the overall impact of environmental regulations
on the competitiveness of business sectors and economic growth. To provide insights into this
issue, we examine the operating and market performances of affected firms and their employment
conditions following regulatory changes.
3.7.1 Product market performance
We posit that gaining competitive advantages through green innovation would allow firms in
competitive markets to experience better post-regulatory-shock product market performance
than less competitive firms. To test this conjecture, we again conduct analyses using triple-
difference regression models, where the dependent variable, Firm Performancei,t+2, represents a
firm’s product market performance at year t+ 2, as follows.
Firm Performancei,t+2 = α0 + α1Postc,t × Treatc × Compi,t−1 + α2Postc,t × Treatc
+α3Treatc × Compi,t−1 + α4Postc,t × Compi,t−1 + α5Postc,t
+α6Treatc + α7Compi,t−1 +
K∑
k=1
βkXki,c,t + FE + εi,c,t, (3.5)
Our study employs three firm-level product market performance measures: market share
growth, price markup, and profit margin. Market Share Growth is computed as the difference
in sales-based market share between the current and the previous year, expressed in percentage.
It captures the product market expansion associated with a firm’s ability to attract customers
following a regulatory shock. Markup is the ratio of sales to the differences in sales and EBITDA,
and Profit Margin is defined as the net income divided by total sales. They measure the extent
to which gains in businesses translate to pricing power and profitability. Table 3.10 reports
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estimates of model (3.5).
A few notable results emerge from the table. Our findings suggest that a higher level of
competition is associated with significant increases in the treatment effect of a nonattainment
shock on firm performance. Columns (1)-(2) document the impact of a county-level shock on a
firm’s overall market share growth. The Post× Treat× Comp coefficient estimates are positive
and statistically significant in all specifications. In Column (1), an increase in competition
measured by Fluidity from the bottom to the top decile of its distribution would lead to a 23%
increase in the treatment effects of a regulatory shock.43 In Column (2), an inter-decile increase
in Similarity is associated with a 14% relative difference in treatment effects. The coefficient on
Post × Treat reveals, at most, a weak negative impact on less competitive firms at year t + 2.
The estimates are marginally significant in Column (1) and statistically insignificant in Column
(2). Collectively, the results point to an overall increased market share growth for competitive
firms due to stricter environmental regulations.
Results on Markup and Profit Margin presented in Columns (3)-(4) and (5)-(6), respectively,
suggest that a favorable impact on market expansion can also translate to higher pricing power
and profitability. The triple interaction coefficients are positive and statistically significant
for both outcome variables and across all specifications, indicating that firms facing tougher
competition enjoy a higher post-regulatory-shock markup and profit margin than their less
competitive counterparts. In particular, the α1 estimates for Markup range from 0.068 (t−stat=
2.31) in Column (3) to 0.078 (t−stat= 1.74) in Column (4), and the estimates for Profit Margin
range from 0.100 (t−stat= 1.71) in Column (5) to 0.206 (t−stat= 1.87) in Column (6). Similar
to the results on Market Share Growth, less competitive firms also do not appear to suffer
significant negative regulatory impacts on their price markup and profitability. The Post×Treat
coefficient estimates are negative but largely insignificant, except for the regression on Markup
shown in Column (3). This specification yields a statistically significant α2 estimate of -0.003,
albeit small. Taken together, the α1 and α2 estimates suggest an overall improvement in product
43This percentage is computed as follows: 0.190/0.066×(0.103-0.024)=0.227, where 0.066 is the average market
share growth value for firms in our sample.
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market performance for competitive firms following regulatory shocks.
These results complement our earlier findings on the innovative activity induced by envi-
ronmental regulations and directly associate enhanced firm performance with clean technology
development. Such an observation makes a critical addition to the literature as very few exist-
ing studies are able to show that green innovation leads to better firm performance. Most of
these studies are limited to analyzing green technology patenting without drawing any inferences
on the profitability and growth of regulated firms (e.g., Brunnermeier and Cohen 2003; Calel
and Dechezleprêtre 2016). Some even suggest the possibility that despite new green inventions,
there are high opportunity costs to diverting resources away from other productive investments,
potentially hampering firm performance (Gray and Shadbegian 1998; Popp and Newell 2012;
Aghion et al. 2016). Our analyses on a series of economic consequences allow us to better draw
a conclusion on the overall impact of environmental regulation on firm competitiveness.
A prior study by Lanoie et al. (2011) is related to our work, except it employs postal survey
data. The authors show that regulation-induced green innovation has positive effects on business
performance but find no evidence that the cost-saving innovation can more than compensate
for compliance costs. Our findings, instead, yield a stronger conclusion: the resulting positive
operating outcomes suggest that the benefits arising from innovative responses to environmental
regulations can outweigh the associated regulatory burden. These results are broadly consistent
with prior studies that have found positive regulatory effects on firm productivity in the long-
run (e.g., Berman and Bui 2001; Lanoie et al. 2008), supporting the notion that environmental
policies can do more good than harm to firms. However, in contrast to prior research, our study
finds that such positive effects from regulations are concentrated among competitive firms.
3.7.2 Market performance
In the preceding subsection, our analyses have shown that competitive firms enjoy better product
market performance arising from their green innovative activity than firms in less competitive
environments. We now test whether the financial market would react more favorably to these
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competitive firms and their associated benefits that reduce the regulatory burden.
One challenge we face in analyzing firms’ market performance is identifying the actual an-
nouncement dates of nonattainment shocks. To circumvent this issue, we rely on long-run abnor-
mal returns to observe market reactions to regulatory shocks instead of attempting short-term
stock performance measures in narrow event windows around county status changes. Following
He and Huang (2016), we calculate the one-year-ahead buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR)
using both the Fama-French three-factor and Fama-French-Carhart four-factor models over the
one year following a nonattainment shock.44 To assess the heterogeneous market reactions to
county-level shocks, we estimate the following triple-interaction model using pooled OLS regres-
sions:




βkXki,c,t + FE + εi,c,t, (3.6)
where BHARi,t+1 denotes the BHARs measured over the one-year period between t and t + 1;
and Eventc,t is a dummy indicator that equals 1 for county c during the year in which c switches
from an attainment to a nonattainment status.
Table 3.11 reports the regression results. We find evidence that competition has impor-
tant influences over the market reactions to regulatory shocks. Columns (1)-(2) and Columns
(3)-(4) document the effects on Fama-French 3-factor BHAR and Fama-French 4-factor BHAR,
respectively. Consistent with our expectation, the coefficient on Event× Comp is positive and
statistically significant for both BHAR measures and in all specifications, suggesting that in-
vestors react more positively to competitive firms undergoing nonattainment shocks than to
firms with less competitive pressure. For example, Column (1) reports an estimate of 1.234
(t−stat= 2.67), implying that an inter-decile increase in Fluidity would result in about 10
percentage points higher in the Fama-French 3-factor BHAR (1.234×(0.103-0.024)=0.097) fol-
lowing a nonattainment event. Similarly, Column (3) shows that the Fama-French 4-factor
44Untabulated results show that using one-year-ahead cumulative abnormal returns as dependent variables
would lead to qualitatively similar findings.
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BHAR during the one-year following a nonattainment shock is approximately 13 percentage
points (1.690×(0.103-0.024)=0.133) higher for firms in the top Fluidity-ranked decile than firms
in the bottom decile.
In contrast, the negative Event coefficients suggest an adverse market reaction to nonattain-
ment shocks for firms in less competitive environments. The negative α2 estimates in Model
(3.6) range from -0.043 in Column (2) to -0.112 in Column (3) and are all statistically signif-
icant at the 1% level, implying a negative market reaction to a nonattainment event by 4-11
percentage points for less competitive firms.
The combined results indicate that while less competitive firms experience a negative BHAR
following a nonattainment shock, the BHAR increases significantly with the competition. Such
a pattern substantiates our hypothesis that investors expect competitive firms to extract more
benefits from their strategic responses to environmental regulations than their less competitive
peers, and the market incorporates such heterogeneity into stock prices.
3.7.3 Social welfare implications
Operating and market performance reveal the effects of environmental policies on firms’ compet-
itiveness. We now investigate how these effects influence the firms’ abilities to create jobs and
maintain labor demand. Policy makers and economists often view environmental regulations
as detrimental to regional employment and their social welfare implications. We challenge this
conventional view and argue, instead, that gaining competitive advantages and boosting busi-
nesses through green innovation would allow firms in competitive markets to better maintain
their local employment than their less competitive counterparts.
To assess how regulations affect firms’ local labor demand, we re-estimate Eq.(3.5) using the
number of employees a firm has in a county during year t + 2 as the dependent variable and
report the results in Table 3.12. As demonstrated by the positive and significant coefficient on
Post×Treat× Comp, a higher level of competition is associated with significant increases in the
treatment effect of a nonattainment shock on local employment. Column (1) reports a coefficient
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estimate of 0.914 (t−stat= 2.88), indicating that firms in the top Fluidity-ranked decile have
about 2% (0.914/3.932×(0.103-0.024)=0.018) more local employees than firms in the bottom
decile following a regulatory shock. Column (2) implies a 1% relative difference in the treatment
effects for an inter-decile change in Similarity. The coefficient estimates of Post × Treat are
negative for regressions against both competition measures but are only marginally significant
at the 10% level in Column (1). They indicate that environmental regulations have, at most, a
weak negative impact on the local employment of firms with less competitive concerns.
Collectively, the results point to a net increase in regional employment for competitive firms
following regulatory changes, possibly to satisfy the growing business gained through innovative
responses. Our findings contradict prior claims that environmental regulations reduce labor
demand (e.g., Kahn 1997; Greenstone 2002) and suggest that environmental policies may benefit
regional social welfare given the appropriate corporate targets.
3.8 Conclusion
The conventional wisdom contends that environmental regulations impose onerous compliance
costs on businesses and impede productivity and economic growth, thereby adversely affect-
ing firm competitiveness. However, the existing literature has not fully explored the outcomes
and implications of these regulatory and enforcement changes across different counties in the
United States. The variation in the nonattainment status across counties provides a unique
opportunity to test the impact of environmental rules in diverse economic and environmental
settings. Our study, therefore, exploits these county-level nonattainment designation variations
as a quasi-natural experiment to examine whether and how the intensity of product market
competition influences firms’ strategic responses to strict environmental policies. Using detailed
plant-level information with publicly traded parent companies in the United States, we find that
heightened competitive pressure induces firms to develop significantly more green innovation out-
put when facing increased environmental regulatory stringency. We also explore whether there
are sources of gains in competitive strengths arising from this green innovation strategy. Our
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findings indicate that regulation-induced green innovation helps competitive firms to improve
competitiveness and differentiate themselves from competing rivals through product differenti-
ation. These firms are also able to attract more corporate customers following a nonattainment
shock than their less competitive counterparts.
A 2012 survey by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) reveals that U.S. manu-
facturers, especially small manufacturers with fewer than 50 employees, bear a disproportionate
share of the regulatory burden and that such regulatory compliance costs are often not affected
by economies of scale.45 Resources complying with burdensome environmental regulations hin-
der manufacturers’ ability to innovate and make better products. Yet there is virtually no prior
research that looks at the economic consequences of these increasingly stricter environmental
laws. Motivated by the survey, we examine the economic consequences of competitive firms’
green innovation strategy. The findings suggest that competitive firms can increase their market
share growth, markup, and profit margin and enjoy favorable market reactions, as measured
by the firms’ one-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns. We attribute our results to these firms’
ability to leverage their strategic environmental policies to reduce the regulatory burden. It is
important to stress that our evidence does not necessarily contradict the NAM’s 2012 survey
findings. The survey indicates that some of the costs associated with regulatory compliance are
fixed costs, hence a firm with fewer employees bears roughly the same cost as a firm with many
employees. Thus, on average, such costs put undue stress on smaller manufacturing firms that
have to reallocate their resources toward abatement.
While our study provides new evidence that tighter pollution policies stimulate green innova-
tion among firms in highly competitive product markets and, in turn, increase firm performance,
it does not necessarily suggest the need for more government intervention to promote a greener
environment. Several schools of economics push for a limited governmental role in economic
markets, unless in extreme cases of market failure (see, e.g., Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974; Peltz-
45“The cost of federal regulation to the U.S. economy, manufacturing and small business” by W.
Mark Crain and Nicole V. Crain of the National Association of Manufacturers; https://www.nam.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/Federal-Regulation-Full-Study.pdf
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man, 1976). They argue that corporations are incentivized to behave in an environmentally
responsible manner by their commitment to stakeholders, their desire to preserve reputation,
and their objective to improve long-term growth (e.g., Hart and Zingales 2017). Hence, we are
inclined to argue that environmental regulation acts only as a catalyst to encourage corporations
to become greener. With growing stakeholder engagement on corporate policy directions,46 firms
could have a greater desire to meet their environmentally-conscious stakeholders’ demand and
protect the environment, even without regulatory enforcement. Nonetheless, there are various
economic costs and other environmental benefits that are beyond the current scope of our study.
We will leave these issues for future research.
46In August 2019 Business Roundtable, 181 CEOs publicly committed to lead their corporations for the benefits
of all stakeholders – customers, employees, suppliers, communities, and shareholders.
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Figure 3.1: NAAQS Revisions and Net Changes in Nonattainment Counties
The figure shows the net changes in the number of nonattainment counties by criteria pollutant during the sample
period 1996-2017. The net changes, defined as the difference in the number of nonattainment counties between
the current year and the previous year, are plotted as solid orange lines. The years of NAAQS revisions are
illustrated by vertical dashed lines.
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Table 3.1: Distribution of County Characteristics by State
This table reports the average number of firms per county, the average number of plants per county, the
number of counties ever obtained a nonattainment status, the number of counties, the percentage of counties
ever obtained a nonattainment status, and the average nonattainment period in years for the sample period
from 1996 to 2017.
No. of Firms No. of Plants No. of Counties No. of % of Counties Nonattained
State per County per County Nonattained Counties Nonattained Period (years)
Alabama 7.31 11.59 4 62 6.45 11.75
Arizona 22.73 74.60 9 15 60.00 16.33
Arkansas 4.49 6.30 1 74 1.35 9.00
California 38.45 133.39 44 58 75.86 16.20
Colorado 9.63 17.94 16 59 27.12 9.63
Connecticut 42.74 109.79 8 8 100.00 20.00
Delaware 31.64 57.62 3 3 100.00 19.67
Florida 19.41 42.62 2 66 3.03 4.00
Georgia 6.47 11.34 28 150 18.67 14.36
Hawaii 25.15 55.64 0 4 0.00 0.00
Idaho 4.32 6.09 6 41 14.63 12.50
Illinois 9.58 26.80 14 97 14.43 15.21
Indiana 7.93 13.17 31 90 34.44 7.42
Iowa 3.91 5.36 2 99 2.02 4.00
Kansas 3.67 5.58 1 98 1.02 5.00
Kentucky 4.26 6.55 10 115 8.70 11.40
Louisiana 7.74 12.69 8 62 12.90 12.50
Maine 9.29 12.95 10 16 62.50 8.30
Maryland 22.27 48.47 14 23 60.87 17.79
Massachusetts 45.78 109.07 14 14 100.00 19.86
Michigan 11.40 25.86 29 83 34.94 5.72
Minnesota 7.62 14.80 9 86 10.47 4.22
Mississippi 4.28 5.29 1 80 1.25 4.00
Missouri 5.49 9.60 7 111 6.31 13.29
Montana 2.80 3.31 10 49 20.41 15.80
Nebraska 3.65 5.62 1 74 1.35 5.00
Nevada 10.24 24.12 5 17 29.41 12.00
New Hampshire 12.21 17.52 4 9 44.44 16.50
New Jersey 40.17 84.37 21 21 100.00 19.90
New Mexico 6.62 11.31 2 30 6.67 12.50
New York 21.62 52.44 30 62 48.39 17.63
North Carolina 9.37 16.08 22 100 22.00 6.23
North Dakota 2.51 3.02 0 45 0.00 0.00
Ohio 13.85 29.04 40 88 45.45 10.50
Oklahoma 5.17 8.87 0 75 0.00 0.00
Oregon 10.55 19.40 11 35 31.43 8.36
Pennsylvania 17.09 32.82 49 67 73.13 13.65
Rhode Island 20.84 36.46 5 5 100.00 20.00
South Carolina 9.53 15.44 1 46 2.17 12.00
South Dakota 2.50 3.04 0 59 0.00 0.00
Tennessee 7.00 12.22 15 94 15.96 7.73
Texas 7.80 18.49 22 238 9.24 16.18
Utah 8.97 16.59 7 27 25.93 14.43
Vermont 6.46 8.16 0 14 0.00 0.00
Virginia 7.91 14.98 19 97 19.59 7.58
Washington 13.94 34.40 7 38 18.42 6.86
West Virginia 3.75 4.64 12 54 22.22 10.25
Wisconsin 9.56 15.97 12 71 16.90 13.50
Wyoming 4.43 5.32 4 22 18.18 6.75
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
This table shows summary statistics for the main variables employed in this study over the sample period 1996-2017.
It provides the number of observations (NObs), mean, standard deviation (Std Dev), and various levels of percentiles
from the 5th to the 95th percentile. NAttain is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is in an nonattainment
county during the year and 0 otherwise; Plants is the number of plants a firm owns in a county; Employees is the
number of employees a firm has in a county; competition measures include product market fluidity (Fluidity), total
product similarity score (Similarity), the average log number of rival firms sharing at least one common corporate
customer (PeerCount), the average log number of rival firms sharing at least one common major corporate customer
who each account for, at the minimum, 10% of the supplier’s sales (MPeerCount), and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
defined at the two-digit SIC level (HHI); firm response measures include plant closure indicator (PlantClosure),
market share growth (MktGrowth), markups (Markup), and net profit margin (Margin); control variables include
log of total assets (Size), Tobin’s Q (TobinQ), leverage ratio (Leverage), asset tangibility (Tangibility), cumulative
R&D stock (R&D), capital expenditure (CapEx), cash holdings (Cash), and log number of employees a firm has in a
county (Employees). Construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.5. All variables are winsorized
at 1% and 99%.
Variable NObs Mean Std Dev 1st 25th 50th 75th 99th
Innovation Variables
Green Patents 523,791 1.192 1.325 0.000 0.000 0.693 2.197 4.710
Green Cites 520,541 0.654 0.997 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.103 3.980
Green PatentsLocal 477,686 0.018 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.693
Green CitesLocal 477,686 0.004 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.201
Competition Variables
Fluidity 462,547 0.058 0.031 0.011 0.034 0.052 0.074 0.156
Similarity 490,050 0.024 0.028 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.022 0.180
Firm-specific Characteristics
NAttain 523,791 0.456 0.498 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Plants 523,791 2.139 4.022 1.000 1.000 1.000 2.000 15.000
Size 523,791 8.597 1.845 3.427 7.491 8.831 9.975 12.248
TobinQ 523,791 1.995 1.105 0.800 1.275 1.657 2.320 6.716
Leverage 523,791 0.238 0.156 0.000 0.132 0.223 0.323 0.713
Tangibility 523,791 0.253 0.170 0.024 0.125 0.210 0.334 0.695
R&D 523,791 0.034 0.053 0.000 0.001 0.017 0.042 0.287
CapEx 523,791 0.046 0.034 0.005 0.023 0.036 0.060 0.174
ROA 523,791 0.140 0.096 -0.274 0.100 0.142 0.191 0.332
Employees 523,791 3.932 1.255 2.398 2.890 3.714 4.718 7.419
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Table 3.3: The Effect of Competitive Firms’ Environmental Regulatory Response
on Green Innovation
This table reports regression results from triple-difference models that examine the effect of competitive firms’
environmental regulatory response on green innovation as follows:
Green Innovationy,t+2 = α0 + α1Postc,t × Treatc × Compi,t−1 + α2Postc,t × Treatc + α3Treatc × Compi,t−1





where Green Innovationy,t+2 denotes firm i’s or firm-county’s green innovation and is measured by Green Patents,
Green Cites, Green PatentsLocal and Green CitesLocal; Treatc is a binary variable that equals 1 if the county has
ever been classified as a nonattainment area during the sample period and 0 otherwise; Postc,t is a binary variable
that equals 1 for county c during the years in which c has a nonattainment status and 0 otherwise; Compi,t−1 denotes
competition and is measured by Fluidity or Similarity; Xi,t is a vector of controls including Size, TobinQ, Leverage,
Tangibility, R&D, CapEx, Cash, and Employees. Construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.5.
All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. FE denotes firm, county, and year fixed effects. NObs
is the number of firm-county-year observations, and R̄2 is the adjusted R-squared value. All t−statistics reported in
parentheses are computed based on adjusted standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Firm-level Green Innovation in Year t + 2
Green Patents (t+2) Green Cites (t+2)
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post×Treat×Comp 0.343* 0.579*** 0.411** 0.642***
(2.01) (3.72) (2.39) (4.61)
Post×Treat -0.021* -0.011* -0.023** -0.013**
(-1.99) (-1.88) (-2.42) (-2.86)
Treat×Comp -0.408*** -0.387** -0.508*** -0.513***
(-3.10) (-2.67) (-3.63) (-3.73)
Comp -1.305 -2.437* -0.248 -1.062
(-0.75) (-1.76) (-0.15) (-0.93)
Size 0.293*** 0.299*** 0.215** 0.209***
(4.56) (4.48) (2.80) (3.10)
TobinQ 0.052* 0.061** 0.053* 0.055*
(1.83) (2.14) (2.05) (2.08)
Leverage 0.015 0.084 0.045 0.086
(0.05) (0.29) (0.22) (0.41)
Tangibility 0.318 0.387 0.588 0.709
(0.60) (0.74) (0.98) (1.18)
R&D 2.044** 2.055** 1.496* 1.433*
(2.67) (2.58) (1.97) (1.84)
CapEx 1.165 1.521* -0.309 -0.005
(1.74) (2.06) (-0.32) (-0.01)
ROA 0.158 0.273 -0.180 -0.068
(0.50) (0.87) (-0.62) (-0.22)
Employees 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.18) (-0.51) (0.62) (0.17)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 462,413 489,919 459,335 486,671
Adj R2 0.816 0.808 0.724 0.721
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Table 3.3: The Effect of Competitive Firms’ Environmental Regulatory Response
on Green Innovation
– Continued
Panel B: Firm-County Level Green Innovation in Year t + 2
Green Patents (t+2) Green Cites (t+2)
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post×Treat×Comp 0.097** 0.111*** 0.025** 0.027***
(2.31) (3.56) (2.81) (3.41)
Post×Treat -0.005* -0.002** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-2.14) (-2.36) (-3.03) (-3.32)
Treat×Comp -0.013 0.036 -0.003 0.012
(-0.27) (0.79) (-0.22) (0.99)
Comp -0.017 0.111 -0.013 0.023
(-0.11) (0.75) (-0.38) (0.70)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 462,413 489,919 459,335 486,671
Adj R2 0.816 0.808 0.724 0.721
Panel C: Firm-Level Green Innovation in Year t + 3
Green Patents (t+2) Green Cites (t+2)
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post×Treat×Comp 0.355* 0.553*** 0.513** 0.717***
(2.01) (3.73) (2.70) (4.57)
Post×Treat -0.022* -0.012** -0.036*** -0.022***
(-1.99) (-2.12) (-3.04) (-4.07)
Treat×Comp -0.416** -0.336* -0.553*** -0.506***
(-2.26) (-2.04) (-4.51) (-3.37)
Comp -2.159 -1.358 -0.112 -1.177
(-1.16) (-0.89) (-0.05) (-1.06)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 376,504 397,775 373,906 395,019
Adj R2 0.822 0.814 0.724 0.717
Panel D: Firm-County Level Green Innovation in Year t + 3
Green Patents (t+2) Green Cites (t+2)
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post×Treat×Comp 0.135* 0.203*** 0.050** 0.086***
(2.05) (3.02) (2.15) (3.08)
Post×Treat -0.008* -0.005** -0.003* -0.002**
(-1.81) (-2.42) (-2.00) (-2.60)
Treat×Comp -0.015 0.099 0.000 0.000
(-0.16) (1.17) (0.00) (0.00)
Comp -0.112 0.087 -0.065 -0.018
(-0.44) (0.18) (-0.75) (-0.13)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 338,654 358,846 338,654 358,846
Adj R2 0.277 0.276 0.267 0.267
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Table 3.4: Robustness Tests
This table reports regression results from triple-difference models that examine the effect of competitive firms’
environmental regulatory response on green innovation as follows:
Green Innovationi,t+2 = α0 + α1Postc,t × Treatc × Compi,t−1 + α2Postc,t × Treatc + α3Treatc × Compi,t−1





where Green Innovationi,t+2 denotes firm i’s green innovation and is measured by Green Patents and Green Cites;
Treatc is a binary variable that equals 1 if the county has ever been classified as a nonattainment area during the
sample period and 0 otherwise; Postc,t is a binary variable that equals 1 for county c during the years in which c has
a nonattainment status and 0 otherwise; Compi,t−1 denotes competition and is measured by Fluidity or Similarity;
Xi,t is a vector of controls including Size, TobinQ, Leverage, Tangibility, R&D, CapEx, Cash, and Employees.
Construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.5. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. In Panel A, the regression model contains firm and countytimesyear fixed effects (FE). In Panels B
and C, the models are estimated on subsamples of firms from industries with average per-firm emissions greater
than 100 tonnes and industries with above-median total emissions, respectively. In Panel D, the triple-difference
model is estimated with no firm-specific control variables. FE denotes firm, county, and year fixed effects. NObs is
the number of firm-county-year observations, and R̄2 is the adjusted R-squared value. All t−statistics reported in
parentheses are computed based on adjusted standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Control for Firm and County×Year Fixed Effects
Green Patents (t+2) Green Cites (t+2)
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post×Treat×Comp 0.970* 1.871*** 0.937** 1.502***
(1.82) (4.10) (2.24) (3.63)
Treat×Comp -1.236** -1.180** -1.233** -1.538***
(-2.41) (-2.46) (-2.84) (-3.91)
Comp -3.338 -4.714*** -0.816 -1.848
(-1.32) (-2.89) (-0.49) (-1.60)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 453,028 479,984 450,622 477,401
Adj R2 0.278 0.283 0.253 0.261
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Table 3.4: Robustness Tests – Continued
Panel B: Industries with Average Per-Firm Emissions > 100 Tonnes
Green Patents (t+2) Green Cites (t+2)
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post×Treat×Comp 0.320* 0.596*** 0.474** 0.654***
(1.70) (3.79) (2.55) (5.19)
Post×Treat -0.021* -0.013** -0.028** -0.014***
(-1.78) (-2.25) (-2.63) (-2.93)
Treat×Comp -0.413*** -0.370*** -0.543*** -0.502***
(-2.69) (-2.76) (-3.73) (-3.80)
Comp -0.782 -2.350* -0.154 -1.128
(-0.47) (-1.78) (-0.08) (-0.98)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 421,278 448,057 418,240 444,849
Adj R2 0.793 0.786 0.724 0.720
Panel C: Industries with Above-Median Total Emissions
Green Patents (t+2) Green Cites (t+2)
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post×Treat×Comp 0.571** 0.627*** 0.609*** 0.653***
(2.60) (3.84) (3.12) (4.94)
Post×Treat -0.038** -0.015** -0.038*** -0.015**
(-2.63) (-2.12) (-3.12) (-2.67)
Treat×Comp -0.597*** -0.400** -0.667*** -0.526***
(-2.94) (-2.73) (-4.12) (-3.86)
Comp -1.636 -2.539* -0.398 -1.160
(-0.82) (-1.85) (-0.20) (-0.96)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 373,058 396,120 370,176 393,068
Adj R2 0.817 0.808 0.735 0.730
Panel D: Without Firm-Specific Characteristics
Green Patents (t+2) Green Cites (t+2)
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post×Treat×Comp 0.379** 0.578*** 0.444** 0.659***
(2.06) (3.53) (2.46) (4.65)
Post×Treat -0.024* -0.012* -0.026** -0.014**
(-2.09) (-1.80) (-2.49) (-2.84)
Treat×Comp -0.464*** -0.404** -0.554*** -0.535***
(-3.47) (-2.63) (-3.77) (-3.75)
Comp -0.945 -2.612 0.175 -1.216
(-0.55) (-1.73) (0.11) (-1.12)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 462,413 489,919 459,335 486,671
Adj R2 0.812 0.803 0.721 0.717
141
Table 3.5: Subsample Analysis of County-Level Emissions Marginally Above or
Below NAAQS Thresholds
This table reports regression results from triple-difference models that examine the effect of competitive firms’
environmental regulatory response on on green innovation using a subsample in which the county-level pollutant
concentrations are 10% above or below the NAAQS threshold, as follows.
Green Innovationi,t+2 = α0 + α1Postc,t × Treatc × Compi,t−1 + α2Postc,t × Treatc + α3Treatc × Compi,t−1





where Green Innovationi,t+2 denotes firm i’s green innovation and is measured by Green Patents and Green Cites;
Treatc is a binary variable that equals 1 if the county has ever been classified as a nonattainment area during the
sample period and 0 otherwise; Postc,t is a binary variable that equals 1 for county c during the years in which c has
a nonattainment status and 0 otherwise; Compi,t−1 denotes competition and is measured by Fluidity or Similarity;
Xi,t is a vector of controls including Size, TobinQ, Leverage, Tangibility, R&D, CapEx, Cash, and Employees.
Construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.5. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. FE denotes firm, county, and year fixed effects. NObs is the number of firm-county-year observations,
and R̄2 is the adjusted R-squared value. All t−statistics reported in parentheses are computed based on adjusted
standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Green Patents (t+2) Green Cites (t+2)
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post×Treat×Comp 0.698* 0.724** 0.496 0.803**
(1.87) (2.46) (1.43) (2.76)
Post×Treat -0.045* -0.019* -0.032 -0.020*
(-2.09) (-2.00) (-1.51) (-1.85)
Treat×Comp -0.677*** -0.288 -0.525** -0.391*
(-2.96) (-1.56) (-2.36) (-1.74)
Comp -0.837 -1.930 0.554 -1.008
(-0.50) (-1.36) (0.34) (-0.83)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 139,883 145,275 138,696 144,012
Adj R2 0.816 0.808 0.713 0.709
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Table 3.6: Effects of Environmental Regulations and Import Penetration on Green
Innovation
This table reports regression results from triple-difference models that examine the joint effects of environmental
regulations and import tariff reduction (Tariff) on green innovation, as follows.
Green Innovationy,t+2 = α0 + α1Postc,t × Treatc × Tariffi,t−1 + α2Postc,t × Treatc + α3Treatc × Tariffi,t−1





where Green Innovationy,t+2 denotes firm i’s or firm-county’s green innovation and is measured by Green Patents,
Green Cites, Green PatentsLocal and Green CitesLocal; Treatc is a binary variable that equals 1 if the county has
ever been classified as a nonattainment area during the sample period and 0 otherwise; Postc,t is a binary variable
that equals 1 for county c during the years in which c has a nonattainment status and 0 otherwise; Tariffi,t−1 is a
binary indicator that equals to 1 if there is a significant import tariff rate reduction in the industry in previous year
and 0 otherwise; Xi,t is a vector of controls including Size, TobinQ, Leverage, Tangibility, R&D, CapEx, Cash, and
Employees. Construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.5. All variables are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentiles. FE denotes firm, county, and year fixed effects. NObs is the number of firm-county-year
observations, and R̄2 is the adjusted R-squared value. All t−statistics reported in parentheses are computed based
on adjusted standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
Green Patents (t+2) Green Cites (t+2)
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post×Treat×Tariff 0.035** 0.017* 0.007** 0.001**
(2.35) (1.88) (2.81) (2.52)
Post×Treat -0.035** -0.019** -0.007*** -0.002***
(-2.28) (-2.16) (-3.25) (-3.63)
Treat×Tariff -0.009 -0.019** 0.000 0.000
(-0.68) (-2.69) (0.04) (1.45)
Tariff 0.392** 0.217*** 0.023* 0.003
(2.75) (3.77) (1.80) (1.22)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 406,878 404,026 372,938 372,938
Adj R2 0.804 0.7287 0.229 0.241
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Table 3.7: The Effect of Competitive Firms’ Environmental Regulatory Response
on Green Innovation by Industry Type
This table reports subsample regression results from triple-difference models that examine the effect of competitive
firms’ environmental regulatory response on green innovation , as follows.
Green Innovationi,t+2 = α0 + α1Postc,t × Treatc × Compi,t−1 + α2Postc,t × Treatc + α3Treatc × Compi,t−1





where Green Innovationi,t+2 denotes firm i’s green innovation and is measured by Green Patents and Green Cites;
Treatc is a binary variable that equals 1 if the county has ever been classified as a nonattainment area during the
sample period and 0 otherwise; Postc,t is a binary variable that equals 1 for county c during the years in which c has
a nonattainment status and 0 otherwise; Compi,t−1 denotes competition and is measured by Fluidity or Similarity;
Xi,t is a vector of controls including Size, TobinQ, Leverage, Tangibility, R&D, CapEx, Cash, and Employees.
We divide firms into three terciles based on the degree of industry mobility they belong to. Industry mobility
is measured by its plant fixed cost or agglomeration of economies. Construction of the variables is presented in
Appendix Table A.5. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. FE denotes firm, county, and
year fixed effects. NObs is the number of firm-county-year observations, and R̄2 is the adjusted R-squared value.
All t−statistics reported in parentheses are computed based on adjusted standard errors clustered at the firm-year
level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Firms Grouped by Plant Fixed Costs
Green Patents (t+2) Green Cites (t+2)
Least Mobile Industry Most Mobile Industry Least Mobile Industry Most Mobile Industry
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post×Treat×Comp 0.694** 0.732*** 0.300 1.264 0.496* 0.661*** -0.229 0.157
(2.31) (3.05) (0.78) (1.55) (1.78) (3.09) (-0.66) (0.30)
Post×Treat -0.054** -0.029** -0.002 -0.013 -0.025 -0.013 0.021 0.003
(-2.47) (-2.35) (-0.06) (-0.55) (-1.29) (-1.16) (0.78) (0.18)
Treat×Comp -0.279 -0.403* -0.644** -1.078* -0.499** -0.587*** -0.133 -0.133
(-0.86) (-1.72) (-2.20) (-2.08) (-2.05) (-2.87) (-0.43) (-0.24)
Comp 0.054 0.812 0.147 -1.668 3.666** 1.170 -2.695 -2.847
(0.02) (0.46) (0.05) (-0.25) (2.20) (0.61) (-0.90) (-0.48)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 71,923 76,459 72,539 76,450 71,636 76,173 71,892 75,803
Adj R2 0.876 0.860 0.852 0.852 0.822 0.816 0.762 0.766
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Table 3.7: The Effect of Competitive Firms’ Environmental Regulatory Response
on Green Innovation by Industry Type – Continued
Panel B: Firms Grouped by an Industry’s Agglomeration of Economies
Green Patents (t+2) Green Cites (t+2)
Least Mobile Industry Most Mobile Industry Least Mobile Industry Most Mobile Industry
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post×Treat×Comp 0.551* 0.956** 0.330 0.372 0.734*** 0.986*** 0.214 0.539
(1.77) (2.59) (1.29) (1.43) (3.08) (4.16) (0.89) (1.68)
Post×Treat -0.029 -0.018 -0.022 -0.013 -0.041** -0.020** -0.014 -0.016
(-1.24) (-1.52) (-1.27) (-1.33) (-2.52) (-2.20) (-0.85) (-1.60)
Treat×Comp -0.422* -0.667*** -0.557* -0.387 -0.554*** -0.791*** -0.423 -0.337
(-2.10) (-3.46) (-1.99) (-1.23) (-3.42) (-4.80) (-1.44) (-1.26)
Comp -5.618 -0.544 -0.572 -0.819 -4.114 -2.084 -1.842 -1.741
(-1.66) (-0.16) (-0.20) (-0.42) (-1.22) (-0.82) (-0.78) (-0.91)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 125,340 134,585 118,399 123,509 125,057 134,302 117,589 122,696
Adj R2 0.861 0.846 0.834 0.829 0.802 0.798 0.745 0.744
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Table 3.8: The Effect of Competitive Firms’ Environmental Regulatory Response
on Product Differentiation
This table reports regression results from triple-difference models that examine competitive firms’ environmental
regulatory response on product differentiation as follows:
Product Diffi,t+2 = α0 + α1Postc,t × Treatc × Compi,t−1 + α2Postc,t × Treatc + α3Treatc × Compi,t−1





where Product Diffi,t+2 is measured by firm i’s patent originality score and average similarity score at t+ 2; Treatc
is a binary variable that equals 1 if the county has ever been classified as a nonattainment area during the sample
period and 0 otherwise; Postc,t is a binary variable that equals 1 for county c during the years in which c has a
nonattainment status and 0 otherwise; Compi,t−1 denotes competition and is measured by Fluidity or Similarity;
Xi,t is a vector of controls including Size, TobinQ, Leverage, Tangibility, R&D, CapEx, Cash, and Employees.
Construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.5. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. FE denotes firm, county, and year fixed effects. NObs is the number of firm-county-year observations,
and R̄2 is the adjusted R-squared value. All t−statistics reported in parentheses are computed based on adjusted
standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Patent Originality(t+2) Average Similarity (t+2)
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post×Treat×Comp 0.001 0.102** 0.029*** 0.013**
(0.03) (2.32) (3.64) (1.99)
Post×Treat 0.000 -0.002 -0.001* -0.000
(0.22) (-1.69) (-1.93) (-0.01)
Treat×Comp -0.025 -0.079* 0.005 -0.021***
(-0.75) (-1.94) (0.62) (-2.93)
Comp 0.470* 0.344 -0.149*** 0.025***
(1.92) (1.11) (-15.59) (3.61)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 362,970 384,332 211,536 222,444
Adj R2 0.557 0.555 0.514 0.501
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Table 3.9: The Effect of Competitive Firms’ Environmental Regulatory Response
on Corporate Customer Relationships
This table reports regression results from triple-difference models that examine competitive firms’ environmental
regulatory response on attracting corporate customers as follows:
Customersi,t+2 = α0 + α1Postc,t × Treatc × Compi,t−1 + α2Postc,t × Treatc + α3Treatc × Compi,t−1
+α4Postc,t × Compi,t−1 + α5Postc,t + α6Treatc + α7Compi,t−1 +
K∑
k=1
βkXki,c,t + FE + εi,c,t,
where Customersi,t+2 is defined by firm i’s total number of corporate customers, number of local corporate customers,
ratio of non-green customers to green customers, ratio of local non-green customers to local green customers; Treatc
is a binary variable that equals 1 if the county has ever been classified as a nonattainment area during the sample
period and 0 otherwise; Postc,t is a binary variable that equals 1 for county c during the years in which c has a
nonattainment status and 0 otherwise; Compi,t−1 denotes competition and is measured by Fluidity or Similarity;
Xi,t is a vector of controls including Size, TobinQ, Leverage, Tangibility, R&D, CapEx, Cash, and Employees.
Construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.5. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. FE denotes firm, county, and year fixed effects. NObs is the number of firm-county-year observations,
and R̄2 is the adjusted R-squared value. All t−statistics reported in parentheses are computed based on adjusted
standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Panel A: Number of Corporate Customers
Total No. of Customers (t+2) No. of Local Customers (t+2)
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post×Treat×Comp 0.300** 0.311 0.271* 0.825***
(2.00) (1.10) (1.67) (2.63)
Post×Treat -0.014 0.011* -0.018* -0.023***
(-1.48) (-0.70) (-1.81) (-3.31)
Treat×Comp -0.121 -0.003 0.585** 0.692
(-1.05) (-0.01) (2.10) (1.14)
Comp 1.629 3.657 0.575 0.116
(1.39) (1.40) (0.91) (0.09)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 462,413 489,919 462,413 489,919
Adj R2 0.838 0.834 0.662 0.657
Panel B: Ratio of Non-Green to Green Corporate Customers
Non-Green/Green Customers (t+2) Non-Green/Green Local Customers (t+2)
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Post×Treat×Comp 0.924* 0.929* 1.072* 0.925*
(1.69) (1.94) (1.81) (2.09)
Post×Treat -0.039 -0.003 -0.093* -0.052*
(-0.89) (-0.09) (-1.94) (-2.04)
Treat×Comp -1.517*** -0.734 0.580 0.107
(-2.67) (-1.42) (0.85) (0.14)
Comp 5.538*** -2.548*** -1.861 -0.383
(10.49) (-4.15) (-0.86) (-0.23)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 210,027 215,167 107,731 109,839
Adj R2 0.687 0.688 0.553 0.555
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Table 3.10: The Effect of Competitive Firms’ Environmental Regulatory Response
on Operating Performance
This table reports regression results from triple-difference models that examine the effect of competitive firms’
environmental regulatory response on operating performance as follows:
OpPerformancei,t+2 = α0 + α1Postc,t × Treatc × Compi,t−1 + α2Postc,t × Treatc + α3Treatc × Compi,t−1




βkXki,c,t + FE + εi,c,t,
where OpPerformancei,t+2 is measured by firm i’s market share growth, markup, and profit margin; Treatc is a
binary variable that equals 1 if the county has ever been classified as a nonattainment area during the sample
period and 0 otherwise; Postc,t is a binary variable that equals 1 for county c during the years in which c has a
nonattainment status and 0 otherwise; Compi,t−1 denotes competition and is measured by Fluidity or Similarity;
Xi,t is a vector of controls including Size, TobinQ, Leverage, Tangibility, R&D, CapEx, Cash, and Employees.
Construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.5. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. FE denotes firm, county, and year fixed effects. NObs is the number of firm-county-year observations,
and R̄2 is the adjusted R-squared value. All t−statistics reported in parentheses are computed based on adjusted
standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Market Share Growth Markup Profit Margin
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post×Treat×Comp 0.190* 0.234** 0.068** 0.078* 0.100* 0.206*
(2.08) (2.51) (2.31) (1.74) (1.71) (1.87)
Post×Treat -0.011* -0.004 -0.003** -0.001 -0.004 -0.003
(-1.88) (-1.64) (-2.18) (-1.40) (-1.50) (-1.44)
Treat×Comp -0.157* -0.191** -0.040 -0.039 -0.133*** -0.250***
(-1.78) (-2.83) (-1.60) (-1.13) (-2.62) (-2.60)
Comp -0.423 0.329 -0.008 -0.257 -0.015 -0.567
(-0.73) (1.20) (-0.06) (-1.42) (-0.08) (-1.59)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 461,927 489,414 462,292 489,798 462,100 489,603
Adj R2 0.234 0.218 0.855 0.852 0.767 0.765
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Table 3.11: The Effect of Competitive Firms’ Environmental Regulatory Response
on Market Performance
This table reports regression results from triple-difference models that examine the effect of competitive firms’
environmental regulatory response on market performance as follows:
BHARi,t+1 = α0 + α1Eventc,t × Compi,t−1 + α2Eventc,t + α3Compi,t−1 +
K∑
k=1
βkXki,c,t + FE + εi,c,t,
where BHARi,t+1 is measured by a one-year buy and hold abnormal return using either the Fama-French three-
factor or four-factor model; Eventc,t equals 1 for county c during the year in which c switches from an attainment to
a nonattainment status; Compi,t−1 denotes competition and is measured by Fluidity or Similarity; Xi,t is a vector
of controls including Size, TobinQ, Leverage, Tangibility, R&D, CapEx, Cash, and Employees. Construction of the
variables is presented in Appendix Table A.5. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. FE
denotes firm, county, and year fixed effects. NObs is the number of firm-county-year observations, and R̄2 is the
adjusted R-squared value. All t−statistics reported in parentheses are computed based on adjusted standard errors
clustered at the firm-year level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Fama-French 3-factor BHAR (t+1) Fama- French 4-factor BHAR (t+1)
Fluidity Similarity Fluidity Similarity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Event×Comp 1.234*** 1.205** 1.690*** 1.807***
(2.67) (2.38) (3.20) (3.38)
Event -0.086*** -0.043*** -0.112*** -0.058***
(-3.14) (-3.49) (-3.59) (-4.46)
Comp -0.085 -0.716 -0.626 -0.856
(-0.09) (-0.60) (-0.62) (-0.63)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
NObs 454,487 481,742 454,487 481,742
Adj R2 0.229 0.223 0.232 0.228
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Table 3.12: The Effect of Competitive Firms’ Environmental Regulatory Response
on Firm-County-Level Employment
This table reports regression results from triple-difference models that examine competitive firms’ environmental
regulatory response on firm-county-level employment:
Labori,c,t+2 = α0 + α1Postc,t × Treatc × Compi,t−1 + α2Postc,t × Treatc + α3Treatc × Compi,t−1
+α4Postc,t × Compi,t−1 + α5Postc,t + α6Treatc + α7Compi,t−1 +
K∑
k=1
βkXki,c,t + FE + εi,c,t,
where Labori,c,t+2 is defined by the log of one plus firm i’s two-year ahead number of firm-county-level employees;
Treatc is a binary variable that equals 1 if the county has ever been classified as a nonattainment area during the
sample period and 0 otherwise; Postc,t is a binary variable that equals 1 for county c during the years in which c has
a nonattainment status and 0 otherwise; Compi,t−1 denotes competition and is measured by Fluidity or Similarity;
Xi,t is a vector of controls including Size, TobinQ, Leverage, Tangibility, R&D, CapEx, Cash, and Employees.
Construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.5. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. FE denotes firm, county, and year fixed effects. NObs is the number of firm-county-year observations,
and R̄2 is the adjusted R-squared value. All t−statistics reported in parentheses are computed based on adjusted













Fixed Effects Yes Yes
NObs 462,413 489,919
Adj R2 0.145 0.143
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Table A.1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources for Essay 1
Variable Definition Data Source
Customer Concentration
Customer Sales The sum of sales to all major corporate customers divided by the supplier’s total sales.
A firm accounting for at least 10% of its supplier’s total sales is defined as a major
corporate customer.
Compustat
Customer HHI The sum of squared sales percentages to major corporate customers. Compustat
Largest Customer The sales percentage to the major corporate customer who accounts for the largest
share of the supplier’s total sales.
Compustat
Institutional Ownership
ST% The number of shares owned by short-term institutional investors divided by total
number of shares outstanding. Institutional investors whose average portfolio churn
rate over the last four quarters is higher than at least 2/3 of all institutions are defined
as short-term.
13F
LT% The number of shares owned by long-term institutional investors divided by total
number of shares outstanding. Institutional investors whose average portfolio churn
rate over the last four quarters is lower than at least 2/3 of all institutions are defined
as long-term.
13F
NCross ST% The number of shares owned by short-term institutional investors of a firm who do
not simultaneously own any of the major corporate customers of the firm, divided by
total number of shares outstanding.
13F
NCross LT% The number of shares owned by long-term institutional investors of a firm who do not
simultaneously own any of the major corporate customers of the firm, divided by total
number of shares outstanding.
13F
Trans% The number of shares owned by transient institutional investors divided by total num-
ber of shares outstanding. Transient investors are identified following Bushee’s (1998
and 2001) classification of 13F institutional investors.
Bushee’s Website
Dedi% The number of shares owned by dedicated institutional investors divided by total
number of shares outstanding. Dedicated investors are identified following Bushee’s
(1998 and 2001) classification of 13F institutional investors.
Bushee’s Website
Firm Characteristics
Size The log of market capitalization of a firm. Compustat
Tobin’s Q Total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity minus
deferred taxes divided by total assets.
Compustat
Book-to-Market Book value of equity divided by market capitalization of a firm. Compustat
Age The log of one plus the number of years since the first year the firm appears in Com-
pustat.
Compustat
Div. Yield Dividends divided by market capitalization of a firm. Compustat
Price The log of stock price. CRSP
Return−3,0 Past 3-month cumulative stock return. CRSP
Return−12,−3 9-month cumulative stock return ended 3 months prior to the fiscal year-end. CRSP
Turnover The monthly trading volume divided by total number of shares outstanding, averged
over the past year.
CRSP
Forecast Error The absolute difference between the actual EPS and the median consensus analyst
forecasts last reported prior to the fourth fiscal quarter end, scaled by the stock price
at the beginning of the fiscal quarter.
IBES
PostFD A dummy variable equal to one after the adoption of Fair Disclosure Regulation in
2000, and zero otherwise.
Customer Industry
M&A
The weighted average customer industry M&A intensity for a supplier, where industry
M&A intensity is the aggregate M&A costs divided by the aggregate sales over all firms
within an customer industry averaged over the last five years, and the weights are the
percentage of supplier’s sales to each customer industry.
Compustat
Customer Reg Index The one-year-lagged weighted average customer industry Regulation Index for a sup-
plier, where Regulation Index is an industry-wide measure computed by McLaughlin
and Sherouse (2018) counting the number of federal regulatory restrictions applicable
to each 6-digit NAICS industry, and the weights are the percentage of supplier’s sales
to each customer industry. The measure is expressed in natural log.
RegData
Short Selling Activity
Short Interest The number of shares shorted on the 15th business day of each month divided by the
total number of shares outstanding at the end of the month.
Compustat
Disp Short Interest The standard deviation of monthly short interests over the past 12 months. Compustat
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Table A.2: Variable Definitions and Data Sources for Essay 2
Variable Definition Data Source
Measures of Stock Price Crash Risk
NCSKEW Negative of the ratio of the third moment to standard deviation cubed of firm-specific
abnormal weekly returns during a fiscal year.
CRSP
DUVOL Log ratio of the standard deviation of firm-specific abnormal weekly returns of the
down weeks to that of the up weeks. Down (up) is defined as the return above (below)
the annual mean.
CRSP
Crash Count The number firm-specific weekly returns exceeding 3.09 standard deviation below the
mean firm-specific weekly return over the fiscal year.
CRSP
Measures of Competition
Peer Count The number of customer-connected peers, averaged across all customers of the sup-
plier, and transformed to natural log value. Customer-connected peers are defined
as those firms within the same Hoberg and Phillip’s (2010; 2016) text-based network




Peer Sales The sum of the customer-connected peers’ sales to each customer of the supplier,
scaled by customer’s cost of goods sold, averaged across all customers of the supplier.
Revere; Compustat
Peer Sales The sum of the customer-connected peers’ sales to each customer of the supplier,
scaled by customer’s cost of goods sold, averaged across all customers of the supplier.
Revere; Compustat
Peer Similarity The average product similarity score with all customer-connected peers, averaged
again across all customers of the supplier.
Revere; Hoberg and
Phillips (2010, 2016)
Non-Linked Peer Count The log number of total supplier peers not sharing a common customer with a supplier.
Non-Linked Peers are identified as mutual competitors of a supplier in the Revere
Relationship database (FactSet Revere) and within the same Hoberg and Phillip’s












The prior five years’ moving average of total customer M&A transaction values divided
by the customer’s total sales, weighted averaged across all customers of the supplier,
where the weights are the percentage of supplier’s sales to each customer.
SDC
Post× Treat A interaction dummy variable equal to one if the connected peers of a firm file for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy during the year, and zero otherwise.
Ma et al. (2019)
Peer Disaster A dummy variable equal to one if the connected peers of a firm are hit by a major




Peer Count (CompAl) Peer Count computed on those customer-connected supplier peers who have formed
business alliances with the focal firm, where business alliances are defined as pairs of
firms committed to any of the following forms of business relationship: (i) research
collaboration; (ii) integrated product offering; (iii) joint venture; (iv) cross-ownership
in equity stakes; (v) products, patents, and intellectual property licensing; (vi) use of
each other’s manufacturing, marketing, and distribution services.
Revere
Peer Sales (CompAl) Peer Sales computed on those customer-connected supplier peers who have formed




Peer Similarity computed on those customer-connected supplier peers who have formed
business alliances with the focal firm.
Revere
Peer Count (CusAl) Peer Count computed on those supplier peers connected to common customers who
have formed business alliances with the focal firm.
Revere
Peer Sales (CusAl) Peer Sales computed on those supplier peers connected to common customers who




Peer Similarity computed on those supplier peers connected to common customers who
have formed business alliances with the focal firm.
Revere
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Table A.2: Variable Definitions and Data Sources for Essay 2 – Continued
Variable Definition Data Source
# Inst The log number of institutional owners of the firm. 13F
Media Coverage The log number of unique news sources covering a firm over its fiscal year. Ravenpack
High Dispersion A dummy variable equal to one if analyst forecast dispersion is above the fourth quar-
tile of all firms in the same industry-year, and zero if it is below the first quartile.
Analyst forecast dispersion is defined as the standard deviation of annual EPS fore-
casts, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year.
IBES
Direct Disclosure Measures
All News Ratio of the number of firm-specific negative-news disclosure events to the number of
firm-specific positive-news disclosure events in a given year. An event is considered as
negative-news (positive-news) event if it results in a negative (positive) cumulative ab-
normal return from the Fama-French 4-factor model during the 3-day window around
the announcement (-1,1). Disclosure events are earnings announcements, conference
presentations, client announcements, earnings calls, product-related announcements,
and corporate guidance events from Capital IQ Key Development. The firm and year
observations with less than 4 events are removed.
Capital IQ
5% Significant News Ratio of the number of firm-specific negative-news disclosure events associated with
CAR(-1,1) less than -5% to the number of firm-specific positive-news disclosure events
associated with CAR(-1,1) greater than 5% in a given year.
Capital IQ
10% Significant News Ratio of the number of firm-specific negative-news disclosure events associated with
CAR(-1,1) less than -10% to the number of firm-specific positive-news disclosure events
associated with CAR(-1,1) greater than 10% in a given year.
Capital IQ
Comment Letters Number of different corporate filings in SEC from the supplier triggered a comment
letter from SEC’s review division requesting clarifications, additional information, or




An indicator equal to one if the supplier have a material restatement filed in Form
8-K in a given year, and 0 otherwise.
Audit Analytics
Size The log of market price multiplied by the number of oustanding shares outstanding. Compustat
MB Market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity. Compustat
Leverage Long-term debt divided by total assets. Compustat
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Compustat
∆ Turnover Average monthly stock turnover within a fiscal year minus that of the previous year. CRSP
AbAccr The prior three years’ moving sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals,
where discretionary accruals are estimated from the modified Jones model (Dechow,
Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995).
Compustat
Sigma The standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal-year period. CRSP
Return The mean of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal-year period. CRSP
MktShare The proportion of a fimr’s sales in the 2-digit SIC industry. . Compustat
HHI Index The sum of squared market shares of all firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry. Compustat
Fluidity A “cosine” similarity between a firm’s products and the changes in the rivals’ products,





The sum of the squared sales percentages to all major corporate customers of a firm,
where major corporate customers are those accounting for at least 10% of the firm’s
total revenue.
Compustat
Bankruptcy A dummy variable equal to one if a firm files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy during the
year, and zero otherwise.
Ma et al.(2019)
Disaster A dummy variable equal to one if a firm is hit by a major natural disaster during the




Table A.3: Additional Robustness Tests
This table reports additional robustness results from regressing supplier stock price crash risk on each proxy for
existing competition, and additional controls, as follows:
Crash Riski,t+1 = α0 + α1Connected Peer Threati,t + α2Additional Control +
K∑
k=1
βkXki,t + FEt + εi,t,
where Xki,t is a vector of controls, including size, market-to book equity value (MB), leverage, return on assets
(ROA), change in stock turnover, abnormal accruals (AbAccr), standard deviation of returns (Sigma), past stock
return, as well as year and industry fixed effects (FE). Panels A and B conduct the same analysis as Table 2 with
additional controls. Panel A controls for customer concentration, whereas Panel B replicates the panel regressions of
Table 2, except the sample excludes the global financial crisis years of 2008-2009. The three measures of connected
peer threats include Peer Count, Peer Sales, and Peer Similarity. The three measures of stock price crash risk are
NCSKEW, DUVOL, and Crash Count. t−statistics of the regression coefficients are shown in parentheses and are
computed based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. The number of observations (NObs) and adjusted
R2 are reported. Construction of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.2.
NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 Crash Countt+1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Control for Customer Concentration
Peer Countt 0.027*** 0.014*** 0.019***
(5.04) (3.96) (4.52)
Peer Salest 0.366** 0.214** 0.184*
(2.55) (2.40) (1.74)
Peer Similarityt 1.068*** 0.580*** 0.551***
(5.14) (4.45) (3.43)
Customer 0.110** 0.140*** 0.104** 0.058* 0.074** 0.053* 0.012 0.035 0.015
Concentrationt (2.22) (2.76) (2.08) (1.94) (2.42) (1.77) (0.32) (0.93) (0.40)
NObs 28,585 27,123 28,585 28,585 27,123 28,585 28,598 27,136 28,598
Adj-R2 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.018 0.017 0.017
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A.3: Additional Robustness Tests – Continued
NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 Crash Countt+1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel B: Exclude Global Financial Crisis Years 2008 and 2009
Peer Countt 0.027*** 0.014*** 0.017***
(4.72) (3.87) (3.92)
Peer Salest 0.391*** 0.229** 0.198*
(2.59) (2.42) (1.76)
Peer Similarityt 1.145*** 0.659*** 0.520***
(5.25) (4.82) (3.10)
NObs 25,241 23,948 25,241 25,241 23,948 25,241 25,252 23,959 25,252
Adj-R2 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.018 0.018 0.017
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A.4: Supplier Business Risk and Stock Price Crash Risk
This table reports results from regressing supplier stock price crash risk on each proxy for existing competition as
well as on a proxy for a supplier’s product market pricing power, as follows::
Crash Riski,t+1 = α0 + α1Connected Peer Threati,t + α2Business Riski,t +
K∑
k=1
βkXki,t + FEt + εi,t,
where Xki,t is a vector of controls, including size, market-to book equity value (MB), leverage, return on assets
(ROA), change in stock turnover, abnormal accruals (AbAccr), standard deviation of returns (Sigma), past stock
return, as well as year and industry fixed effects (FE). Business Risk of a suppiler is proxied by: (i) supplier
market power, measured as the price-cost margin scaled by sales; (ii) supplier operating risk, measured as annual
standard deviation of a firm’s quarterly operating income before depreciation over total assets; (iii) supplier operating
performance is measured by subtracting the number of positive product market news from the number of negative
product market news occurred in a calendar year. The three measures of connected peer threats include Peer Count,
Peer Sales, and Peer Similarity. The three measures of stock price crash risk are NCSKEW, DUVOL, and Crash
Count. t−statistics of the regression coefficients are shown in parentheses and are computed based on standard
errors clustered at the firm level. The number of observations (NObs) and adjusted R2 are reported. Construction
of the variables is presented in Appendix Table A.2.
NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 Crash Countt+1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Supplier Market Powert+1
Peer Countt 0.029*** 0.015*** 0.018***
(5.29) (4.27) (4.34)
Peer Salest 0.431*** 0.234** 0.203*
(2.93) (2.57) (1.81)
Peer Similarityt 1.033*** 0.535*** 0.500***
(4.84) (4.03) (3.01)
Supplier Market -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
Powert+1 (-0.76) (-1.26) (-0.54) (-0.92) (-1.47) (-0.74) (-0.86) (-1.28) (-0.75)
NObs 26,987 25,618 26,987 26,987 25,618 26,987 26,991 25,622 26,991
Adj-R2 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.018 0.018 0.018
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A.4: Supplier Business Risk and Stock Price Crash Risk – Continued
NCSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 Crash Countt+1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel B: Supplier Operating Riskt+1
Peer Countt 0.029*** 0.014*** 0.019***
(5.32) (4.16) (4.50)
Peer Salest 0.408*** 0.235*** 0.190*
(2.85) (2.66) (1.80)
Peer Similarityt 1.130*** 0.610*** 0.546***
(5.50) (4.74) (3.46)
Supplier Operating 0.821** 0.940** 0.786** 0.641*** 0.712*** 0.623*** 0.124 0.190 0.115
Riskt+1 (2.11) (2.38) (2.02) (2.69) (2.92) (2.61) (0.43) (0.64) (0.40)
NObs 25,320 23,973 25,320 25,320 23,973 25,320 25,324 23,977 25,324
Adj-R2 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.017 0.017 0.017
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Supplier Operating Performancet+1
Peer Countt 0.029*** 0.014*** 0.019***
(5.32) (4.16) (4.50)
Peer Salest 0.408*** 0.235*** 0.190*
(2.85) (2.66) (1.80)
Peer Similarityt 1.130*** 0.610*** 0.546***
(5.50) (4.74) (3.46)
Supplier Operating 0.016** 0.017*** 0.017** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.013** 0.014** 0.013**
Performancet+1 (2.47) (2.59) (2.52) (2.12) (2.21) (2.14) (2.33) (2.52) (2.47)
NObs 28,585 27,123 28,585 28,585 27,123 28,585 28,598 27,136 28,598
Adj-R2 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.018 0.017 0.018
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A.5: Variable Definitions and Data Sources for Essay 3
Variable Definition Data Source
Measures of green innovation (firm-specific)
Green Patents The natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s total number of green patents filed (and
eventually granted) during the year, where green patents are those classified as envi-
ronmentally sound technologies (ESTs) by WIPO based on their IPC patent classes
WIPO; PATSTAT
Green Cites The natural logarithm of one plus the total number of citations received by firm i’s
green patents filed (and eventually granted) during the year
WIPO; PATSTAT
Measures of green innovation (firm-county-specific)
Green PatentsLocal The natural logarithm of one plus the number of firm i’s green patents filed during
the year that have received citations from its local customers, where local customers
are those with at least one plant in county c when citing firm i’s patents
Dun & Bradstreet;
WIPO; PATSTAT
Green CitesLocal The natural logarithm of one plus the number of citations received by firm i’s green




Fluidity Constructed by Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014), which is a ”cosine” similarity
score between firm i’s own word usage in its 10-K product descriptions and the aggre-




Similarity Constructed by Hoberg and Phillips (2016), which measures the total ”cosine” sim-




Tariff A dummy variable equals to 1 for the two years after a major tariff reduction in firm
i’s industry and is equal to 0 for other years and for firms in industries without tariff
changes; tariff rates are defined as the collected duties divided by the custom value
of imports for each industry; a major tariff reduction event is defined as a decline in
the tariff rate by more than 4 times larger than the average tariff reduction of the
industry during the sample period, and it is not preceded or followed by a major tariff
increase greater than 80% of the reduction
WITS World Bank
Identification Strategy Variables
Treat A binary variable that equals 1 if a county has ever been classified as a nonattainment
area and 0 if otherwise.
EPA Green Book
Post A binary variable that equals 1 for a county during years in which the county has a
nonattainment status and 0 if otherwise.
EPA Green Book
Event A binary variable that equals 1 for a county during the year in which the county
switches from an attainment status to a nonattainment status
EPA Green Book
Measures of product differentiation, customer attraction, and other firm performance
Patent Originality One minus the sum of squared percentage of backward citations made by a patent to
each patent class (at the three-digit IPC level), averaged across all patents filed by
firm i during a year
PATSTAT
Average Similarity The average of Hoberg and Phillip’s (2016) product similarity score between firm i
and its competitors in the same TNIC industry
Hoberg-Phillips Data
Library
Total No. of Customers The natural logarithm of one plus the total number of corporate customers firm i has
in a year
Revere
No. of Local Customers The natural logarithm of one plus the total number of local corporate customers firm




The ratio of the number of corporate customers with no green patents to the number




The ratio of the number of local customers with no green patents to the number of
local customers with at least one green patent
Revere; PATSTAT
Market Share Growth Market share growth as the difference in firm i’s market share between the current
year and the previous year, scaled by the previous year’s market share
Compustat
Markup Ratio of sales to the difference of sales and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation,
and amortization
Compustat
Profit Margin Income before extraordinary items divided by sales Compustat
3-Factor BHAR One-year buy-and-hold abnormal return obtained using the Fama-French three-factor
model
CRSP




Table A.5: Variable Definitions and Data Sources for Essay 3 – Continued
Variable Definition Data Source
Control Variables
Size The natural logarithm of total assets. Compustat
TobinQ Total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity minus
deferred taxes divided by total assets.
Compustat
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets. Compustat
Tangibility Gross property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Compustat
R&D Research and development expenditures divided by total assets Compustat
CapEx Capital expenditure divided by total assets. Compustat
ROA operating income before depreciation divided by total assets Compustat
KZIndex KZ index defined as −1.002× cash flow +0.283× Tobin’s Q+3.139× Leverage
−39.368× dividends −1.315× cash holdings
Compustat
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